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Abstract 
 
 
Nostalgia has become a much-discussed phenomenon in recent times. Whether 
it be its prevalence in popular culture mediums such as film or music, or its 
effects on political and social developments in Western societies, nostalgia is 
seemingly present in most aspects of everyday life. Does this, therefore, relate 
to modern-day German society? This thesis will examine a specific type of 
nostalgia associated with the ‘old’ Federal Republic, the democratic country 
founded after the Second World War that ultimately changed once its political 
institutions extended eastwards. Otherwise known as, Westalgie, the concept 
can be considered a general term indicating nostalgia for features of everyday 
life in the FRG such as economic stability under Rhenish capitalism, political 
reticence in terms of foreign policy, and compounded with symbols of West 
German accomplishment such as the Deutschmark or the Volkswagen Beetle. 
This thesis will seek to explain how such a phenomenon has occurred in recent 
times, while also examining its impact on certain issues in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. Furthermore, it will compare and contrast Westalgie with the more 
widely acknowledged East German nostalgia, commonly referred to as Ostalgie. 
Academic literature concerning Westalgie is both lacking and underdeveloped, 
meaning this thesis will be one of the first studies to scrutinise an important and 
complex form of nostalgia in German society. Yet this specific type of nostalgia 
warrants greater investigation to help contextualise perceptions, both past and 
present, of the political, economic, and social developments in the Federal 
Republic.  
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1. Introduction: The Legacies of the Bonn Republic 
 
 
Since the reunification of Germany in 1990, nostalgia for both former German 
countries – the West German Federal Republic and the East German Democratic 
Republic – has been contentious and controversial for German citizens, 
politicians, and outside observers. Indeed, considering the success of the current 
Federal Republic in terms of political and economic achievements ever since the 
reunification of Germany, such tendencies to critique modern-day developments 
warrant some investigation. This thesis will examine a specific type of nostalgia 
associated with the ‘old’ Federal Republic, the democratic country founded after 
the Second World War that ultimately changed once its political institutions 
extended eastwards. Undoubtedly, recent interest in West Germany’s past and 
present suggests a sense of nostalgia that is more commonly referred to as 
Westalgie – formed by the German words Nostalgie and West, meaning 
‘nostalgia’ and ‘west’ respectively. It can be considered a general term 
indicating nostalgia for features of everyday life in West Germany such as 
economic stability under Rhenish capitalism, political reticence in terms of 
foreign policy, and compounded with symbols of West German 
accomplishment such as the Deutschmark or the Volkswagen Beetle.  
Interest in the legacies of ‘old’ Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), 
both public and academic, has increased steadily during the past few years. So 
much so that it seemingly parallels attention given to the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR), especially regarding the complex and convoluted concept of 
nostalgia. Yet as a relatively new phenomenon within public and academic 
discourses, research concerning Westalgie is unsurprisingly lacking. Moreover, 
academic study focussing on the Eastern counterpart to West German nostalgia 
is far more developed, covering a wider range of historiographical debates.1  
Therefore, this thesis will discuss a concept that has yet to be given 
much academic scrutiny, helping to explain its emergence as well as its 
relationship with politics and economics. More generally, the concept of 
nostalgia has become much more prevalent in Western societies than ever 
before. Academic interest in the phenomenon has unsurprisingly increased, with 
interest focussing on an extensive array of subjects such as its place in cinema, 
its prevalence in social media, as well as its impact on political developments. 
For example, the decision by the British public to leave the European Union 
arguably unearthed certain notions of nostalgia, with key figures of the Vote 
Leave campaign stressing Britain’s past as a leading figure on the world stage. 
Consequently, now more than ever it seems essential to analyse how nostalgia 																																																								
1 The Eastern counterpart to West German nostalgia is more commonly known as Ostalgie, a  
combination of the German words Nostalgie and Ost, meaning East. It, too, can refer to features 
of everyday life from the past but under the German Democratic Republic instead of the Bonn 
Republic.  
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has had an impact on developments in modern-day society. Is a sense of 
nostalgia influencing perceptions of developments in the Berlin Republic? Or 
are there more pragmatic reasons as to why political, economic, and social 
changes are being scrutinised. Consequently, this thesis will examine post 
reunification issues in the Federal Republic, while also using the history of West 
Germany to compare and contrast how different the Berlin Republic is to the 
Bonn Republic.   
 
 
From Bonn to Berlin: Changes and Consequences of Reunification 
 
 
Nostalgia can help to express displacement in a new environment whilst 
yearning for facets of the past that have changed. The reunification of Germany 
represents a change that altered the lives of German citizens in the FRG and 
GDR, helping to create a potential sense of nostalgia developing in the minds of 
East and West Germans. Germany after 1990 was different not just for East 
Germans, who had to adjust to a different way of life not akin to their socialist 
upbringing, but for West Germans as well. True, as the ‘old’ Federal Republic 
would eventually encompass the East German country, the idea of wistful 
sentimentality for West Germany may seem questionable and paradoxical. 
Since the changes in the FRG after the fall of the Wall were by far not as 
fundamental as in the GDR, it is easy to question the validity of Westalgie, or at 
the very least consider it as a reverse form of Ostalgie.2  
Although the Federal Republic had appeared to best its Communist 
counterpart, and although the institutions of the West were largely imposed on 
the East, the Berlin Republic that emerged following reunification was 
ultimately of a different nature to both the GDR and the ‘old’ FRG. Obviously, 
West Germans were less directly affected by the radical restructuring in several 
aspects of life, from employment and housing, education and welfare services, 
which faced the easterners making the leap from communism to capitalism.3 
Yet that is not to say that the impact reunification had on West Germans was 
non-existent. As Ruth Wittlinger notes, West Germans also had to become 
familiar to a different Federal Republic. For one, the Federal Republic has 
become much larger, faced new challenges such as high unemployment, budget 
deficits, and a more active German foreign policy, a stark contrast to what West 
Germans grew accustomed to between 1949-1990.4 Not only that, but the 																																																								
2 Dorothea Otto, ‘“Westalgie” in Leander Haußmann’s Herr Lehmann’, Senses of Cinema, No. 
60, (October, 2011), http://sensesofcinema.com/2011/feature-articles/“westalgie”-in-leander-
hausmann’s-herr-lehmann/, accessed 4th March 2018.  
3 Mary Fulbrook, A History of Germany 1918-2008: The Divided Nation, (Chichester, 2009), 
pp. 293-294. 
4 Ruth Wittlinger, German National Identity in the Twenty-First Century: A Different Republic 
After All?, (New York, 2010), p. 66. 
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Federal Republic has also had to contend with a wide variety of identities trying 
to assimilate within a German culture. East Germans have found it difficult to 
integrate within a dominant West German society, migrants continue to seek 
citizenship after decades of post-war immigration initiatives, and asylum 
seekers have arrived to pursue a better life in the Federal Republic. 
Multiculturalism is therefore challenging old conceptualisations of what it 
means to be ‘German’ and thus coming into conflict with a ‘West German’ 
identity in the process.  
Economic factors, too, have affected the overall development of the 
Federal Republic in more ways than one. Solidarity taxes, introduced by the 
German government to help finance the process of reunification, are sometimes 
criticised by Westerners believing they are bearing the brunt of East Germany’s 
entry into the Federal Republic. A regional German court in Hannover even saw 
it fit to label the solidarity taxes as unconstitutional.5 The Deutschmark, a 
symbol and expression of West Germany’s post-war identity, gave way to the 
Euro early in the new millennium. From the challenging circumstances under 
which the currency was born, to its overall performance concerning low 
inflation, the Deutschmark was a source of national pride for both East and 
West Germans. In the East it had a mythical status in line with its performance 
during the Wirtschaftswunder. In the West the Deutschmark characterised a 
perceived sense of identity in the form of ‘hard work’ and ‘diligence.’6 It 
became a key factor in helping West Germany recover from the Second World 
War both economically and psychologically. 
Reunification caused severe socioeconomic dislocation in certain parts 
of the Federal Republic. From the perspective of West Germans, who were 
familiarised to a certain way of living under the FRG government, reunification 
also had broad political, economic, and social consequences. With confidence 
created by the boom years of the late 1980s, as well as the experience of the 
‘economic miracle’ early in the Federal Republic’s history, the reunified 
government believed East Germany’s economic integration would be a smooth 
transition. However, the overall growth of Germany’s gross national product 
fell from 3.7 percent in 1991, to -1.1 percent in 1993. Growing deficits in their 
account balance, as well as an increase in unemployment, were more negative 
reactions to merging the East German economy with the West.7  
             In 2004, one opinion poll found that 24 percent of West Germans 
believed it would be better if the Berlin Wall were still up.8 Whilst clearly in the 																																																								
5 ‘Paying for German Reunification: Court Rules ‘Solidarity’ Tax is Unconstitutional’ Der 
Spiegel International, 25th November 2009, accessed 5th March 2015.  
6 Matthias Kaelberer, ‘Deutschmark Nationalism and Europeanised Identity: Exploring Identity 
Aspects of Germany’s Adoption of the Euro’, German Politics, Vol. 14, No. 3, (2005), p. 292.   
7 See Christopher Flockton, ‘The German Economy since 1989/1990: Problems and Prospects’, 
in Klaus Larres, Germany Since Unification, (2001, London), pp. 63-87.  
8  ‘Getting Back Together is so Hard’, The Economist, 16th September 2004, 
http://www.economist.com/node/3204021, accessed 28th February 2015.  
	 4 
minority, such viewpoints requires examination in light of Westalgie’s more 
recent appearance in the public sphere. The most basic accomplishment of the 
‘old’ FRG was a return of order after the Second World War, a recovery of 
normalcy that made it possible to resume a regular life. 9  Reunification 
invariably caused issues of four decades of separation to come to the fore rather 
quickly, leaving one former minister of Saxony to argue ‘We might be the first 
country which has, by unifying, created two peoples.’10 For West Germans the 
processes of 1990, whilst not having the same impact on East Germans, clearly 
created some tensions in reunified Germany. Because of such uncertainties, 
Westalgie has found a place in film, literature, and even popular culture. 
Germans can even tour the major sights of West Berlin in a Volkswagen Beetle, 
an obvious symbol of West German heritage.11 However, the broader effects of 
such nostalgia have yet to be given serious academic scrutiny. This thesis, 
therefore, will aim to shed greater light on the phenomenon of Westalgie, in the 
hope of contributing to academic discussions on nostalgia and its impact on 
modern-day German society.     
 
 
Nostalgia: Problems and Perspectives 
 
 
As this thesis will discuss Westalgie extensively, there is a need to recognise the 
fundamental basics of nostalgia and its overall effect on individuals and society. 
Certainly, this means understanding why people experience nostalgia, why it 
poses potential issues in the present day developments, and why the concept is 
important in relation to contemporary Germany. Nostalgia is defined as ‘A 
sentimental longing or wistful affection for the past.’ It is, according to Atia and 
Davies, a bittersweet side effect of modernity as well as a potential cause of 
hostility to the changes that modernity brings.12 Prior to its acceptance as a 
cultural phenomenon in the nineteenth century, nostalgia was deemed a medical 
condition attributed to people experiencing symptoms such as persistent 
thoughts about home, melancholy, insomnia, anorexia, anxiety, lack of breath, 
and palpitations of the heart.13 The term usually applied to those who had 
migrated from one location to another such as immigrants, soldiers, exiles, and 																																																								
9 Konrad H. Jarausch, ‘The Federal Republic at Sixty: Popular Myths, Actual Accomplishments, 
and Competing Interpretations’, in Jeffery J. Anderson and Eric Langenbacher, (eds.), From the 
Bonn to the Berlin Republic: Germany at the twentieth anniversary of Unification, (New York, 
2010), p. 19.  
10 ‘Getting Back Together is so Hard’. 
11 One tourist company, for example, offers such an experience and has dubbed it as: ‘Westalgie 
on Four Wheels’. See, http://www.berlin.de/tourismus/insidertipps/3037483-2339440-vw-
kaefer-tour-durch-berlin-westalgie-au.html, accessed 11th March 2015.  
12 Nadia Atia and Jeremy Davies, ‘Nostalgia and the Shapes of History’, Memory Studies, Vol. 
3, No. 3, (July, 2010), p. 181.  
13 Janelle L. Wilson, Nostalgia: Sanctuary of Meaning, (Lewisburg, 2005), p. 21.  
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general travellers. After all, the word itself is actually a compound of two Greek 
words: nostos, meaning ‘return home’, and algia meaning ‘longing.’14 If one 
were to abide strictly by its definition, nostalgia is in essence an extreme form 
of homesickness that can be experienced universally. Drawing on his own 
experiences, Roderick Peters links nostalgia and homesickness strongly, 
suggesting geography acts as a key determinant to an individual’s ability to 
reminisce, with the aftereffects ranging from a fleeting sadness to an 
overwhelming craving that interferes with an individual’s attempts to cope with 
their present circumstances.15 
Yet in the case of modern day Germany, a change in geography has not 
necessarily been the primal cause for the onset of nostalgia in present times. 
True, the diminishment of borders between East and West Germany highlights a 
physical change to geographical boundaries. However, the reunification of 
Germany did not involve any literal migration of citizens but rather a change in 
social, economic, cultural, and political thinking for both sides of the border. As 
such, nostalgia has come to encompass more than its literal meaning, 
emphasising the fact that it has become both a cultural phenomenon and a 
personally subjective one. 16  In contrast to Peters’ use of geography as a 
fundamental rationale for one’s nostalgic tendencies, Davis uses the transition 
of ageing from childhood to pubescence, from adolescent dependency to adult 
independence, as a suitable explanation for the potential onset of nostalgia.17 In 
truth, Peters’ and Davis’ examples are suitable justifications for nostalgia as 
they both refer to a dramatic change in one’s life to construct distinctive 
memories in an individual. It is the differentiation between the past and present 
that allows one to look back nostalgically; otherwise there would be no need to 
compare today’s realities against preceding recollections. Carrying the notion of 
change into the context of modern day Germany, reunification at the start of the 
nineties brought forth this difference that would spur on nostalgia from both 
sides of Germany. For the ‘old’ Federal Republic, change meant the extension 
of their political, economic, and social ideals eastwards to an identity shaped 
after forty years of communism 
At the same time, critiques of nostalgia are certainly well documented 
amongst academics, novelists and psychoanalysts, with the common objection 
being nostalgia’s risk of creating false recollections of the past, as well as its 
potential to overlook and underplay important historical evidence. Doris 
Lessing, for example, described nostalgia as a ‘poisoned itch’, with its sense of 
pleasure when scratching it eventually making matters worse for the recipient.18 																																																								
14 Timothy Barney, ‘When We Was Red: Goodbye Lenin! and Nostalgia for the “Everyday 
GDR”’, Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, (June, 2009), p. 135.  
15 Roderick Peters, ‘Reflections on the Origin and Aim of Nostalgia’, Journal of Analytical 
Psychology, Vol. 30, No. 2, (April, 1985), p. 135.  
16 Wilson, Nostalgia, p. 30.  
17 Fred Davis, Yearning For Yesterday: A Sociology of Nostalgia, (new York, 1979), p. 49.  
18 Dorris Lessing, ‘The Memoirs of a Survivor’, (London, 1976), p. 7.  
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Indeed, coupled with such criticisms of the concept is the fear that prolonged or 
overbearing nostalgia could potentially constrict one’s ability to act in the 
present.19 In his analysis of nostalgia and the certain issues that emanate from it, 
David Lowenthal highlights three specific critiques: firstly, the 
commercialisation of nostalgia and the inauthenticity felt to accompany it. 
Second is nostalgia’s sense of unreality that pervades truths about the past. And 
lastly, its reactionary slant that glosses over the past’s iniquities and 
indignities.20 By this logic, nostalgia’s virtues are exaggerated and are instead 
overshadowed by complicated problems emanating from remembering the past 
too fondly; this, too, is especially pertinent when the past includes controversial 
historical evidence. 
It should be noted, however, that recent literature concerning nostalgia, 
in particular Ostalgie, has developed to consider a wider array of issues. In fact, 
the terms ‘nostalgia’ and ‘identity’ are often used in conjunction with one 
another to explain one’s tendencies to recollect past memories. According to 
Fred Davis, nostalgia is one of the means we employ in the never-ending work 
of constructing, maintaining, and reconstructing our identities. 21  Russian 
citizens, for example, experienced a nostalgic wave concerning the Soviet era 
but in a manner to restore a collective sense of belonging and to re-establish 
cultural connections with the past that would be neither horrifying nor 
humiliating.22 It can be, therefore, useful to help develop and foster identities 
amongst individuals who feel displaced in their current surroundings. Of course, 
this can only apply if such memories share a commonality amongst individuals, 
even if said commonality can be considered arbitrary or tangential. In the 
context of West Germans who may experience forms of Westalgie, such 
decisions to reminisce can be construed as a form of identity building in a new 
and different environment, especially considering Germany’s complicated 
history regarding German national identity. In short, nostalgia is a complex 
concept that is either praised for its ability to form identities amongst 
individuals or criticised for its lack of forward thinking.  
Nostalgia is largely an expression of displacement in contemporary 
times, indicating strong affection for past memories. Westalgie is very much 
explained by changing circumstances that, in the eyes of West Germans, have 
not been positive. Though not a universal representation of how all West 
Germans view their current situation in the contemporary Federal Republic, one 
commentator notes, ‘We West Germans had the better land. We had a country 
that was better than the GDR before reunification, and we had a country that 
																																																								
19 Atia and Davies, ‘Nostalgia’, p. 181.  
20 David Lowenthal, ‘Nostalgia Tells it like it Wasn’t’, in Christopher Shaw and Malcolm 
Chase, (eds.), The Imagined Past: History and Nostalgia, (Manchester, 1989), pp. 21-22.  
21 Fred, Yearning, p. 31.  
22 See Sergei Alex Oushakine, “‘We’re Nostalgic But We’re Not Crazy’: Retrofitting the past in 
Russia, The Russian Review, 66 (July, 2007), pp. 451-482.  
	 7 
was better than the one in which we live today.’23 In a similar fashion, another 
West German citizen stated that Ossies were different and strange compared to 
Westerners.24 Such appraisal for the FRG and its citizens, as well as criticisms 
of the current German political and social landscape, highlights a notable 
difference between the Bonn and Berlin Republic.   
 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
Unlike academic literature pertaining to Ostalgie, where critiques and 
discussions about its place in modern day Germany are widely available, there 
lacks a similar amount of the engagement regarding Westalgie. Little has been 
written about how widely circulated Westalgie has spread since the fall of the 
Wall, nor has there been much discussion on whether such nostalgia has 
damaged – or is still damaging – the processes of inner German unity. Yet 
although scholarly research regarding Westalgie is lacking compared to 
Ostalgie, there exists a solid foundation of literature to analyse and critique. For 
instance, works detailing depictions of Westalgie in mediums such as literature 
and film are indeed available. Andrew Plowman cites works such as Dorothea 
Dieckmann’s Damen & Herren (2002) and Jess Jochimsen’s Das Dosenmilch-
Trauma. Bekenntnisse eines 68er-Kindes (2000) as clear evidence that some 
form of nostalgia is inherent in West German literature, particularly in popular 
literary discourses since the mid-nineties.25 Similarly, in regards to cinema 
commentators have noted that, much like Ostalgie’s emergence in German films 
such as Sonnenallee and Goodbye Lenin!, West German nostalgia makes an 
appearance in Oskar Roehler’s Die Unberührbare  or Leander Haußmann’s 
Herr Lehmann.26 
  It is, in fact, critical evaluations of Westalgie that are lacking in 
academic discourses, from its effect on developments in recent times, to 
rationalisations as to why it has appeared less palpably than Ostalgie. There are, 
however, useful examples of criticisms towards nostalgia for the Federal 
Republic, particularly more so at the start of the millennium than in 
contemporary times. In line with earlier criticisms that have often been 
associated with academic literature concerning nostalgia, Tobias Dürr attaches 																																																								
23  Christoph Schröder, ‘Mein Land ist weg!’, Die Zeit, 28th October 2014, 
http://www.zeit.de/kultur/2014-10/brd-wiedervereinigung-polemik, accessed 27th February 
2015.  
24 ‘West Berlin Recalls ‘Island of Freedom’ that Vanished with Wall’, Reuter, 7th November 
2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/08/us-germany-wall-westberlin-
idUSKBN0IR1EX20141108, accessed 7th May 2015.  
25 Andrew Plowman, ‘Westalgie? Nostalgia for the 'Old’ Federal Republic in Recent German 
Prose’, A Journal of Germanic Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3, (2004), pp. 249-261.  
26 Otto, “Westalgie”.  
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negative connotations to Westalgie. By doing so, he links nostalgia with a West 
German mentality, stubborn and lacking the ability to look forward instead of 
backwards. According to Dürr, because the West German Bonn Republic was 
undoubtedly a successful model in the years between 1949 and 1989/1990, there 
is an almost irresistible temptation for the majority of West Germans to imagine 
the present and the future as an almost seamless sequel to a well-persevered 
past.27 Westalgie is therefore a ‘West German’ problem, creating a mentality 
devoid of self-criticism and leading to a dominant West German consciousness 
that is blocking timely changes in politics, economics, and society for Germany 
as a whole. Above all, Dürr contends that it is this form of nostalgia that has 
prevented East Germans to successfully acclimate alongside West Germans in 
the Berlin Republic.  
  Nevertheless, there are a few facts to take into account. Firstly, as 
previously mentioned, recent literature has developed beyond criticisms of 
nostalgia, with Ostalgie in particular coming under less scrutiny compared to 
when it first emerged in the East German consciousness.28 From an academic 
perspective, the perception that nostalgia restricts one’s ability in forward 
thinking has changed significantly. More recent studies have, in an attempt to 
challenge the hegemonic view that nostalgia is inherently bad for the individual, 
sought to seek alternative uses for nostalgia. From identity building, providing 
existential meaning, and offering overall general comfort, nostalgia’s virtues are 
more often than not highlighted with a greater degree of optimism than before. 
Moreover, Germans have always had a long-standing preoccupation with social 
integration. Not only did Germany absorb those ethnic Germans expelled from 
the East after World War Two, but since reunification, also Spätaussiedler (late 
resettlers) who had been trapped in socialist countries. Former guest workers, 
immigrants, and refugees must also be considered when discussing social 
integration in a German context.29 Criticisms levelled at West Germans by Dürr 
are primarily focussed on the interaction between East and West Germans 
whilst not including historical outsider groups such as immigrants and former 
guest workers that may or may not have become recently naturalised German 
citizens. The progression of social integration is largely a two-way process, 
requiring reciprocal levels of understanding from all parties involved. Indeed, 
Dürr chooses to not apply similar critiques to Ostalgie, but rather suggests that 
East Germans are victims of West Germany’s own identity of successful 
economic and political heritage.  																																																								
27 Tobias Dürr, ‘On “Westalgia”: Why West German Mentalities and Habits Persist in the Berlin 
Republic’, in Dieter Dettke, (ed.), The Spirit of the Berlin Republic, (New York, 2003), p. 41.  
28 See, for example, Claire Hyland, ‘Ostalgie Doesn’t Fit!: Individual Interpretations of and 
Interaction with Ostalgie’, in Anna Saunders and Debbie Pinfold, (eds.), Remembering and 
Rethinking the GDR: Multiple Perspectives and Plural Authenticities. (Basingstoke, 2013), pp. 
101-115; see also Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, (New York, 2002).  
29 Hilary Silver, ‘The Social Integration of Germany since Unification’, in From the Bonn to the 
Berlin Republic, p. 183.  
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Yet research conducted by Anja Vogel analysing communicative 
practises of inter-generational and cross-German (East and West) interactions 
during classes of contemporary German History in Berlin high schools, 
addressed the question of national identity formation among Berlin youth. The 
research concluded that it was in fact older East Germans that formalised their 
own eastern identities through the uses of pronouns such as ‘we’ and ‘they’.30 
Vogel concludes that mentalities preoccupied with pre-reunification sentiment 
were more likely to be associated with East Germans as opposed to West 
Germans due to the great ruptures in the personal and professional lives of 
Easterners. The use of pronouns, though subtle and partially subconscious, 
suggests a stronger sense of identity amongst East Germans as opposed to West 
Germans and even those that chose to identify strongly with the Berlin 
Republic. Vogel concludes that West German teachers, having gone through 
fewer and rather minimal social, political, and economic changes over the last 
twenty years, are not faced with the same dilemma and are more inclined to not 
reinforce identities through the use of language. It should be noted that young 
students, however, did not automatically adopt their teacher’s stance on national 
identity. The post-unification-born students of this study exhibited a growing 
disinterest in personalising and identifying with a divided German past – East or 
West. Their primary focus and identification was increasingly with a unified 
German nation. 
  These findings suggest that both Ostalgie and Westalgie are a 
generational phenomenon, having an obviously greater impact on those that 
lived during Germany’s four decades of separation. Of course, this does not 
suggest that such forms of nostalgia have to be overcome by the older 
generations of East and West Germans. Instead, both Roger Cook and Elena 
Pourtova suggest that nostalgia may be a necessary transitional step towards a 
united German nation, with Cook arguing it may help to allay the latent 
insecurities that have kept Germany locked into pre-reunification modes of 
fragmented identity.31 Using nostalgia for the Soviet Union amongst Russian 
citizens as a case study, Pourtova notes that nostalgia can help as a tool for 
retrospection as opposed to simple wistful sentimentality. In other words, 
nostalgia is the comprehension of one’s own past in order to better understand 
the present.32 The process of nostalgia, according to Pourtova, is an act of 
maturity in so far as it will allow the individual to come to terms with the past, 
allowing new identities to foster in the process.33 Much like an immigrant can 																																																								
30 See Anja Vogel, ‘Negotiating German Identities in Classroom Interaction – An Analysis of 
Pronoun Use’, in Donald Backman and Aida Sakalauskaite, (eds.), Ossi Wessi, (Newcastle upon 
Tyne, 2008), pp. 143-171.  
31 Roger F. Cook, ‘Recharting the Skies Above Berlin: Nostalgia East and West’, German 
Politics and Society, Vol. 23, No. 1, (Spring, 2005), p. 55.  
32 Elena Pourtova, ‘Nostalgia and Lost Identity’, Journal of Analytical Psychology, Vol. 58, No. 
1, (February, 2013), p. 38.  
33 Ibid, p. 48.  
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lament the loss of one’s past heritage when moving to a new environment, 
nostalgia helps to bridge the gap between past sentimentalities and present day 
circumstances. True, such processes are by no means universal; every individual 
can potentially react to nostalgia differently, thereby making the process of a 
collective post-wall identity amongst older Germans problematic. Yet for the 
generations of Germans that lived in a divided country, one of nostalgia’s key 
factors may help to create a greater sense of identity since Germany reunified.   
  Plowman, on the other hand, suggests that Westalgie was used early on 
to emphasise the differences between the West German government and the 
Berlin Republic following 1990.34 The continuity between the two republics has 
become more contested considering the social and political realities of the post-
reunification era. As such, nostalgia has existed – more specifically in literature 
according to Plowman – as a form of social analysis to distinguish the 
differences between the Bonn and Berlin Republic. Westalgie is complex in the 
sense that its can vary from person to person. It is clear that nostalgia for the 
‘old’ Federal Republic serves a multitude of functions. It validates a former way 
of life, reaffirms personal and communal identity, and provides amusement and 
distraction from contemporary life.35 In this thesis, focus will be given to 
rationalising the more recent interest in West Germany’s heritage. It, too, will 
seek to answer why West Germany is viewed more nostalgically more recently 
and why, in comparison to Ostalgie, did this not occur quickly after 
reunification. To what extent is the former West Germany viewed 
nostalgically?; and what can this tell us about the processes of inner German 
unity?  
Additionally, though nostalgia for both West and East Germany do share 
similar traits, such as its perceived detachment from the current Federal 
Republic, Westalgie is its own unique phenomenon. For example, an argument 
against Ostalgie suggests that it encourages detachment from democratic 
institutions in favour of a return to a totalitarian dictatorship. As the FRG’s 
political principles were kept once the transition of reunification occurred, there 
is by no means any political rejection of democratic values associated with 
Westalgie. Consequently, there is a need to treat both sets of nostalgic 
occurrences differently in spite of certain similarities between the two.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
34 Plowman, ‘Westalgie?’, p. 251.  
35 Mary Elizabeth O’Brien, Post-Wall German Cinema and National Identity: Utopianism and 
Dissent, (New York, 2012), p. 29.  
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Structure 
 
 
The introduction to this thesis has been used to contextualise the concept of 
Westalgie in modern times. As stated, the intention of this thesis is to explain 
the recent emergence of nostalgia for the Bonn Republic and how it has 
impacted political, economic and social developments over time. It also seeks to 
demonstrate its existence in not only the political and economic sphere, but in 
wider mediums such as film and literature. In order to rationalise such 
developments, this thesis will need to engage with several facets of West 
Germany’s history, namely its economic and political history, providing greater 
context to how and why Westalgie’s appearance has become more 
acknowledged over the last few years.  
Even though this thesis will discuss Westalgie extensively, it is still 
important and necessary to analyse Ostalgie and its place in modern day 
Germany. It, too, is necessary to compare the two phenomenon together, as they 
both can function as a way for East and West Germans to assimilate a sense of 
identity in reunified Germany.  Therefore, the first chapter will be dedicated to 
nostalgia for the GDR, discussing how it emerged, why such a phenomenon 
occurred so soon after Germany reunified, as well as its relevance in today’s 
time politically and socially. Indeed, as scholarly research concerning Ostalgie 
is much more pervasive, this chapter will mainly analyse the debates 
surrounding its appearance in contemporary Germany, from fears concerning its 
ability to undermine democratic institutions, to doubts about how authentic the 
commodification of Ostalgie has become. It is important not to assume that both 
forms of nostalgia for its respective countries are the same. Ostalgie emerged 
largely because of issues created by German reunification. Westalgie, on the 
other hand, is a much more recent issue, related more to economic and political 
developments later in the history of the Federal Republic.  
Following on from this, the next chapter will detail the political history 
of the Bonn Republic, detailing the transition from West Germany to the 
inclusion of the Eastern states after 1990.  Not only will this chapter provide 
historical context to the history of the FRG, but also it will critically assess 
whether Westalgie can be explained by political changes since the reunification 
of Germany. In light of changes to German foreign policy, such as aiding the 
War on Terror, assessing the public’s reactions to governmental policies 
through the use of opinion polls can help to assess any link between nostalgia 
and political actions. Understanding West German nostalgia’s relationship with 
politics, too, requires examination into election results of the Federal Republic, 
both on a local and Federal level. Considering changes to Germany’s political 
culture since reunification, such as the move from Bonn to Berlin, analysing 
how the German political system has changed since reunification will help 
create a wider understanding as to whether Westalgie is linked with politics or 
not.  
	 12 
The next chapter will focus on Westalgie from an economic viewpoint 
such as West Germany’s relationship with the Euro. Due to the symbolic nature 
of the Deutschmark, as an image of Germany’s post-war economic recovery and 
overall stability, it seems necessary to discuss the country’s preoccupation with 
its former currency as well as the Common Currency.  Plenty of opinion polls 
suggest that the Deutschmark is viewed in higher regard than the Euro, 
especially since the country fell into recession between 2008 and 2013. Indeed, 
such perceptions of the Deutschmark, along with its circulation around 
Germany even a decade after its replacement with the Euro, indicates some 
linkage with the German populace and Westalgie.36 Matthias Kaelberer argues 
that money serves as a tool for governments to solidify feelings of national 
belonging and identity among citizens of a country.37 Consequently, Germany’s 
relationship with the Deutschmark will be closely scrutinised, creating a broader 
sense of whether Westalgie is intimately connected to the economic success of 
the ‘old’ Federal Republic. Using empirical data such as opinion polls, and 
collecting data from focus groups in Germany, this thesis can help to gain a 
greater understanding of how the Deutschmark is viewed in modern times. This, 
above all, will reveal if nostalgia for West Germany can be rationalised by 
economic heritage.     
  Following on from economics, the next chapter will analyse whether 
nostalgia for the ‘old’ West Germany has had an impact on German 
multiculturalism. Indeed, more recent criticisms of multiculturalism may 
suggest some form of nostalgia for a time where discussions on immigrant 
integration and assimilation were far less complex and underdeveloped. 
However, it can be argued that West Germany was always a multicultural 
society, meaning that West German nostalgic criticisms of the Federal 
Republic’s immigration policies are either incorrect or are presented in a rose-
tinted fashion. Indeed, as German multiculturalism has been criticised more and 
more, especially, since the early 2010s, it is necessary to understand if nostalgia 
for West Germany has had an impact on critical discourses against immigration 
as well as the integration of foreigners.  
  The final chapter will focus more specifically on the city of West 
Berlin and how nostalgia has affected its inhabitants. As some examples of 
West Berlin nostalgia have been considered examples of Westalgie, it seems 
essential to analyse if that is truly the case. After all, West Berlin was unique in 
the sense that it was considered a part of West Germany but not actually 
geographically located within its borders. It is therefore likely that West 																																																								
36 In 2012, it was reported that around thirteen billion Deutschmarks were in circulation within 
Germany, with many traders still willingly accepting Deutschmarks instead of the Euro. For 
more, see ‘Die Mark ist nicht totzukriegen’, Stern, 28th February 2012, 
http://www.stern.de/wirtschaft/news/10-jahre-dm-aus-die-mark-ist-nicht-totzukriegen-
1792861.html, accessed 28th February 2015.  
37 Kaelberer, ‘Deutschmark Nationalism and Europeanised Identity’, p. 283.  
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Berliners developed their own sense of identity that while linked with West 
Germany was fundamentally different overall. This notably frames nostalgia for 
West Berlin in a different context to Westalgie as both sets of phenomenon refer 
to two different and distinct areas. Consequently, it is more probable that West 
Berlin nostalgia is separate from nostalgia for West Germany, highlighting a 
complex feature of Westalgie.  
  Yet the complexity of nostalgia for the ‘old’ West Germany is not just 
found when discussing the city of West Berlin. Overall, Westalgie is a 
multifaceted concept that is far more nuanced on closer inspection. Criticisms of 
developments that have occurred in the Berlin Republic’s history can in certain 
instances, be explained by some notions of nostalgia for West Germany, but 
also for pragmatic concerns as well. After all, if one were assume that nostalgia 
helps to critique modern-day issues while referencing the past, then one must 
also assume that a large number of people are also nostalgic for the ‘old’ West 
Germany. This, of course, is problematic, as criticisms of contemporary issues 
are not always influenced by nostalgic tendencies.  It is this point that outlines 
the difficulty in examining Westalgie. It is not simply a Western counterpart to 
Ostalgie as some may assume, but rather its own separate concept. The 
complexities of nostalgia for the ‘old’ West German will therefore be noted 
heavily within this thesis, as it is clear that Westalgie needs far more academic 
research to discuss its impact on contemporary German society.  
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2. Ostalgie: East German Nostalgia and Identity 
 
 
If there were no ‘good old days’ as one scholar puts it, then why long for 
them?38 Indeed, such a phrase is perhaps misleading as it suggests life in the 
German Democratic Republic was incessantly dreadful. In certain respects this 
was in fact true; life expectancy in the GDR, for example, lagged behind West 
German figures particularly amongst men.39 Yet the very fact that nostalgia for 
East Germany exists suggests that there were some positive aspects that both 
East and West Germans can acknowledge. Ostalgie has developed varying 
definitions since its arrival so soon after reunification. For some, it represents a 
GDR past that never was, or at the very least a selective past that ignores certain 
aspects. For others, it represents a marketing ploy aimed at tourists or nostalgic 
East Germans; many have profited from Ostalgie’s appearances in mainstream 
mediums such as film and cinema. Yet an ideal way to define East German 
nostalgia is to link it with the process of identity formation amongst Easterners 
after reunification. After the events of 1989/1990, the lives of East Germans 
changed drastically. A reunification process, largely led by West Germans, 
removed facets of the East German regime quickly. In the midst of such loss, 
nostalgia helped to cultivate an Eastern presence within the Berlin Republic. 
Therefore, the Trabant, once derided for being substandard compared to 
Western innovation, became a symbol of pride for many East Germans; 
television programmes concerning the GDR came to prominence, and a 
resurgence in East German products, from clothes to board games, helped to 
establish an East German consumer culture.   
This chapter will analyse the more widely documented phenomenon 
known as Ostalgie. It seeks to clarify the various rationalisations for Ostalgie’s 
appearance, but ultimately suggests reunification as a primary facilitator overall. 
Moreover, scholars have attempted to explain Ostalgie as a way to 
conceptualise an ‘eastern identity’ in reaction to their heritage and past being 
overlooked.40 Can the same be said of Westalgie to appropriate a ‘Western 
identity’ in a similar fashion? Following on, the next section will detail 
depictions of Ostalgie in the form of various mediums since its emergence in 
the early nineties. The chapter will then conclude with how Ostalgie relates to 																																																								
38 Barney, ‘When We Was Red’, p. 135.   
39 Tobias Vogt calculates that without reunification, East German men on average would have 
died 6 years earlier whilst woman would have lived 4 years fewer. See, Tobias Vogt, ‘How 
Many Years of Life did the Berlin Wall Add?: A Projection of East German Life Expectancy’, 
Gerontology, Vol. 59, No. 3, (February, 2013), pp. 276-82.  
40 See, for example, Claire Hyland, ‘The Era Has Passed, But it’s Nice to Remember: Eastern 
Identifications with the GDR Past and Unified Germany’, in David Clarke & Ute Wölfel, (eds.), 
Remembering the German Democratic Republic: Divided Memory in a United Germany, (New 
York, 2011), pp. 144-156; Daphne Berdahl, ‘(N)Ostalgie for the Present: Memory, Longing, 
and East German Things, Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 64, No. 2, (1999), pp. 192-211. 
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politics in the Federal Republic. Much like East Germans felt after reunification, 
West Germans had to mourn a life that changed by various different factors. 
Nostalgia for the Federal Republic, one can argue, occurred because the Berlin 
Republic contrasted heavily with the Bonn Republic. In this respect Ostalgie 
shares a common trait with its West German counterpart. At its most 
fundamental level, nostalgia for East Germany can help to remember facets of 
the GDR in a positive light. The notion that Ostalgie helps to create an ‘East 
German identity’ is also significant when analysing its effect on East Germans. 
This Eastern nostalgia therefore developed an identity that was unique 
compared to the West but also highlighted the positive aspects of East 
Germany’s heritage. Concerning Westalgie, the process of identity formation is 
somewhat parallel to Ostalgie. Both rely upon shared experiences to shape a 
distinctive sense of self and both required the consequences of change to 
rationalise the desire to do so. More contemporary examples of West Berlin 
nostalgia such as the recent museum exhibition entitled ‘West Berlin – an Island 
Looking for the Mainland’ can be rationalised as a reactive psychological 
process to foster a West Berlin identity. Social networking websites, too, 
suggest the convergence of citizens drawing upon their own experiences to 
share among likeminded groupings.  
However, Ostalgie has sometimes been interpreted as a backward 
looking reaction to modernity, especially in the early years following 
reunification. It is also criticised for trivialising the controversial GDR past in 
favour of kitschy fads and financial initiatives whilst ignoring the government’s 
infringement on human rights or the role of the Stasi in everyday life. In defence 
of Ostalgie, certain scholars have argued that such nostalgia simply refers to 
features of everyday life in the GDR, rather than its most controversial facets. 
For example, Dominic Boyer acknowledges that East Germans have been 
fixated on the past but resists the urge to codify such actions under the term 
Ostalgie. Instead, he attributes examples of GDR nostalgia as remembrance of 
an individual’s youth, or the grief amongst older generations of East Germans at 
the foreclosure of the utopian and humanitarian fantasy of socialism. In essence, 
he argues that a longing for the GDR is by no means a desire to return to the 
social, political, and economic policies of the past.41 It is, therefore, more 
likely that Ostalgie can be considered a form of introspection to the GDR past, 
thus helping to cultivate an East German identity in the process. Ostalgic 
tendencies therefore highlight a sense of meaning for Easterners, especially in 
regard to how the reunification of Germany changed and altered the lives of 
East Germans. 
 
 
 																																																								
41 See Dominic Boyer, ‘Ostalgie and the Politics of the Future in Eastern Germany’, Public 
Culture, Vol. 18, no. 2, (Spring, 2016) pp. 361-381.     
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The Immediate Origins of Ostalgie 
 
 
Even one year on from reunification talk of nostalgia for the German 
Democratic Republic was noticeable.42 The reunification of Germany had a 
deep impact on groups of East Germans accustomed to a certain way of life. Not 
only were their core political and economic beliefs eroded along with the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, but East Germans soon faced the startling reality that 
reunification would have prolonged after-effects. What was initially believed to 
be the reframing together of a single ethnocultural community, and the 
reclassification of East Germans as citizens of the Federal Republic, became 
something different and unique.43 As noticeable cultural differences between 
Eastern and Western Germans re-emerged, the euphoria caused by reunification 
and the meaning of ‘Ein Volk’ became challenged in public discourses. The 
immediate origins of Ostalgie can therefore be traced to the changing 
circumstances of Easterners following the events of 1989/1990. Differences 
ranging from economic difficulties, fragmented identities, and integrating into a 
Western society helped to create and develop a feeling of nostalgia amongst 
former East German citizens. Though nostalgia for the German Democratic 
Republic can be expressed through material goods, it also alludes to a loss of 
community associated with GDR socialisation. As such, Ostalgie is both a 
material and cultural phenomenon, touching upon wider questions of the 
process of growing unity of Germans, the prospects of a common national 
identity, and the development of a common political culture in the Federal 
Republic.44 
Labelled by Daphne Berdahl as a ‘Symbolic resistance to Western 
hegemony,’45 Ostalgie is ultimately a product of German reunification. The 
term became part of the East German public’s lexicon rather quickly owing to a 
series of changes brought on by the fall of the Berlin Wall. For the ‘old’ Federal 
Republic, change meant the extension of their political, economic, and social 
ideals eastwards to an identity shaped by forty years of communism. In the East, 
however, this sense of change was much more pronounced with the 
aforementioned extension of the FRG’s principles, as well as the complete 
dismissal of everyday GDR products. The remarkable pace of Germany’s 																																																								
42 An article from Der Spiegel, for example, highlights how quickly East Germans became 
disillusioned from living in the ‘new’ Federal Republic, arguing that a type of GDR nostalgia 
could “break out”. For more, see Rolf Schneider, ‘Von linker Melancholie’, Der Spiegel, 19th 
August 1991, http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13489018.html, accessed 26th June 2015.   
43 Elaine Kelly, ‘Reflective Nostalgia and Diasporic Memory: Composing East Germany after 
1989’, in Anna Saunders and Debbie Pinfold, (eds.), Remembering and Rethinking the GDR: 
Multiple Perspectives and Plural Authenticities, (New York, 2013), p. 116.  
44 Carsten Zelle, ‘Ostalgie? National and Regional Identifications in Germany after Unification’, 
IGS Discussion Papers Series Number 97/10, (September, 1997), p. 1.  
45 Daphne Berdahl, On the Social Life of Postsocialism: Memory, Consumption, Germany, 
(Bloomington, 2010), p. 51.  
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reunification quickly overturned the GDR’s heritage in favour of West 
Germany’s free market system coupled with stylish and modern consumer 
products.  
One important differentiation between the GDR and the post-reunified 
Germany refers to the economic situation of the Federal Republic after 1990, 
arguably the most immediate issue that helped foster nostalgia for East 
Germany. From an economic viewpoint, reunification had a great amount of 
expectations coming from former GDR citizens. As West Germans began to 
enjoy the profits of the post-war economic miracle, and the ever-increasing 
range of consumer goods, Easterners looked on fully aware that their 
government could not keep up with the West economically.46 As such, it was 
assumed that unification, at least economically, would be a quick process for 
East Germans. Yet soon after reunification, the East German Länder had to 
accept a monetary and banking system regulated by the Bundesbank as well as 
the break-up and privatisation of state monopolies by the Treuhandanstalt.47 
One of the consequences of the transition from a planned to a market economy 
was a large decline in production in the east particularly in agriculture and 
industry. Unemployment rose rapidly during 1990-1995 from 2.7 percent to 14 
percent; the number of job creation schemes increased from 5,000 to 419,000; 
and a greater amount of East Germans decided to retire early after 1990.48 
Unemployment figures in the East also contrasted with the West. For example, 
unemployment in 1994 stood at 15 percent in the Eastern states compared to 7.4 
percent in the West.49 Women were particularly hit harder by the changing 
economic system as they usually worked in industries impacted more by 
reunification. Subsequently, unemployment among East German women in 
1994 reached an annual average of 21.5 percent, almost twice as high as the rate 
among men.50 To help finance the overall cost of reunification, the Kohl 
government introduced ‘temporary’ solidarity taxes to each individual’s tax bill 
that was to be paid by both East and West Germans.   
Change, as emphasised by Peters and Davies, is a key determinant for 
nostalgia. The variation in an individual’s life can be either positive or negative; 
but it must be significant enough for one to clearly differentiate between the 
past and the present. East Germans experienced a startling change 
economically, stressing the point that the Federal Republic was indeed different 																																																								
46 Paul Cooke, Representing East Germany Since Unification: From Colonisation to Nostalgia, 
(Oxford, 2005), p. 146.  
47 David G. Williamson, Germany Since 1815: A Nation Forged and Renewed, (Basingstoke, 
2005), p. 372.  
48 Gerhard A. Ritter, The Price of German Unity: Reunification and the Crisis of the Welfare 
State, (Oxford, 2011), pp. 83-85.  
49 Alexander Neubacher and Michael Sauga, ‘Germany’s Disappointing Reunification: How the 
East was Lost’, Der Spiegel International, 1st July 2010, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-s-disappointing-reunification-how-the-
east-was-lost-a-703802.html, accessed 8th July 2015.  
50 Ritter, The Price of German Unity, p. 84.  
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to the former GDR. The economic legacy of reunification is presented as a 
painful experience for both East and West Germans. Yet for East Germans the 
process was made much harder due to such a dynamic shift in everyday life not 
solely limited to economics. While in the past the FRG has been seen in the East 
as an attractive model, reality after reunification could not keep up with the 
supposed image of Western superiority against dormant and monotonous 
socialism. As Lowenthal notes, ‘A perpetual staple of nostalgic yearning is the 
search for a simple and stable past as a refuge from the turbulent chaotic 
present.’51 In this regard, Ostalgie can provide a sense of psychological comfort 
in times of great distress – and in this specific case, economic distress.   
At the same time, nostalgia for the former GDR also tackles more 
complex issues of identity in reunified Germany. Nostalgia is readily employed 
by individuals to construct and form their identities.52 It can provide a sense of 
social connectedness upon a collective group of people who experience 
nostalgia, thereby providing more positive associations with the past.53 Without 
a sense of identity, a person’s history and past experiences can be left 
redundant. Such fears quickly resonated strongly with the East German 
populace, with many aspects of the GDR vanishing after reunification. The pace 
of unification, in which the implementation of the West German social, 
economic, and political system took all but ten months, left very little trace of 
the socialist GDR.54 In line with the fast reunification process had on the ‘new’ 
Federal Republic, East German products vanished almost instantly, leading one 
East German to comment, ‘It wasn’t just that we all only wanted to have the 
nice western products. Rather there were no eastern products to buy.’ In this 
sense, such deliberate removal of GDR products rendered the entire eastern 
experience obsolete.55 
The ‘turbulent chaotic present’ that Lowenthal mentions can refer to the 
experiences of East Germans after reunification. With such a rupture in the lives 
of East German citizens, the aforementioned speed of German reunification 
quickly reduced the heritage of the GDR to a totalitarian state with little to 
remember about. The consequences of reunification also meant a total shift in 
everyday life for East Germans. Generous maternity leave, funds for expectant 
mothers, and state-provided childcare gave way after reunification, removing 
normative socialist values that had remained constant since the establishment of 
the German Democratic Republic.56 Such changes to the lives of GDR citizens 																																																								
51 Lowenthal, ‘Nostalgia Tells it like it Wasn’t’, p. 21. 
52 Davis, Yearning For Yesterday, p. 31.  
53 See Jacob Juhl, et al., ‘Fighting the Future with the Past: Nostalgia Buffers Existential 
Threat’, Journal of Research in Personality, Vol. 44, Issues 3, pp. 309-314. 
54 Claire Hyland, ‘Ostalgie Doesn’t Fit!’, p. 103. 
55 Berdahl, Social Life of Postsocialism, p. 50.  
56 Paul Kubicek, ‘The Diminishing Relevance of Ostalgie 20 Years after Reunification’, in 
Katharina Gerstenberger and Jana Evans Braziel, (eds.), After the Berlin wall: Germany and 
Beyond, (New York, 2011), p. 89.  
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were perceived as negating their heritage and identity in a post-reunification 
setting. In the GDR, the workplace was not only a centre of everyday sociality; 
it was also a symbolic space of community and national belonging. For 
example, factory-sponsored field trips often provided the only opportunities for 
families to travel away from home. Also, many East German factories housed a 
day-care centre, a general store, and even a doctor’s office on factory grounds.57 
The centrality of the workplace as a social hub helped to create an identity even 
in the face of oppression against the East German government. Yet as soon as 
the GDR fell, very little remained socially, politically, or economically.   
  Such change is naturally attributed to reunification; more specifically, 
a West German-led reunification process. It was, indeed, a one-sided 
progression that formulated a sense of difference between East and West 
Germans. Yet one also infers a sense of arrogance amongst not just West 
German citizens, but West German politicians, for simply opting to maintain the 
more successful of the two systems out of the FRG and the GDR. Instead of the 
drafting of a new constitution for both East and West Germany, reunified 
Germany decided to keep its West German Basic Laws intact. From a purely 
technical point of view there was no need to create a new constitution for united 
Germany because the political leaders of the post-GDR had decided to join the 
Federal Republic by ascension.58 Moreover, the decision to follow the path of 
article 23 – allowing accession to the Basic Law – helped to avoid delays and 
uncertainties that would have been involved in drafting a new constitution.59 As 
a consequence, none of the elements of the socialist system or the eastern 
German lifestyle were incorporated into the new Federal Republic, and 
therefore ill feelings and negative judgements about West Germans easily 
prevailed in the East.60 For many East Germans, such dismissal of GDR facets, 
ranging from political and social policies to East German products, created the 
impression of a lost identity in a post-reunified setting. A recent publication by 
the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung reports that, even two decades after 
unification, eastern identity continues to be depicted as an ‘alterity’. It is 
represented as a divergence from the contemporary German norm, which is 
almost always presented as being synonymous with the West German system.61 
With reunification came the assumption of a better life for East 
Germans. However, the dominant narrative amongst West Germans placed East 
Germany as an anachronism, comparatively substandard, and on the periphery 
of modernised matters.62 In essence, East Germans had to adjust themselves 																																																								
57 Berdahl, Social Life of Postsocialism, p. 49.  
58  Ulrich K. Preuß, ‘German Unification: Expectations and Outcomes’, Hertie School of 
Governance – Working Papers, No. 48, (November 2009), p. 4.  
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socially within a different culture that did not view the GDR’s heritage in the 
same light. The pressure to assimilate quickly amongst West Germans 
conflicted with the desire to retain parts of an East German identity. 
Consequently, nostalgic yearnings for the GDR can be attributed to a Western 
hubris and pressure to reduce the East German past. 
Martin Blum, too, offers a unique perspective as to why nostalgia for old 
GDR products existed after reunification. Advertising in East Germany had 
political connotations. When the East German market eventually became sealed 
off from the West, packaging became subject to new socialist requirements, 
although these requirements did not necessarily focus on a product’s design 
aesthetics. Accordingly, socialist advertising gradually eroded any attempt to 
innovate product design and advertising. This, in essence, forced consumers to 
get to know their products and brands very well.63 Without the allure of 
advertising creating a primal connection between products and consumers, 
knowing the individual characteristics of each product on the shelf helped forge 
connections and identities with Eastern products. Westerners could rely on a 
product’s quality through branded identity. Easterners, on the other hand, had to 
develop these identities overtime and largely by their own experiences, thereby 
creating their own unique biographies for products in a planned economy.64 
This, coupled with a lack of changes to product design throughout the history of 
the GDR, constituted a firm distinctiveness in East German memory.65 
  The immediate origins of Ostalgie are therefore varied and unique. 
However, it is abundantly clear that the reunification of Germany provided 
enough change to the lives of East Germans to trigger such nostalgia. It is also 
important to stress that nostalgia for East Germany developed rather quickly in 
the nineties, mostly because of the fast pace of German reunification. The 
consequences of the events of 1989/90 were so sudden and drastic for East 
Germans that it was easy to notice how different life was once the West German 
system extended eastwards. Therefore, Ostalgie exists as a reactive 
counterculture to life post-reunification. Although it may not strictly desire for a 
full return to life under the GDR, it strongly questions various aspects of 
Western culture and capitalism, not to mention the entire process of 
reunification as a whole.  
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From Goodbye Lenin! to the Ampelmännchen: Depicting Ostalgie 
 
 
Since the emergence of Ostalgie in public discourses, scholars have quickly 
identified a wide range of mediums representing such nostalgia. This section 
discusses the more materialistic aspects of Ostalgie, from its appearance in film, 
television, literature, and even household objects. For certain people, nostalgia 
for East Germany became a marketing strategy and a fashion statement. It was 
taken upon by eager entrepreneurs readily able to appeal to an individual’s 
nostalgic tendencies. For example, the Berlin Tourism Bureau offered an 
Ostalgie-Tour, on foot or in the form of a ‘Trabi-Safari.’ Numerous second-
hand shops in East Berlin enabled young professionals to outfit their apartments 
in a similar style to GDR households. Former East German rock musicians such 
as Dirk Michaelis, IC, Dirk Zöllner, and Die Puhdys made comeback tours. 
More symbolically, Trabant cars – mocked for their inferiority compared to 
West Germany’s own Volkswagen Beetle – became highly regarded vintage 
vehicles.66  
Unsurprisingly then, Ostalgie has managed to find a place within 
popular culture; it can be seen in the commodification of East German products 
and childhood characters, such as the Sandmann, and in TV shows, including 
ZDF’s Ostalgie Show, MDR’s Ein Kessel DDR (A Pot of the GDR) and RTL’s 
DDR Show.67 Certainly, such vast appearances in the public sphere of Germany 
hark back to Lowenthal’s earlier critique that nostalgia can be determined by 
commercialisation and therefore be inauthentic in its outlook on the past. Critics 
could label such nostalgic tendencies to be kitschy, due to the fact that the 
commercialisation of Ostalgie can be interpreted as a trivialisation of the GDR 
past. Indeed, there are a few points to consider; firstly, early in the new 
millennium much of the increased interest in Eastern consumer culture actually 
came from the West. One of the major distributors of East German products 
found that around 85 percent of its cliental was based in the West.68 Moreover, 
symbols of the GDR – most notably the Ampelmännchen – have been taken 
upon by Western entrepreneurs to appeal to a wide variety of audiences. Today 
one can find shops selling Ampelmännchen memorabilia in the form of key 
chains, confectionary, and even pasta. This is perhaps one example of how 
Ostalgie can be exploited. Not simply to elicit an emotional response from 
nostalgic Easterners, but for financial gain as well. Prominent Ostalgie 
entrepreneur, Markus Heckhausen, explained the West German interest with 																																																								
66 Mattias Frey, Postwall German Cinema: History, Film History, and Cinephilia, (New York, 
2013), p. 109.  
67 Hyland, ‘Ostalgie Doesn’t Fit!’, p. 103.  
68  Michael Bartsch, ‘“Kost the Ost” zahlt sich nicht aus’ Taz, 6th November 2003, 
http://www.taz.de/1/archiv/print-archiv/printressorts/digi-
artikel/?ressort=wu&dig=2003%2F11%2F06%2Fa0102&cHash=59c0abd5d4/, accessed 12th 
October 2015. 
	 22 
East German symbols as ‘Something new that they did not know before.’69 In 
this sense, Ostalgie for tourists and West Germans highlights the kitschy side to 
such a phenomenon. It presents a selective past of the East German regime to 
those who did not live under the East German government. Personal memories 
and biographies with GDR products are not associated with such cliental. 
Rather, Ostalgic products highlight the broad appeal in contemporary German 
consumer culture. Nevertheless, the lure of this nostalgia can potentially be 
advantageous toward driving tourism in East Germany thereby allowing 
tourists, German youth, and West Germans to ‘experience’ Ostalgie to a limited 
extent.70   
However, for East Germans Ostalgie can resonate with them differently. 
As the main group of Germans to experience life during Germany’s four 
decades of separation, there is a personal element to such nostalgia that typically 
refers to an Eastern presence within the ‘new’ Federal Republic. Identity and 
nostalgia are linked together strongly in academic literature. Nostalgia typically 
refers to an individual’s displacement in the present, causing one’s own identity 
to be questioned by present changes. As previously stated, Ostalgie developed 
as a form of counter culture to combat the Western lead reunification process. 
The consequences of reunification helped to develop a sense of loss in terms of 
political and cultural identity, thereby creating a sense of isolation between East 
and West Germans. East German nostalgia, therefore, can be found in various 
mediums to associate East Germans with various parts of their pre-existing 
identity. Analysing the everyday history of normal GDR citizens, as opposed to 
oversimplifying Ostalgie as a trivialisation of East German history, helps to 
create a greater understanding of nostalgia’s many virtues in contemporary 
Eastern Germany.71  
  Academic literature concerning Ostalgie has evolved since the early 
nineties. Recent discussions have strayed from critiques labelling Ostalgie as a 
commercial fad and instead sought to outline and discuss more pragmatic issues 
related to nostalgia for the GDR. Research into musical lyricism highlights the 
fact that Ostalgie’s presence has the potential to be widespread, though only in 
the form of collating and conveying a sense of cultural heritage.72 Moreover, 																																																								
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Ostalgie can represent the more positive aspects of East Germany’s past, 
helping to conceptualise an identity suitable for post-reunified life.73  East 
German nostalgia, therefore, conveys a sense of coping and adapting to life after 
the Wall. Its appearances in various outlets suggest that one of Ostalgie’s 
biggest virtues is its ability to present itself so vividly in large aspects of 
everyday life. Nostalgia for East Germany engages with the realities of GDR 
life, not through naïve delight, but through introspection and cultivating a 
distinctive East German culture. Using Pourtova ‘s analysis of nostalgia as a 
process of retrospection as opposed to simple wistful sentimentality, one can 
argue that Ostalgie can help create a better understanding of the present by 
analysing the past.74 In this sense, nostalgia can help an individual adopt a more 
tangible understanding of identity amongst East Germans.75 Much like an 
immigrant laments the loss of one’s past heritage when moving to a new 
environment, nostalgia helps to bridge the gap between past sentimentalities and 
present day circumstances. 
  Such examples of introspection are abundantly clear in the various 
forms of Ostalgie already existing. Take, for instance, the critically acclaimed 
motion picture Goodbye Lenin!, where one character tries amusingly hard to 
avoid his GDR-fanatic mother from realising the end of East Germany is soon 
upon them. Or even literature published by authors such as Ingo Schulze, whose 
narratives certainly highlight the more disappointed effects of reunification. For 
example, one of his fictional characters, Renee Meurer, seemingly has high 
expectations of capitalism and its features, going as far as believing that simply 
being in a Western civilisation would change natural facets of everyday life 
such as eating, drinking, and even walking. Naturally, even such changes in the 
lives of East Germans were not as pronounced, leaving said character to argue, 
‘I found it even harder to believe I was in Italy,’ noting how similar natural 
human interactions in East Germany were to other European countries on one of 
his first trips outside of the GDR.76 Indeed, such disappointment alludes to a 
lack of change – rather than an overbearing sense – reunification had on East 
Germans alike. This is because the changes reunification had on East Germany 
were not that visceral. Instinctive and habitual human interactions could hardly 
be altered by the events of 1990. Instead, one could argue that Meurer’s 
statement reflects the emergence of disillusionment towards capitalism and 
Westernisation as a whole. Small quips such as those from Meurer undermine 
the virtues of reunification and call into question the high expectations of 
Westernisation from East Germans. 
As for who may experience nostalgic tendencies for the GDR, it can 
reasonably be assumed that those effected most by the consequences of 																																																								
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reunification – people forced into early retirement, unemployed men and 
women in industries that collapsed because of reunification, and older East 
Germans acclimated to life in the GDR – are the main group of people 
experiencing Ostalgie. Using data conducted by German General Social Survey, 
Paul Kubicek argued that East Germans who identify more with the GDR are 
more likely to experience Ostalgie, citing the fact that identity, or rather a loss 
of identity, is a strong determinant for nostalgia’s appearance. Unsurprisingly, 
East Germans who identified more with the GDR were typically older and were 
therefore more likely to have experienced reunification negatively. In fact, East 
Germans who were between the ages of 18-29 showed little support for the 
GDR in comparison. What is surprising is that the level of identification with 
the East German government remained the same amongst men and women.77 As 
stated previously, women were greatly affected by the socio-economic 
consequences of reunification, suggesting that they were more likely to have 
experienced Ostalgie.  
  Today, one can see Ostalgie’s presence in a number of different 
varieties. It is quite simple to suggest an over-commodification of East German 
symbols and brands indicates inauthenticity. True, such ventures appear 
profitable from a financial viewpoint. Yet nostalgia’s effect on the individual, in 
terms of social commentary and cultural identity forming, highlights a deeper 
sense of functionality than originally thought in the nineties. East German 
nostalgia is often linked in television, film, and literature to cultural artefacts 
and sensory experiences, particularly those involving childhood and innocence. 
In this sense, Ostalgie works to recall a simpler, more peaceful period, and is 
therefore more about time and place, not ideology, politics, or economic 
circumstances. 78  Statements by certain East Germans such as, ‘The 
Ampelmännchen is actually a symbol that some things from the GDR should 
have simply stayed and everything shouldn’t have been made the same,’79 
reflect a growing sense of loss of one’s heritage in the face of Westernisation. 
Experiencing nostalgia for the GDR can be a complex and oversimplified 
concept, especially to those that did not live under the GDR government. 
However, East Germans are not incurable sentimentalists that are afraid to face 
the truth of the past.80 Rather, they seek to clarify their heritage and presence 
whilst coming to terms with the ‘new’ Federal Republic.  
  Westalgie, too, requires the individual to come to terms with a different 
environment. However, with Ostalgie, identity formation amongst East 
Germans stands as a principal explanation for why such a phenomenon can take 
place. In this sense, West Germans can subconsciously apply their sense of 
discomfort caused by reunification to compare and contrast life between the two 																																																								
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republics of Germany. Even though West Germans did not need to adjust to a 
new political and economic system to the same extent as East Germans, and 
although they did not share a common past under an oppressive regime, they 
still faced concerns regarding their own heritage.81 There are, however, a couple 
of points to consider. East Germans could draw upon a collective identity as 
they shared a common past unlike West Germans. They purchased the same 
consumer goods and took part in the same state organised activities. West 
Germans, on the other hand, could not claim the same sense of shared identities. 
Therefore, Westalgie can be experienced by conflicting generations of West 
Germans. From the West German student movement in 1968, to a new 
generation of Germans in 1989, plenty of sub-identities exist within a ‘West 
German’ identity.  
 
 
Nostalgia and Western Democracy 
 
 
One noticeable difference between Ostalgie and Westalgie is the subject to 
which they refer to. Nostalgia for West Germany, of course, suggests a 
preoccupation with the past that is uniquely West German. Ostalgie, however, 
refers to features of everyday life under Communist rule. It consciously 
compares and contrasts facets of both the GDR and the current Federal 
Republic. It is because of such differentiation that scholars have identified an 
added dimension of East German nostalgia, namely its effect on democratic 
institutions that replaced former Communist states. Whilst Westalgie harks back 
to a different period notably without East Germans, reunification did not 
fundamentally change the dominant economic system for West Germans. 
Instead, the events of 1989/90 altered everyday life for East Germans in a 
dramatic and prompt fashion. So much so that fears of a revival of East German 
communism became linked with the emergence of Ostalgie in public discourses. 
In essence, with nostalgia for the former GDR came the assumption that it 
would constitute a threat to the consolidation of democracy in the Eastern 
Länder.  
  Empirical data highlighted by Ekman and Linde revealed that approval 
of a return to communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe had varied between 
former Eastern bloc countries, with Slovakia showcasing the strongest case to 
retreat to the days of the past.82 Federal election results in the Eastern states 
reveal sustained support amongst Easterners for the successor party of the 
Socialist Unity Party (SED), the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). For 																																																								
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example, election results in the 1998 Federal Elections highlight that support for 
the PDS within the five Eastern Länder and Berlin averaged at 40.3 percent of 
the East German electorate. Results in the next two Federal Elections show 
similar findings whilst average support for the PDS fell to 35.2 percent in the 
2005 elections. After reunification the PDS found support in the East by valuing 
East Germany’s heritage and past. For example, the PDS widely supported the 
diffusion of consumer products from East Germany, staged campaigns to save 
street names named after communist heroes and to preserve GDR historical 
buildings such as the Volkskammer in East Berlin.83  
  Yet are these findings indicative of nostalgia for East Germany? 
Indeed, they highlight a sizeable amount of support for the left, but one can 
rationalise such gains in other ways. The most obvious is to suggest that support 
for left-wing parties in the East is likely due to the fact that East Germans spent 
over four decades – albeit undemocratically – under socialism. Support for the 
PDS can therefore be considered a natural continuation of overall support for 
the left amongst the East German electorate. One can also argue that these 
electoral gains can be considered more in line with generalised protests for more 
representation in the East, alluding to a previous statement that Ostalgie is more 
about time and place rather than ideology. Moreover, with former Eastern 
European countries being integrated within the European Union, such forms of 
nostalgia may typically decline, as generations of citizen’s personal histories 
become less connected to socialisation under communism.84 
After all, empirical data suggests that, in spite of the harrowing 
economic hardships and general difficulties associated with reunification, East 
Germans experienced the transition of 1989-1990 as well as its aftereffects more 
positively. For example, in 1995 when asked, ‘How are you personally today 
compared to your time in the GDR on the whole?,’ fifty percent of applicants 
felt their lives were comparatively better, twenty-seven percent felt their 
personal circumstances had remained similar after reunification, and twenty-
three percent noted that their lives had been made worse after West Germany 
encompassed the East. 85  Moreover, even if the ‘new’ Federal Republic 
experienced economic difficulties early on, fear of job losses and 
unemployment amongst Easterners declined as the country became more 
acclimated to its reunified status. Though it should be noted that such fears and 
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anxieties concerning employment were still more pertinent in the East compared 
to the West.86  
Moreover, around the turn of the millennium, a vast majority of people 
were convinced that unifying Germany was still the right thing to do, more so in 
the East than in the West.87 In 2009, almost two decades after Germany 
officially reunified, similar results were found amongst former residents of the 
German Democratic Republic. In an opinion poll conducted by the Pew 
Research Centre, over eighty percent of the East German applicants responded 
positively when asked about German reunification retrospectively; just sixteen 
percent felt negative about the events of 1989/1990. Similarly, in the same study 
over sixty percent of East Germans believed their lives were better off because 
Germany reunified compared to the sixteen percent of whom felt the opposite. It 
should also be noted that those asked were over the age of twenty-nine and 
could therefore judge the position of contemporary Germany against their own 
experiences in East Germany.88 
Indeed, these statistics do not explicitly refer to Ostalgie in the public 
sphere. They do, however, showcase that politics and nostalgia are not mutually 
exclusive. Stefan Berger argues that the emergence of East German nostalgia in 
the public sphere meant it was a sure sign that many East Germans had yet to 
arrive in the reunified country.89 Coupled with this, a general critique of 
nostalgia for the GDR was the assumption that people’s political attitudes can 
be shaped by the memories fostered in families or peer groups.90 Yet, as 
empirical data has shown, this is only true to a limited extent. Political opinions 
are malleable and subject to change over the course of one’s own life. Ostalgie 
exists as a critique of the German political, economic, and social system after 
reunification. This, however, does not mean it offers any viable or pragmatic 
alternatives to reshaping and redressing problems produced by reunification.91 
Unsurprisingly, there is by no means an East German movement to bring back 
the GDR; empirical data continues to show that, whilst contemporary Germany 
is by no means clear of its own ‘wall in the head’, returning back to the social 
conditions of the GDR past is a remote option for Easterners. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
 
One can detect similarities between Ostalgie and Westalgie. For one, they both 
relied on great social, political, and economic changes to help bring upon 
uncertainty between the two sets of Germans. However, Ostalgie appears much 
more relevant to the notion of a loss of identity than it does West Germans. The 
integration of East Germans, as Thomas Ahbe puts it, did not happen in a way 
of a ‘historic honeymoon period’.92 To complicate matters further, plenty of 
identities exist within modern Germany now; since the 1950s the Federal 
Republic – both ‘new’ and ‘old’ – has had to accept and integrate new identities 
in the form of immigrants, asylum seekers, and guest workers. With the 
reunification of Germany, and the subsequent issues that followed from it, an 
Eastern identity has developed that sits beside a German identity. In this sense, 
by accepting pluralist identities the country may come closer to a more inclusive 
idea of Germaness.93 East German nostalgia, therefore, is not strictly associated 
with GDR fanatics or even those who chose to live outside the present. In 
comparatively analysing Ostalgie and Westalgie one should note that change is 
in fact the major reason that facilitates one to experience nostalgia. This specific 
change primarily rests with the overall processes of reunification, as well as the 
speed of these developments.  
As such, Ostalgie is a reaction to reunification, as well as a reaction 
against Western hegemony to define and dictate how East Germans should 
remember their own pasts. It can also clarify an Eastern presence within the 
Berlin Republic through the presence of Ostalgic films and literature, and the 
commodification of Eastern products. Moreover, whilst one should be cautious 
about examining personal memories, especially those that have lived in 
historically contentious eras, they are still useful in understanding how East 
Germans build their identity in a setting that overtook large parts of their 
heritage. A simple way to view Ostalgie’s virtues can be summed up quite 
poignantly by Roger Rosenblatt’s statement: ‘we want to relive those thrilling 
days of yesteryear, but only because we are absolutely assured that those days 
are out of reach.’94 To conclude, the commodification of Ostalgie may well 
mean that East German products, movies and television programmes concerning 
life under the GDR, as well as literature will continue to be produced for quite 
some time. Yet as new generations of Germans born in the Berlin Republic 
dictate what constitutes German national identity, the concept of Ostalgie – and 
even Westalgie – may be left redundant as time passes. 
 																																																								
92 Thomas Ahbe, Ostalgie: Zum Umgang mit der DDR-Vergangenheit in den 1990er Jahren, 
(Erfurt, 2005), p. 64.  
93 See, Hyland, ‘The Era Has Passed’, pp. 144-156.  
94 Roger Rosenblatt, ‘Lack Back in Sentiment’, New York Times, 28th July 1973, p. 23. 
	 29 
3. West German Political Nostalgia in the Berlin Republic 
 
 
The development of nostalgia ultimately suggests the lack of utopia in 
contemporary society. For East Germans, such absence can easily be found 
within varying aspects of everyday life. East German brands vanished, 
unemployment became a realistic prospect, and the politics of the GDR gave 
way to the more dominant West German political system. This, too, can be 
explained quite comfortably by the quick pace German Reunification had on 
East Germans post 1990. Understanding a rationale for the emergence of 
Ostalgie is therefore straightforward. For West Germany, however, this is more 
complex. Westalgie as a phenomenon is much more case-specific, and this is 
certainly true when considering the political changes the Federal Republic 
experienced in the years following 1990. While it can be argued that West 
Germans noticed the political changes caused by Reunification, can it be said 
that all West Germans felt the same about said changes? More importantly, did 
they react in such a way that would suggest a sense of nostalgia concerning pre-
1990 German politics? 
  This chapter will assess the political element of Westalgie. It will do so 
by looking at how the Federal Republic’s domestic and foreign policies have 
evolved since the reunification of Germany. For example, German foreign 
policy has changed significantly compared to West German foreign policy, 
becoming much more assertive on the world stage. This was also generally 
unthinkable for West Germans during the Cold War. Therefore it is fair to ask: 
‘are the political changes the Federal Republic experienced after reunification a 
credible rationale for Westalgie’s emergence?’ If one were to compare 
Ostalgie’s emergence with West German nostalgia, it is clear that it developed 
because there was a clear sense of change between the past and the present. As 
highlighted in the previous chapter, reunification brought an unprecedented 
level of social, political, and economic change to East Germans. This, however, 
is not easily comparable to Westalgie. While it can be argued that West 
Germans did experience a set of changes after the events of 1989 and 1990, the 
impact of said changes were not as hard-hitting or readily obvious straight 
away.  
  Consequently, West German nostalgia is a far harder phenomenon to 
characterise or define. Of course, one can easily suggest that it is a West 
German reaction to the changes reunification brought. Yet this is an 
oversimplified view that does not take into account whether this has affected 
every West German or when the phenomenon developed in the first place. 
Analysing the political differences between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ FRG is a good 
starting point to address these issues as there are clear moments of change that 
are discernible to the viewer. What is noticeable, however, is that a lot of 
political differences between the past and present occurred later in the nineties 
	 30 
and from the new millennium onwards. This, at the very least, helps to highlight 
that Westalgie developed later than Ostalgie. West German nostalgia was 
therefore not a direct consequence of reunification like its Eastern counterpart, 
but rather a response to later issues in the history of reunified Germany. Another 
issue worth addressing is that critiques of certain policies are by no means an 
example of nostalgia’s onset. There are, after all, other practical reasons to 
criticise German foreign policy rather than blaming nostalgia. This, too, proves 
an issue for Westalgie.   
  Nevertheless, the chapter will highlight specific changes West 
Germans have experienced on a political level. At the very least, one could 
argue that such changes are a contribution to Westalgie’s emergence in the 
public sphere, even if there are other facets that may have had more of an 
important role in its development such as economic changes, or German 
multiculturalism.  
 
 
Domestic Concerns: German Politics after 1990 
 
 
Two weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 West German Chancellor, 
Helmut Kohl, surprised the public with a ten-point plan for unification with a 
slowly democratising GDR. The Federal Republic, according to Kohl, would 
continue to cooperate with East Germany in all areas that directly benefitted 
both sides, and offer an extensive and unprecedented level of assistance and 
cooperation to the transformation of the East German economic and political 
system. 95  Furthermore, liberal reforms introduced by other Communist 
governments such as the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary, helped to 
encourage a path for East and West Germany to end forty years of separation.    
  Indeed, the events of 1989 and 1990 presented a major opportunity for 
East and West Germany to reunify. The first and only free elections to be held 
in East Germany proved a success for Kohl. The conservative Alliance for 
Germany, led by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and backed by West 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and also comprising of the German Social 
Union (DSU) and the Democratic Awakening (DA), advocated a fast unification 
pace, with monetary unions followed shortly thereafter by political mergers, as 
well as a market economy. Its slogan was: no more socialist experiments. On 
the other hand, purely East German groups such as the Party of Democratic 
Socialism (PDS) – the former ruling communist party – and the left wing, 
Alliance 90, called for retention of particular GDR characteristics, underlining 
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in particular the state-provided comprehensive social protection.96 Yet in light 
of the growing opportunity to officially unite with the West, East Germans 
seemingly favoured a rapid unity in order to improve the economy and offer 
greater prosperity. The Alliance for Germany won 48% of the popular vote and 
192 seats, in comparison to the PDS’s 16% and 66 seats.97 This, in itself, 
marked a blow for the East German system. The electorate had chosen the 
conservative East German CDU in favour of a customary left-wing political 
party. This, too, presented a sign that East Germans were willing to accept a 
Western orientated political system, to help speed up the practical processes of 
reunification, and perhaps to demonstrate a sense of inner unity with West 
Germans.    
  The two German economies would also merge, culminating in the 
‘Treaty Establishing a Monetary, Economic and Social Union between the 
German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany’ in May of 
1990. The most notable consequence of this was the introduction of the West 
German Deutschmark as the official East German currency. Notably, the 
Deutschmark had a very high reputation amongst East Germans, as it was a 
symbol of the economic success West Germany had experienced from its 
inception up to 1990. This again highlighted the fact that East Germans were 
initially accepting of the West German system. True, the East German economy 
suffered after reunification, with rising unemployment rates, and the 
privatisation of state monopolies. Yet the perception of reunification at the time 
was largely positive. East Germans mostly supported a fast track to 
reunification, which created the assumption amongst West Germans that the 
East would be cooperative with a Western led reunification process.  
   There were, however, notable left leaning West German critics of 
reunification. The novelist Günter Grass, for example, worried about whether a 
reunified Germany would resume a role as a belligerent nation-state. Germany, 
Grass argued, should have remained separated as a consequence of not only the 
Second World War, but also the Holocaust. His views were largely produced by 
the on-going issue of how Germany could come to terms with its past, as well as 
conservative attempts to reassess German guilt in the so-called Historikerstreit 
(Historian’s conflict) during the late 1980s.98 The German sociologist, Jürgen 
Habermas, focussed on the fast pace of reunification and what he perceived to 
be the annexation of East Germany. According to Habermas, the citizens of the 
East Germany were practically obliged to agree to unification by their disastrous 
economic situation and by the hope of improving it quickly and substantially by 
being absorbed into the wealthy West Germany. Consequently, national 
identity, which would be the basis of the new country, will not be a republican 																																																								
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identity, created on the basis of a notable choice of liberty, democracy, and co-
operation among countries. Instead, it would be a national identity of the 
traditional type, based on an idea of the nation as an ethnic, cultural and 
collective community. Thus, there would be no chance of breaking the 
continuity of a tradition that went back to Bismarckian national unification and 
that had always seen German national identity assert itself powerfully against 
western liberal democratic traditions.99 
  Both Grass’ and Habermas’ critiques of reunification refer more to 
issues of aggressive nationalism and how to best deal with the past. Indeed, 
while both clearly reference the past, they do so in a way that acknowledges its 
burdens as opposed to its merits. As previously mentioned, certain critics of 
nostalgia note how it enables one to view the past with rose-tinted glasses. This, 
however, does not appear to be the case for both Grass and Habermas. Their 
criticisms were not primarily influenced by a positive sense of the past, as 
nostalgia would imply, but rather a fear of resurgence in German nationalism. 
True, Grass and Habermas seemingly valued the Bonn Republic’s political 
merits, highlighting the fact that they may have felt some form of nostalgia for 
West Germany. Yet their focus on Germany’s Nazi past shaped their negative 
perceptions of reunification, even if the greater German public did not wholly 
share such views. Criticisms of the events of 1989 and 1990 were largely 
overshadowed by the euphoria amongst East and West Germans.  
Nevertheless, reunification created the hope that East and West 
Germany would be unified on a number of issues; be it social, economic and 
political. The reality, however, is far more complex and nuanced when 
considering the political divisions within the ‘new’ Federal Republic. East 
Germans, as already stated, have found it difficult to integrate within a 
dominant West German society, while West Germans have struggled to come to 
terms with their association with East Germans. Differences in western and 
eastern voting behaviour have their roots in the noticeable identities that 
developed in the two parts of the country during the 40 years of separate 
historical and political development. More than two decades after unification, 
these identity differences continue to persist. East German political identity was 
shaped by a complete reliance on the state during the 40 years of the GDR. 
Consequently, Easterners still favour a more active role for the state.100 East 
Germans also had to cope with the breakdown of the associational framework 
the GDR provided and the resulting shock of social isolation.101 
  West Germans, however, faced their own unique challenges; namely 
the aforementioned difficulty in assimilating an East German populace that was, 																																																								
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for the most part, different in most aspects of everyday life. Assuming that the 
East and West party systems each possessed distinctive qualities and 
characteristics at the time of unification, there are two possible paths forward in 
terms of political system preferences. First, as the two Germanys become more 
integrated over time and a sense of shared identity develops, the voting 
behaviour in the two regions would become similar, and the German party 
systems would become less distinctive. Alternatively, if the integration process 
does not lead to increasing sense of incorporation but rather to the conservation 
or consolidation of separate identities, it should be expected that differences 
between the party systems to persist or even increase.102 Data provided by Amir 
Abedi highlights that the later has occurred in the Berlin Republic, at least in the 
context of the Federal elections held since reunification. To put this into 
context, Abedi analyses how East and West Germans have voted in Federal 
elections since the reunification of Germany. More specifically, the difference 
between votes amongst the two sets of German voters. Using the index of 
dissimilarity – a demographic measure of the consistency between two groups 
that are distributed across component geographic areas – Abedi highlights an 
interesting issue that concerns German voter patterns after the reunification of 
Germany. 
 
 
1). Dissimilarity Between Bundestag Election Results in the Former East and 
West Germany  
 
 
Year Dissimilarity Index Value 
1990 14.5 
1994 18.9 
1998 23.8 
2002 18.4 
2005 22.7 
2009 20.6 
2013 19.8 
 
 
Bundestag Election Results Dissimilarity Index, cited in Amir Abedi, ‘We are 
not in Bonn Anymore: The Impact of German Unification on Party Systems at 
the Federal and Land Levels’, German Politics, Vol, 26, No. 4, (2017), p. 464. 
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What is curious is the fact that electoral differences between East and West 
were actually lower in the first reunified Bundestag election than in subsequent 
ones. Both sets of Germans were more likely to vote in similar patterns early in 
the life of the ‘new’ Federal Republic than any other time. This, of course, can 
be explained by the largely elated response to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
events that gradually led to the reunification of Germany. As stated previously, 
East Germans seemed accepting of the West German model as it was 
comparably more successful than its East German counterpart in almost every 
aspect. Yet the fast pace of reunification and the negative effects it had on East 
and West Germans contributed to a separating electorate based on geographical 
locations. Moreover, this suggests that West Germans were more critical of the 
Federal Republic later than East Germans. 
A significant rise in dissimilarity after 1990, and through 1994, was 
followed by consistently high levels of difference. The highest scores were 
recorded in the 1998 and 2005 elections. Although there has been a steady if 
small decrease in the scores since 2005, the numbers highlight that they have 
yet to return to the earlier results after reunification. While lower than in 2005, 
the index scores for 2009 and 2013 still exceed the scores for the 1990 and 1994 
Bundestag elections. This, in essence, suggests that voting trends are not 
converging in the ‘new’ Federal Republic. What could be taken from this then is 
that nostalgia may well indeed influence the voting patterns of both East and 
West Germans.   
  Indeed, it is far easier to understand why East German voters have 
contributed to such dissimilar voting trends. The onset of mass unemployment 
after unification and the elimination of the GDR welfare system and its 
replacement with the western Bismarckian model had a profound effect on 
people in the former GDR who were used to a paternalistic socialist system in 
which the state took on the role of provider of far-reaching welfare programmes 
for all its citizens. Employment was not only guaranteed but also considered a 
constitutional right and a duty. Moreover, being a worker was crucial to a 
person’s standing in the political community.  
It is perhaps easier to find links between nostalgia and electoral results 
when discussing East Germany as East Germans grew up under a socialist 
system in place. Support for Left-wing parties, it can be argued, is more likely 
to occur in the East as opposed to the West as their political viewpoints were 
linked with the past. Such is not the case for West Germans. As West Germany 
developed after the Second World War, coalition governments made up of 
varying political parties had largely governed the ‘old’ Federal Republic. 
Moreover, the West German political and economic system was successful 
against the East German socialist model, leading the West to incorporate their 
ideologies on the new Eastern Länder. On a regional level, there are certain 
instances where one can see how the Federal Republic’s change has affected 
electoral votes. For example, the year 2016 had shown increasing levels of 
support for the right-wing Eurosceptic political party, Alternative für 
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Deutschland (AfD). In fact, as of very recently the AfD have gained 
representation in ten of the sixteen German state parliaments, even finding 
representation in Merkel’s constituency of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, with her 
Christian Democratic Union coming third behind the Social Democrats (SPD) 
and the AfD.103 
In the context of Westalgie, however, the later levels of dissimilarity in 
the federal elections suggest that political differences developed later in the 
Berlin Republic’s lifetime. The electorate in the west of Germany for years was 
clearly grouped according to the division of society into the conservative and 
left-wing groups. Workers traditionally voted for the Social Democrats, while 
representatives of the middle class voted for the Christian Democrats. The party 
identifications throughout the 1950s and the 1960s had been the result of an 
increasingly structured electorate; the vast majority developed strong partisan 
attachments based on social strata along the lines of class and religion.104 It can 
be argued therefore that nostalgia for West Germany settled at a later time than 
Ostalgie as the changes East Germans felt after reunification were sudden and 
drastic. For West Germans, however, this was not the case.  
For example, as East Germans gradually began to react to the negative 
effects of reunification, Left-wing parties were able to win continuous 
representation in the Bundestag. Die Linke, the successor party of the PDS, 
were able to promote the image of an Eastern German interest party with a solid 
base of voters.105 This, in turn, represented a shift in political perceptions. The 
1990 East German elections highlighted how Easterners were willing to accept a 
West German system by voting a conservative alliance linked with Helmut 
Kohl’s CDU. However, by the end of the 1990s and into the new millennium, 
East Germans had seemingly shown political preference to left-wing groups. As 
stated previously, support for left-wing parties is much greater in the East of 
Germany compared to the West. This, too, contributed to a change in political 
party preferences in the ‘new’ Federal Republic. Identifying with a political 
party is not as black and white as it was prior to reunification, a clear difference 
between the past and the present in relation to the Federal Republic’s domestic 
politics.  
Indeed, there is clearly some acknowledgment that domestic politics in 
the Federal Republic have changed since East Germans were integrated with the 
West. In a similar way to Ostalgie, nostalgia for West Germany highlights such 
changes between the past and the present, but in a far less direct manner. After 
all, it is easier for East Germans to collectively find a specific point in time for 
when change really affected them. Citizens of the former West Germany may 																																																								
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struggle to do so as a unit because the changes they experienced were not so 
sudden and experienced mutually. Voting trends, however, highlight that East 
and West Germans began to diverge from each other politically in the new 
millennium. This, at the very least, suggests that nostalgia for West Germany 
developed much later than Ostalgie. East German nostalgia was a quick 
response to the changes reunification gave to Easterners. For West Germans, 
this took a far slower response and has contributed to its lack of relative 
acknowledgment in the public mainstream.   
 
 
The Changing Nature of German Foreign Policy 
 
 
In 2013, President Joachim Gauck referred to German foreign policy in a 
speech, calling upon the country to share a greater amount of international 
responsibilities: 
Germany has long since demonstrated that it acts in an internationally 
responsible way. But it could build on its experience in safeguarding 
human rights and the rule of law—take more resolute steps to pre-serve 
and help shape the order based on the European Union, NATO, and the 
United Nations. At the same time, Germany must also be ready to do 
more to guarantee the security that others have provided it with for 
decades. Germany should make a more substantial contribution, and it 
should make it earlier and more decisively if it is to be a good partner.106  
Indeed, while Gauck’s statement refers to a more assertive, but responsible, 
foreign policy, his views are seemingly out of odds with what West Germans 
were accustomed to during the Bonn Republic’s lifetime. As William Paterson 
states, ‘the creators of the Federal Republic were aware that both the Imperial 
and Nazi regimes had collapsed because of foreign policy failures which had 
united overwhelming forces against them.’107 It was therefore a priority for 
West Germany to not only provide security for itself, but also remain a 
compliant power on the world stage. After the Second World War, West 
Germany needed to build trust with its Western counterparts, especially in the 
context of the developing Cold War. This, in itself, represented a challenge for 
the ‘old’ Federal Republic, attempting to distance itself from its Nazi past and 
yet still become a welcoming ally to the West.     
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  The first ever chancellor of the Federal Republic, Konrad Adenauer, 
felt his main objective as far as foreign policy was to maintain peaceful relations 
with the major powers after the Second World War. The aggressive foreign 
policies of Imperial Germany and the Third Reich had brought Europe and the 
world to wars of shocking effect. Notably, he felt that ‘both our descent and our 
convictions root us in the West European world,’108 highlighting straight away 
how West Germany should conduct its foreign affairs; namely in line with the 
West. Early West German foreign policy was therefore significantly limited and 
largely determined by Allied intervention, contributing to what would become a 
central feature of West German foreign policy. The newly created Federal 
Republic had to retain the good graces of the West in order to move away from 
its past, restricting West German foreign policy to a great extent.  
  European integration marked an important step for the ‘old’ Federal 
Republic to help integrate itself on the world stage. For the FRG, there was no 
real choice about the Europeanisation of West German politics as its Western 
allies actively pursued it. Yet Germany’s role in the Cold War, too, helped 
necessitate such a need. The division of Europe resulted in a significant 
disruption of pre-existing patterns of trade, resulting in the need to find new 
markets elsewhere. France, for example, accommodated such needs with the 
Schuman Plan (1950), highlighting in some ways international acceptance of the 
West German political system.109  Yet it would take decades for the FRG to 
assume an ‘ordinary’ role in world affairs. For example, Détente at the start of 
the 1970s brought important developments for West German’s European 
policies. It offered the normalisation of relations between the FRG, Eastern 
Europe and, of course, the GDR. Chancellor Brandt’s Ostpolitik allowed West 
Germany to no longer rely on its allies to act as intermediaries in relations with 
certain Eastern European states. More important, however, was the fact that 
West Germanys influence within Europe was growing.110  
  The post-war FRG is often cited as quintessential example of the 
‘trading state’. As Harald Müller states, ‘the country had derived its political 
identity form its success as a trading state. German export philosophy regarded 
exports as a right of business; all state interventions needed specific and explicit 
authority.’111 This, in essence, defines the situation of West German foreign 
policy after the Second World War. The image has become grounded in 
historical memory, leading to a strong characterisation of West German 																																																								
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identity.112 They were not an aggressive force, but rather a state using its trading 
opportunities to benefit the West German system. Their reticence when it came 
to foreign affairs shaped the identity of West German citizens, trying to distance 
themselves from the Nazi past and put forward a successful model of 
rehabilitation. Yet once the reunification of Germany occurred, the West 
German foreign policy model was allowed to alter and determine a new path for 
the ‘new’ Federal Republic.         
Notably, debates centred on the question of how the increase in power 
experienced by Germany after the Cold War and during Reunification would 
affect German foreign policy behaviour. Would post-reunification Germany 
remain a predictable and reliable partner of the Western states? Or would it 
break with the foreign policy traditions of the West German state and maybe 
even fall back into the foreign policy behaviour of the Third Reich, or set itself 
up as a world power in an entirely new way? For outside observers, this was a 
real worry, but internally there were rational debates on how the Federal 
Republic should operate on the world stage after 1990.   
   For example, academic debate concerning German foreign policy after 
reunification at the time highlighted a divisive discourse, unable to agree 
completely on how the Federal Republic should manage its foreign affairs. 
Supporters of a more insistent foreign policy note how the changing nature of 
the geopolitical spectrum after the Cold War fundamentally altered how foreign 
policy could be conducted. The end of the Soviet Union, along with the 
conclusion of bipolar policymaking, meant that Germany operated within a 
multipolar world, with the country’s interests no longer vested in a dual 
ideological conflict. Germany’s power, however, had been significantly 
restricted after World War II and West Germans had grown accustomed to 
viewing their state as small in comparison to other leading nations.113 Yet for 
Germany, this change in the geopolitical realm implied a way for the Federal 
Republic to become a strong world power once again.114  Arnulf Baring argued 
that Germany’s position after the Cold War had changed so significantly that it 
resembled the geopolitical situation held by the German Reich after 1871, with 
Europe a continent of nation states at war with each other for their own 
interests.115   
  The Federal Republic’s geographical position was also a key point for 
those advocating a stronger German foreign policy. The fact that it shares 
borders with nine countries, more than any other European country, made its 																																																								
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security particularly vulnerable in military terms.116 However, it could also be 
argued that Germany’s unique geography could act as a bridge between the East 
and West, especially since they were separated from each other owing to the 
Cold War. Its numerous proficiencies, such as a large population, economic 
success, as well as its cultural influence, add to its significance for European 
and world politics.117 Therefore, a more assertive foreign policy need not rely 
on geographical insecurities, but rather a greater sense of what Germany had 
achieved since the end of the Second World War.  
  Due to its defeat in World War II, Germany had lost its foreign policy 
autonomy and, as a divided state essentially on the border of the Cold War 
conflict, the Federal Republic depended on the backing of other states to 
guarantee its security. As Dirk Peters argues, multilateralism was the key 
strategy under these specific circumstances. Through its integration in Western 
institutions, most notably the EU and NATO, West Germany gradually regained 
autonomy in foreign affairs and were assured of assistance from Western 
powers in safeguarding its survival. The Western allies, in turn, were willing to 
provide this protection in order to secure their own needs during the Cold 
War.118 This, however, changed by 1990. The need to safeguard Germany’s 
security was no longer as much of a priority for Western powers, allowing the 
‘new’ Federal Republic the chance to alter, or at the very least, view its Foreign 
policy differently.  
  Yet critics of such a change argued that the geopolitical situation post 
1990 was unique in its own right and not comparable to 1871, owing to the 
establishment of Western institutions. Furthermore, the influence the United 
States had within Europe at the latter end of the twentieth century far surpassed 
the previous century. This, in turn, made a more docile environment for 
European countries to operate in and fostered a sense of interdependence 
overall. It was, in essence, a sense of continuity for German foreign policy that 
shaped the views of those critical of a shift in external affairs. Moreover, from a 
military perspective, Michael Kreile noted that Germany’s power still remained 
limited in comparison to other leading nations, especially since they lacked any 
weapons of mass destruction and had a limited armed forces in terms of 
numbers.119 The integration of East Germany with the West also did little to 
change the economic position of the Federal Republic. 120  Unemployment 																																																								
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increased for both East and West Germans after 1990, leading to internal 
resentment amongst both sets of Germans. This, too, marked an issue for certain 
critics; outwardly Germany seemed powerful to its European neighbours and 
the United States, but on closer inspection was not the case.121  
  More importantly, it was argued that Germany was reliant on other 
leading powers to secure its geopolitical position. This did not mean that the 
country could attain its goals by itself, but rather it had to cooperate within the 
boundaries that it found itself in after the Cold War. Due to its economic 
linkages and the multilateral institutions it was integrated in, the ‘new’ Federal 
Republic, it was argued, was firmly embedded in the Western world and should 
cooperate accordingly.122 The German government therefore had to continue 
pursuing its foreign policies within the framework of the EU and NATO, 
otherwise self-interest could destabilise the geopolitical spectrum. 
Interestingly, those advocating for the Federal Republic to either 
continue, or at the very least show restraint, regarding its foreign policy lack a 
sense of nostalgia for the ‘old’ Federal Republic in their rhetoric. Their concerns 
are focussed more on specific issues Germany faced at the time of unification. 
Granted, early scholarly debate concerning German foreign policy after 
reunification would not have had the luxury of hindsight when considering the 
potential impact any changes would have had on West German nostalgia. 
Nevertheless, it is curious that such debates were limited to more pragmatic 
concerns of Germany’s geopolitical position after the Cold War, rather than 
how any changes would ultimately affect the mind-set of East and West 
Germans. This, in essence, neither demonstrates nor denies the existence of 
Westalgie and its political impact, but instead highlights the scholarly 
perspective at the time. Prior to reunification the Federal Republic’s foreign 
policy was severely restricted, essentially becoming a part of its identity over 
forty years. It is therefore interesting how academic discourses focussed on 
practical issues, rather than any changes in West German identity after 1990.  
  This, too, stresses an important argument. Ostalgie, an East German 
phenomenon that developed very early in the life of the ‘new’ Federal Republic, 
highlighted how quickly life had changed for East Germans post reunification. 
The sudden and drastic political, economic, and social changes contributed to its 
quick emergence and developed over time as a critique of reunification. 
Westalgie, on the other hand, developed at a much slower pace and refers to 
more case-specific issues. There lacks a clear starting point to its existence as 
either people were unaware of its development, or were focussed on issues that 
did not relate specifically to nostalgia for the ‘old’ West Germany. Indeed, since 
1990 German foreign policy has evolved from its West German past and is by 
no means an exact replica. More recent events such as the British referendum 																																																								
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result to leave the European Union has sparked a debate about its implications 
for European foreign and security policy. Among the key contested issues is the 
role Germany as the EU’s largest economy can and should play in 
compensating for a less prominent British role in this issue area. For long, 
Germany has been perceived as a net consumer of security in Europe and 
beyond, and other EU member states and the US increasingly called upon the 
Federal Republic to increase its defence spending and foreign deployment in, 
for example, EU military missions. On 28 June 2016, five days after the Brexit 
vote, the German Parliament’s Commissioner for the Armed Forces, Hans-Peter 
Bartels, contended that ‘Germany now has even more responsibility’ as it would 
likely have to fill parts of the gap left by the exit of one of Europe’s security 
heavy weights and main troop suppliers, which would redirect its military 
cooperation even stronger toward the United States.123  
   Certainly, such calls suggest the Federal Republic is more willing to 
take greater responsibility in foreign affairs, an obvious difference between the 
past and the present. As previously stated, West German foreign policy 
strategies had been marked by a peculiar sense of discretion. Dirk Peters states, 
‘Germany had been oblivious of its power’.124 However, with the end of the 
Cold War, and the subsequent geopolitical alterations brought on by such an 
end, German foreign policy changed. So soon after reunification the German 
government had to succeed in removing concerns about an overly powerful 
Germany again. In Britain and the United States, issues were voiced that the 
German national character and mislead ambitions might lead the country to 
aspire to a dominant position in Europe. Margaret Thatcher, for example, 
opposed the pace of German unity, discouraging the idea of a strong unified 
Germany again125 Nevertheless, the government reacted to reunification by 
emphasising political continuity in an effort to convince the sceptics that not 
much had changed, that the Federal Republic remained a reliable democratic 
country, and that it would continue to lead a responsible foreign policy.126   
  Yet changes in German foreign policy were noticeable during the 
1990s and extended into the new millennium as well. For example, a clear 
indication that German foreign policy had shifted came very early on. The 
Federal government deployed German troops in the Gulf theatre through the 
winter months of 1990-1991, deployed naval vessels and aircraft for the 
Western European monitoring mission in the Adriatic, and committed aircraft 
and general support in Kosovo. 127  Scholars agree that the general public 																																																								
123 Die Zeit, Eine Truppe weniger für Europa, 28th June 2016, accessed 2nd July 2018, 
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opinions concerning such changes in foreign policy were met with a negative 
response. In fact, as outlined below most Germans who were polled did not 
agree with Kohl’s argument that the Basic Law should be changed to allow for 
the deployment of German troops for United Nations activities.  
 
 
2). Public opinion on the change of Basic Law to allow for German troops in 
UN operations (October 1990 - February 1991) 
 
 
 October 
1990, 
Old 
Länder 
October 
1990, 
New  
Länder 
 February 
1991, 
Old 
Länder 
February 
1991, 
New 
Länder 
I agree 24% 19%  36% 16% 
I 
disagree 
55% 53%  53% 66% 
Do not 
Know 
21% 28%  28% 18% 
 
 
Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Köcher (eds.), Allensbacher Jahrbuch 
der Demoskopie 1984-1992, (Munich 1993), p. 962, cited in Douglas Webber, 
New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?: German Foreign Policy 
Since Unification, (London, 2001), p. 70. 
 
 
It is the reticence of the German populace concerning foreign policy that 
emphasises a strong notion of West German identity. Over 50% of people 
disagreed with the notion of deploying German troops for UN operations so 
soon after the reunification of Germany. In spite of calls from politicians for 
Germany to have an increased presence on the world stage, most of the 
populace seemingly dismissed the notion of a more active German foreign 
policy.  
  More examples of change can be seen with the Federal Republic’s 
stance in the Kosovo War, the first time since the Second World War that 
German soldiers had taken part in a combat mission. This was not a support 
mission like in the Gulf Theatre; German soldiers were taking an active part in a 
NATO-led military operation with a military goal: the withdrawal of Serb 
troops from Kosovo.128 Yet paradoxically, support for this specific conflict 
remained relatively positive amongst the German populace, highlighting a 
distinctive difference between perceptions of foreign intervention in the past 																																																								
128 Wolfgang-Uwe Freidrich, ‘The Legacy of Kosovo: German Politics and Policies in the 
Balkans’, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, German Issues, No. 22, p. 48.  
	 43 
and present. In fact, in a Bundestag debate, Germany’s foreign policy was 
supported by the chairmen of all of the political party groups except the Party of 
Democratic Socialism (PDS), the former East German communists, who argued 
that the air strikes violated international law. 129  Furthermore, research 
conducted by the Congressional Research Service found that there was an East-
West divide in terms of support for Germany’s involvement in the Kosovo War, 
with 56% of Eastern Germans opposing such participation.130 East Germans, 
therefore, felt at greater odds against the Kosovo War than West Germans, 
which can imply a sense of Westalgie amongst Easterners for a time where the 
Federal Republic did not engage in foreign conflicts as much as it was doing in 
1999. Yet their opposition could feasibly be an example of anti-US sentiment, 
as the United States were, too, providing military aid much like the Federal 
Republic.  
  The example of the Kosovo War certainly presents a challenge in 
addressing foreign policy changes as a rationale for Westalgie’s existence. Yet 
as stated previously, West German nostalgia is a much more fluid and complex 
phenomenon in comparison to East German nostalgia. More importantly, other 
examples have shown that the German government has opposed other foreign 
conflicts, namely the Iraq war. In spite showing solidarity with the United States 
after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New 
York, the German government had expressed its reservations about an 
intervention in Iraq very early. Indeed, Helga Haftendorn notes that support for 
the governing coalition at the time remained low, altering the coalition’s ability 
to show support in a war that lacked a strong UN mandate.131   
 
 
3). Do you consider that it would be justified or not that our country participates 
in a military intervention in Iraq without a preliminary decision by the United 
Nations? 
 
 
 Absolutely 
Justified 
Rather 
Justified 
Rather 
Unjustified 
Absolutely 
Unjustified 
German 
Population 
 
4% 
 
6% 
 
29% 
 
61% 
 
 
EOS–Gallup Poll of Europe, January 2003. 
 
 																																																								
129 Karen Donfried, Kosovo: International Relations to NATO Airstrikes, CRS Report for 
Congress, (21st April 1999), p. 3.  
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              As shown in the table above, a majority of German citizens reacted 
very differently to the Iraq War, largely because they felt any conflict needed to 
be justified with a mandate from the United Nations. What is important is that 
the German population emphasised as strong sense of responsibility regarding 
the Federal Republic’s ability to intervene in foreign affairs. Therefore, it is 
important to note that not every specific incident involving German foreign 
policy relates to Westalgie. Perceptions of such events are, too, shaped by 
pragmatic concerns that are not always relevant to the onset of nostalgia. It is, 
however, clear that a reticent foreign policy was a hallmark of a West German 
identity. Moreover, as shown below, the general population of the Federal 
Republic do not regard an increase in national defence spending in the same 
manner as other European countries.  
 
 
4). Do you think we should increase our spending on national defence, keep it 
about the same, or decrease it? 
 
 
 Increase Keep the 
same 
Decrease 
Poland 52% 37% 3% 
Netherlands 49% 38% 9% 
Sweden 47% 45% 7% 
United 
Kingdom 
43% 41% 14% 
Germany 34% 47% 17% 
France 32% 52% 14% 
 
 
‘Europeans Face the World Divided’, Pew Research Center, (13th June 2016), 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/13/europeans-face-the-world-divided/, 
accessed 19th September 2016.  
 
 
In comparison to other European powers, Germany’s response to an increase in 
national defence spending is considerably lower than Poland’s, the 
Netherlands’, Sweden’s, and the United Kingdom’s. Indeed, these figures do 
not necessarily highlight an overt sense of nostalgia for the Federal Republic. 
After all, one can argue that foreign policy issues should take a back step behind 
domestic policies, especially regarding issues such as the financial crisis of 
2007-08 or the refugee crisis of recent years. Furthermore, the population’s 
disposition concerning issues of foreign intervention may still be loosely 
connected to the history of the Third Reich. Yet what public opinion shows is 
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that discretion concerning foreign policy, an important subject for West 
Germany prior to reunification, has largely remained unchanged in spite of any 
actual foreign policy developments in recent times. 
In 2013 the World Values Survey also found that a greater number of 
people would not fight for their country if there were to be an outbreak of war. 
These findings have largely remained constant since the reunification of 
Germany. In a similar poll conducted by the World Values Survey in 1997, 
West Germans were asked the same question, with over 43% stating that they 
would not be willing to fight for Germany.132 Such findings highlight the 
perception of foreign policy amongst the German populace. Whilst the Federal 
Republic has taken a more active foreign policy since reunification, most 
opinion polls show that the German populace does not wholly support this 
 
 
5). If there were to be another war, would you fight for your country? 
 
 
 
 
 
World Values Survey, 2010-2014 Results, p. 29. 
 
 
              Indeed, the issue of German foreign policy highlights another facet of 
change experienced by the Federal Republic after the reunification of Germany. 
Today, German foreign policy is now confronted with an array of challenges, 
which have demanded a response from the country’s foreign policy-makers. 																																																								
132 World Values Survey, 1995-1998 results, West Germany (1997), p. 31.  
Yes	41%	
No	53%	
No	answer	6%	
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Whereas the immediate post-Cold War period was dominated by the need to 
stabilise Europe, the challenges facing contemporary Germany are increasingly 
more global in character.133 It is therefore a challenge to link German foreign 
policy with a sense of nostalgia for the ‘old’ Federal Republic. True, Germany 
has demonstrated a sense of difference between the past and present when it 
comes to its foreign affairs. Yet criticisms levelled at such changes can be 
suggestive of more practical issues when dealing with foreign policy. 
Opposition to the Iraq War in Germany is but one example of such pragmatism, 
even if there is certainly a clear sense that German foreign policy has changed 
since the reunification of Germany.  
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 
Reunification brought with it a not so subtle change to the German political 
system creating a need to integrate a new set of people with their own political 
and social views. This had a profound effect on both the domestic and foreign 
affairs of the Federal Republic. The traditional party preferences of West 
Germany gave way with the introduction of a new electorate, and foreign policy 
became uniquely different in its own right. After examination of the political 
changes – both domestic and externally – the Federal Republic has experienced, 
it is clear that there is, at the very least some examples of nostalgia for the ‘old’ 
Federal Republic. There are, however, issues that must be addressed. For one, 
changes in domestic politics suggest that any notion of nostalgia would have 
developed later in the history of the ‘new’ Federal Republic. As the dissimilarity 
index highlighted, East and West German voting trends drifted more so after the 
turn of the millennium. As such, nostalgia for West Germany is unlike Ostalgie 
when referring to its onset. Reunification and its immediate consequences did 
more to affect East Germans than it did West Germans.  
Furthermore, while nostalgia is a phenomenon that critiques modernity 
and the changes that it brings, there are other genuine reasons to be critical of 
certain issues without feeling nostalgic. The early scholarly debate concerning 
German foreign policy after reunification emphasises this point, with academics 
discussing the Federal Republic’s geopolitical positioning at the time, rather 
than in the past. Pragmatism, one could argue, may have a more important role 
in developing criticisms and discourses rather than nostalgia when it comes to 
the political spectrum. This, too, was highlighted in the German populace’s 
views on the Iraq War, who felt that German foreign policy in this specific 
context relied upon responsible uses of UN mandates. It is therefore hard to 																																																								
133 Alister Miskimmon, ‘Foreign and Security Policy’ in Stephen Padgett, William E. Patterson, 
and Reimut Zohlnhöfer, (eds.), Developments in German Politics Four, (New York, 2014), p. 
211.  
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suggest that nostalgia for West Germany is completely linked with political 
developments in the Berlin Republic. Yes, there are certain examples of specific 
changes between the Federal Republic’s political past and present. But these 
examples do little to demonstrate how widespread and acknowledged such a 
phenomenon has become in contemporary times.  
That is not to say that Westalgie is not useful in understanding the past 
and the present when referencing West German politics, economics, or society. 
For example, an element of Ostalgie is its use in developing an East German 
identity that had become lost after the swift changes reunification brought. 
Without a sense of identity, a person’s history and past experiences can be left 
redundant. Such fears were notably brought up with the East German populace, 
with almost all aspects of everyday life gone for them. This can also be applied 
to West Germans, albeit on a smaller scale in comparison to East Germans. 
They felt a sense of loss once there was a clear recognition that the Bonn 
Republic had given way to the Berlin Republic. Granted, this is perhaps more 
relevant to West Berliners rather than West Germans due to the special 
geographical position of West Berlin, the unique subcultures it developed 
during the Cold War, and the representation of the city in numerous works of 
fiction. The political element of Westalgie therefore acknowledges the changes 
West Germans felt after 1990 and more so after 2000, but is in many ways very 
case-specific and only refers to certain events, rather than the whole picture.  
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4. Westalgie and Economics 
 
 
The previous chapter highlighted that politically, Westalgie can refer to specific 
instances of change the Federal Republic experienced after the year 2000. West 
German nostalgia developed in a later period compared to Ostalgie, largely 
owing to how changes affected East Germans so quickly after reunification. In 
regards to economics, this is a fairly similar trend. The early years following 
reunification highlighted a quick and sudden development of economic issues 
that faced East Germans. Indeed, West Germans were also affected by the 
integration of the Eastern economy into their own, yet the problems they faced 
were not essentially comparable and were largely overlooked by the eastern 
experience. More significant for West Germans was a change in currency from 
the popular and stable Deutschmark to the Euro, a currency that more recently 
has faced challenging moments. This, in essence, helps to establish a potential 
example of Westalgie, as the Deutschmark was arguably a strong symbol of 
West Germany. However, nostalgia for the Deutschmark does not necessarily 
represent a desire to revert to the currency, as opinion on the Euro has remained 
fairly positive in Germany. Overall, West Germany, superior than its Eastern 
counterpart when it came to having a successful economy, prided itself on being 
an economically stable post-war country. Part of its identity was formed by its 
economic success, with the Wirtschaftswunder and the Deutschmark 
contributing to its positive image both at home and abroad. It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that economics would have some form of impact in 
developing nostalgia for West Germany. 
  The first section will provide an understanding of how West 
Germany’s economic success became a source of national pride for West 
Germans. This, in essence, would lay the foundation for the development of 
Westalgie from an economic perspective as one can find a clear discernible 
difference between the past and present. The next section will outline the 
various economic issues East and West Germans faced after reunification, 
highlighting that such issues were primarily a problem for East Germans in 
comparison to West Germans. Lastly, due to the symbolic importance of the 
Deutschmark, its eventual replacement with the Euro will be analysed to not 
only demonstrate a sense of nostalgia for a part of West German history, but 
also to highlight how European integration has caused specific consequences for 
the Federal Republic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 49 
From Ruin to Miracle: Salvaging an Identity 
 
 
To understand how West Germans were able to build a strong sense of identity, 
it is important to view its formative years from an economic perspective. In the 
view of the large scale and highly visible destruction at the end of the Second 
World War, pessimistic opinions – both German and non-German – about 
Germany’s economic future were apparent.  For example, a U.S. report to the 
President concerning Germany’s agricultural and food requirements found that 
25 percent of German pre-war food production came from areas which were 
now taken by Poland and Russia. Similarly, coal production had halved due to 
the lack of availability of skilled workers, leading to the fear of Germany’s 
exports industry declining rapidly.134 The extent of the destruction in German 
cities was also very apparent after the conflict. For example, the American and 
British occupation zones had amassed to a total of 23.3 percent of housing 
destroyed. 135  Moreover, Hamburg’s harbour, the largest in Germany, was 
paralysed by the extent of destruction caused by the war. 2,900 wrecks blocked 
the passage of harbour traffic and over two-thirds of the harbour railway tracks 
had been destroyed. Damage to German cities and landscapes had also been 
self-inflicted by retreating German forces or by Nazi forces following Hitler’s 
instructions to leave behind only ‘scorched earth’ to the advancing enemy. 
Consequently, everything essential to the maintenance of everyday life such as 
farmhouses, water and electricity works, and stocks of food were damaged or 
otherwise destroyed.136 
In the midst of such devastation in Germany, the heads of the provincial 
and national authorities in the British occupational zone assessed the German 
economic situation as being ‘almost thrown back to the early days of 
industrialisation.’ 137  Contemporary newspaper articles reinforce such 
pessimism; one article in particular refers to a general decline in public morale 
in relation to the outcome of the war and its economic consequences.138 
However, in stark contrast to the negativity that accompanied West Germany’s 
economic situation immediately after the war, what followed in the subsequent 
years was a revival of the economy. The sudden recovery in the 1950s, 																																																								
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otherwise known as the Wirtschaftswunder, and supported by West Germany’s 
social market economy, helped to sustain the image of West German economic 
stability for the next four decades. The implementation of a new currency, the 
Deutschmark, also helped to reduce the risk of inflation. With the currency 
reform, the old Reichmarks were to be exchanged for the new Deutschmark on 
a one-to-one basis. More importantly, however, the currency reform 
discouraged retailers to hoard their goods from fear that they would accumulate 
worthless marks. It, too, destroyed the black market, where American cigarettes 
were the currency of choice. People were once again given an incentive to work 
for wages instead of resorting to bartering on the black market.139   
Yet additional prerequisites enabled the West German economy to 
improve dramatically after the war. Importantly, the Allied repairs to 
Germany’s badly damaged transport infrastructure achieved quick results: by 
June 1946, 93 percent of the railway lines in the British zone were open again, 
and 800 bridges had been repaired. In the American zone 78 percent of the 
railway lines were already operational by the end of the war. Yet only after a 
year repairs had ensured that 97 percent of lines were working again. Therefore, 
in spite of an initially harsh winter between the years 1946-47, the 
transportation of essential commodities aided a quick economic recovery.140  
Consequently, West Germany’s shift to a social market system helped it’s 
economy recover from the Second World War with what is known as the West 
German economic miracle. Retrospectively, one article noted, ‘no one will be 
able to deny that the German government has pursued a successful economic 
policy.’ This in spite of the German economy being ‘in the midst of the most 
severe crisis of the post-war period. State finances were shattered and the 
number of unemployed rose ever higher.’141  
Because of such success, it is therefore important to analyse why these 
factors are important when referencing nostalgia for West Germany. This is 
largely explained by the concept of West German identity at the time. In 
comparison to other leading countries such as France, the United Sates, or the 
United Kingdom, The Federal Republic lacked a political ‘founding’ myth. 
This, of course, was because of the notable position West Germany was in after 
the Second World War. As Grünbacher points out, the FRG was to a large 
extent an allied creation and seen by many Germans only as a temporary 
arrangement prior to the eventual reunification of Germany. 142  The 
consequences of the Holocaust, too, meant that the Federal Republic’s 																																																								
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immediate beginnings would be problematic. Any sense of national pride would 
therefore not come in the form of specific political moments as the Allies 
largely controlled early West German domestic policies, and the Nazi past 
would make FRG patriotism difficult. This was also pertinent to the Weimar 
Republic, a failed democracy that allowed the establishment of Nazism, and 
Imperial Germany, whose aggressive foreign policies were considered a starting 
point for the First World War. How then could the Federal Republic recover its 
image outwardly and, more importantly, inwardly?  
  Instead of a political ‘founding’ myth, the Federal Republic had to look 
elsewhere; namely with the economic successes that would soon occur after the 
Second World War. Werner Abelshauser argues that this myth could be found 
via the early economic performances of the FRG. It is, however, misconceptions 
of said performances that allowed the development of an economic ‘founding’ 
myth.  Where previous conceptions discussed a unique Wirtschaftswunder, he 
identified similar economic performance in other European nations of the time. 
He also attributed West Germany’s fantastic growth to pre-1945 trends. The 
‘economic miracle’ was consequently less than miraculous, but rather a series of 
medium-term business cycles within an upward trend.143  
Grünbacher also notes that terms that have become synonymous with 
West Germany’s post-war economic position such as the economic miracle 
have been misinterpreted, contributing to the creation of an economic myth that 
helped to create the Federal Republic. For example, he rejects the term miracle 
as it implies that the early economic success of the FRG was caused by divine 
intervention. Instead rationale explanations are presented such as the German 
work ethic. Hard work and diligence, according to Grünbacher, was a 
distinctive distraction from the Nazi past, allowing West Germans the ability to 
demonstrate to the world that decent people like themselves could not have been 
involved in Nazi atrocities.144 Indeed, much like Abelshauser, Grünbacher notes 
that although the economic miracle could be explained via reasonable factors, 
the sudden success of West Germany’s economy contributed to the ‘founding’ 
myth of the FRG and would act as a starting point for West Germans to 
appropriate into their identity. Mark Spicka highlights that the narrative of West 
Germany’s economic history was even encouraged in Erhard’s publications, 
helping to offer a sense of national redemption for Germans and become a 
source of legitimisation for the West Germany.145  
Stefan Berger, too, shares similar views but looks at the issue in the 
context of overcoming a troubled national past and the embracement of 
democratic values. According to Berger, Allied attempts to represent West 
Germans as victims of Hitler’s regime, along with the desire to eradicate racism 																																																								
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as opposed to nationalism, helped to uplift West Germans at a similar time as 
the economic miracle. The repressions of any signs of neo-Nazism combined 
with economic successes were the prime conditions under which the ‘old’ FRG 
could be successful. Former Nazis were smoothly integrated into the democratic 
nation as long as they showed themselves to be willing converts to the new 
nation and its liberal-democratic ideals. This highlighted how the economic 
success of the FRG strengthened traditionally strong economic identities and 
helped along democratic learning processes.146 Economic success was therefore 
intimately linked with the effort to overcome the past through democratic values 
and ideals. 
  Consequently, it is the economic performance of West Germany in its 
early years that helped shape a distinctive identity for West Germans. While 
they could not look to the past to help shape a positive sense of identity, they 
could view the economic miracle and the social market economy as signs of 
encouraging growth internally and externally. Indeed, though some scholars 
have challenged the term ‘miracle’ in characterising West Germany’s early 
economic performances, they are in agreement that the narrative of the 
Wirtschaftwunder had taken hold in the national consciousness of West 
Germans. After a slow economic start, West Germany transformed itself 
seemingly overnight from an economic cripple to powerhouse and enjoyed 
prodigious levels of growth in the 1950s, which would continue on into the 
1960s. As nostalgia and identity are closely interconnected, it is suitable to view 
the West German economy as an important element of Westalgie. 
Understanding how the economy has performed in recent times is therefore 
important in demonstrating why such nostalgia developed in the first place.  
Even the effects of the economic miracle were noticed outside of 
Germany and, more importantly, much later in the life of the ‘old’ FRG. 
President Ronald Reagan, speaking at the Brandenburg Gate in 1987, stated:  
 
Where four decades ago there was rubble, today in West Berlin there is 
the greatest industrial output of any city in Germany--busy office blocks, 
fine homes and apartments, proud avenues, and the spreading lawns of 
parkland. Where a city's culture seemed to have been destroyed, today 
there are two great universities, orchestras and an opera, countless 
theatres, and museums. Where there was want, today there's abundance--
food, clothing, automobiles--the wonderful goods of the Ku'damm.147 
 
Reagan’s speech highlighted a few important issues concerning the 
Wirtschaftwunder. Firstly, he stresses the close relationship between the ‘old’ 
Federal Republic and the United States in an era of geopolitical instability. 																																																								
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More importantly, however, is the pride West Germans could feel in regard to 
how far the country had come from complete ruin after the Second World War. 
It was, after all, the economic success of the West German system that helped to 
create such perceived prosperity. West German politicians, too, shared similar 
sentiments, highlighting a positive history that West German’s built upon after 
1945. In 1995, in his speech on the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, then 
President, Roman Herzog, pointed out West Germany’s positive achievements. 
After acknowledging the victims of the Germans and the role that Hitler as well 
as many Germans played in the Holocaust, Herzog focused on the positive 
issues that followed 1945; namely, Western integration, reconstruction, the 
economic miracle, the integration of refugees, and the adoption of Western 
democracy and human rights.148 In his inaugural speech on 1st July 2004, 
President Horst Köhler emphasised similar sentiments, stating:  
 
I myself am a member of a generation that experienced the Federal 
Republic as a unique success story, from the reconciliation with our 
neighbours, to the economic miracle, and ultimately reunification. These 
are all great historic achievements and good reasons to have confidence in 
ourselves.149  
 
These examples provide a sense of how West Germans perceived 
themselves during forty years of separation. The Wirtschaftwunder was a 
success story that laid the basis for a semblance of national pride, with military 
strength giving way to economic success – especially given the context of the 
Federal Republic’s fortunes after 1945. In this sense, as well, we see a number 
of high profile figures referring to West Germany in a nostalgic sense. The 
examples provided refer to a successful West Germany, which developed from 
ruin to a successfully sustaining country, in a positive viewpoint. Yet rather than 
point out the trials and tribulations involved in reuniting East and West 
Germany together, the ‘old’ Federal Republic is viewed as a beacon of hope for 
Germans that are displaced in modern times. Positive sentiments highlight the 
need to look to the past to help rectify issues in the present day.         
Indeed, the success of the West Germany’s social market economy made 
it easy for West Germans to grow fond of their new state. As the material 
situation improved for more and more sections of society, support for their 
system changed from an initial pragmatic and conditional support to a 
principled and stronger system support.150 Lifestyle magazines offered tips to 																																																								
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manage one’s diet and nutrition, as the benefits of the economic miracle 
apparently led to issues of weight gain among the German population. Ratgeber, 
for example, stated ‘we have gone a little overboard in our joy over the good 
things that have returned,’ and ‘One thing is certain: lately we have been eating 
too much.’151 Statistical evidence on the matter is difficult to attain yet the fact 
that magazines are even discussing such issues suggests how widespread the 
effects of the Wirtschaftwunder were perceived at the time.  
West Germany was also an important beneficiary in the early years of 
the Cold War. In the context of the United States’ strategic efforts to contain 
Communism after the Truman Doctrine, economic stability was intimately 
connected to political stability. Consequently, the Federal Republic’s economy 
benefitted from the initiation of financial aid from the U.S. such as the Marshall 
Plan. West Germany, therefore, profited from the unstable international rivalry 
that emerged quickly after the Second World War. Added economic stimulation 
came from an increase in demand in German products as a result of the Korean 
War, again a by-product of the Cold War. Overall, West German production 
output leapt upward at an average annual rate of 8.2 percent in the years of 
1950-54 and 7.1 percent in the years 1955-58.152 
The West German economy, too, benefitted from employing external 
labour from varying European countries. Policies were shaped on the view that 
migrant workers were temporary labour units, which could be recruited, utilised, 
and sent away again as employers required.153 In principle, the guest worker 
policies introduced in the Federal Republic were designed to benefit both the 
West German economy, and the foreigners who would return to their respective 
nations as skilled labourers. Very quickly, West Germany began taking in 
workers from countries such as Spain, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, and 
Yugoslavia. Subsequently, the Federal Republic experienced a rapid increase in 
foreigners entering under formal guest worker programmes. Waves of 
Gastarbeiter came from the less developed and rural regions of their respective 
countries of origin. Guest workers in essence filled the gaps caused by the 
complete reduction of East German workforces and therefore allowed West 
Germany’s economy to further progress, in spite of an emerging domestic 
hostility approaching foreign labour towards the 1970s. 
  West Germany therefore had a strong history of economic success 
during forty years of division. As a direct counterpart to East German’s socialist 
economy, West Germans could, at the very least, point to their economic way of 
life as a source of national pride. In the context of where the West German 
economy was after the Second World War, it is apparent that West Germans 																																																								
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aligned themselves with the Federal Republic after the success of its economy. 
It is, therefore, understandable that the West German economy may in some 
way be linked with Westalgie. After all, changes brought on by the reunification 
of Germany had an impact on the German economy, a point that helped 
nostalgia develop like it did in East Germany.  
 
 
Reunification: Problems from an Economic Perspective 
 
 
Faced with the task of integrating a region with decrepit infrastructure, out-
dated technology and no capitalist experience, the West German government 
confronted a number of important decisions in 1990. These included the 
exchange rate at which to effect monetary union, how to privatise eastern firms, 
how to spend money in the east, and whether to raise the money through taxes 
or debt. Considering that reunification acted as the starting point for the 
emergence of Ostalgie, it is prudent to assess the economic impact the same 
event had on West Germans economically. Indeed, as previously stated, the 
political differences between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Federal Republic were 
noticeable. Yet these typically occurred later in the Federal Republic’s history. 
While East Germans were quick to notice the pace of reunification from a 
political and economic viewpoint, West Germans were far more likely to 
critique these changes later on.  
  The crucial point to address is that by the start of the nineties, the East 
German economic structures already had no chance to survive. As such, it was 
only a matter of time as to how quickly it would collapse and be replaced by 
something entirely new. This therefore allowed the West German government 
the ability to integrate the East German economy in any way it saw fit. One of 
the first steps towards economic reunification occurred in 1990 with a monetary 
union between the two German countries. East Germans would adopt the 
Deutschmark, a literal representation of the successful West German economic 
model, replacing the East German mark. The legal framework for the economic 
community between the two states and for the transformation of East 
Germany’s economic order involved nearly a complete adoption of the FRG’s 
economic laws and regulations by East Germany. These changes included the 
restoration of private property and competition in East Germany and the free 
movement of goods, services, labour and capital between East and West 
Germany. In addition, social welfare, pensions, unemployment and health 
insurance programs similar to those in West Germany were introduced into East 
Germany and any deficits in these new programs would be financed temporarily 
by the FRG. Pensions in East Germany were converted to Deutschmark values 
based on net East German incomes, meaning an East German worker could 
receive a maximum pension of 70 percent of his or her net income after 45 years 
	 56 
of employment. The agreement also guaranteed that the Deutschmark value of 
East German pensions could not fall below their former Mark equivalents.154 
  In essence, the economic strategy of the Federal Republic regarding its 
East German counterpart was one of replication. For Westerners, it was 
assumed that the East German economy would benefit straight away from its 
integration with the West. For Easterners, the mass protests of 1989 not only 
mirrored the popular outrage with regards to the constrictions of personal and 
political rights of freedom but also reflected the all-around dissatisfaction with 
the insufficient supply of goods and services in the East. However, much like 
the political unification of the two Germany countries, the economic 
consequences of reunification was not a simple process. This is significant as it 
helps one to understand a starting point for Westalgie. Of course, from an 
economic perspective, reunification had a greater economic impact on East 
Germans as opposed to West Germans. Not only were their core political and 
economic beliefs changed along with the fall of the Berlin Wall, but East 
Germans soon faced the startling reality that reunification would have 
prolonged after-effects. One important differentiation between the GDR and the 
Berlin Republic refers to the economic situation of Germany after 1990, 
arguably the most immediate issue that helped foster nostalgia for East 
Germany.  
From an economic position, reunification had a great amount of 
expectations coming from former GDR citizens. As West Germans began to 
enjoy the profits of the post-war economic miracle, and the ever-increasing 
range of consumer goods, Easterners looked on fully aware that their 
government could not keep up with the West economically.155 As previously 
mentioned, it was assumed that unification, at least economically, would be a 
quick process for East Germans.  
Nevertheless, a feeling of resentment developed between East and West 
Germany because the euphoria of the years after the fall of the wall had been 
replaced with the hardships of everyday life. There, too, was a greater emphasis 
on integrating East Germans into the ‘new’ Federal Republic as opposed to 
West Germans. Focus on developing the Eastern infrastructure at the expense of 
the West meant the perception that reunification was hampered by merging the 
East with the West. Many East Germans spoke of the need for greater 
governmental investment in the east, with the Gesprächskreis Ost arguing that 
‘the economic rebuilding of the East must emphatically stand at the centre of 
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political action.’156 Yet the experience of Westerners, one can argue, remained 
second behind East Germans.  
Indeed, such findings suggest that changing economic circumstances 
mainly affected those in the East as opposed to the West. While this certainly 
appears to be the case, the perspective of Westerners is important to gauge any 
sense of economic nostalgia for West Germany. West Germans, of course, did 
not have to adjust to a new economic ideology, lose beloved brands, or face 
relatively high levels of unemployment. Yet they faced their own challenges in 
merging the East German economy with their own. Reunification caused some 
socioeconomic problems in the old parts of the Federal Republic. From the 
perspective of West Germans, who grew accustomed to a certain way of living 
under the FRG government, reunification also had broad economic 
consequences.  
West German unemployment, while low compared to the East, still 
increased during the first years after reunification, leaving a somewhat negative 
impression of the events of 1989/90, especially considering the initial euphoria 
felt about merging East and West Germany together. The graph below 
highlights the change in West German employment levels both before and after 
reunification, with a general decline in unemployment levels by 1991, only to 
increase towards the end of the decade. 
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6). West German Unemployment Rate before and after Reunification 
 
 
 
 
 
Germany Unemployment Rate, 
http://www.indexmundi.com/germany/unemployment_rate.html, accessed 19th 
June 2017. 
 
 
             It is in periods of personal decline where nostalgia can develop 
overtime. Take, for example, the emergence of Ostalgie so soon after 1990. The 
lives of East Germans were ruptured to the point where they reminisced certain 
elements of their past. While they did not want to go back to a communist 
dictatorship, facets of their upbringing were quickly changed, along with high 
levels of unemployment. This, in a sense, contributed to the feeling of 
difference between the Berlin and Bonn Republic. Taking on the challenge of 
integrating the East German economy had an adverse effect on West German 
citizens. Certainly, these somewhat negative experiences related to the 
reunification of Germany had an impact on the general perception of the events 
of 1989/90.  
The high costs necessary to overcome the economic division between 
the East and West is an important factor in reminding West Germans of 
reunification because the huge subsidisation meant personal financial loses, as 
they had to pay a certain percentage of their wages through ‘solidarity taxes’. 
The economic state of Germany and the effect it has had on the public has been 
a popular topic of debate for Germans. For many years West Germans had been 
accustomed to an Americanised way of life, and the strain on the economy due 
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to transfer payments for the rebuilding of the East had seriously tested the 
West's dedication to reunification. Though the payments were considered 
temporary at the time, their negative effects, such as higher taxes and 
unemployment, have been widely felt. Indeed, when asked how their situation 
has changed since reunification, West Germans polled generally seem to have 
found life more trying.157 Solidarity Taxes, once thought to be only temporary 
still remain in spite of certain opposition to it.  
Although they did not have to adapt to change in the same manner as 
East Germans, it is clear that reunification altered the lives of West Germans 
from an economic perspective. From this position, reunification clearly affected 
East Germans more so than West Germans. This is important in helping to 
understand the complexities of Westalgie. It is, after all, a phenomenon that is 
case-specific. The political element of nostalgia for West Germany highlighted 
this fact and the early economic troubles after reunification do the same. Indeed, 
the West German economy was resoundingly built on an economic ‘founding’ 
myth that was defined by hard work and meticulousness. The economic effects 
of reunification undoubtedly challenged this sense of West German identity. 
Therefore it is no surprise that some form of nostalgia would have developed 
after reunification for West Germans. However, as stated above, these 
immediate effects were felt greater in East Germany than in the West. This 
explains the sudden emergence of Ostalgie, but does little to do the same for 
Westalgie. As such, it is necessary to view a specific and significant economic 
change the Federal Republic did experience in the new millennium; namely the 
introduction of the Euro in favour of the symbolic Deutschmark. 
 
 
From the Deutschmark to the Euro: Adopting the Common Currency  
 
 
The Deutschmark, a symbol and expression of West Germany’s post-war 
identity, gave way to the Euro early in the new millennium. From the 
challenging circumstances from which the currency was born, to its overall 
performance concerning low inflation, the Deutschmark was a source of 
national pride for both East and West Germans. It was an important factor in 
helping West Germans recover from the Second World War both economically 
and psychologically. As such, when the Deutschmark was eventually replaced 
by the Euro in January 2002, debate concerning the loss of a West German 
symbol materialised.  
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The Deutschmark was a strong example of West Germany’s 
international financial and economic success and also contributed to it. Since 
reunification, it had become even more important as a symbol as well as an 
instrument of Germany’s new central role in Europe.  As stated previously, the 
implementation of the Deutschmark contributed in some way to help West 
Germany’s economy thrive so soon after the Second World War. It is, therefore, 
no surprise to consider how important the relationship may be between West 
Germany’s inhabitants and their former currency. The change from the 
Deutschmark to the euro marked a change between the Bonn and Berlin 
Republic, especially considering the symbolic nature of the Deutschmark. 
Sacrificing the currency meant both the loss of a powerful national symbol and 
the loss of a unilateral policy-making power. Matthias Kaelberer notes that 
unlike other European currencies at the time such as the French Franc or the 
Italian Lira, the German Deutschmark was a symbol of national pride due to 
sustained economic success during its lifespan. 158 Moreover, due to West 
Germany’s complex history with national symbols owing to its Nazi past, the 
Deutschmark stood out as a positive symbol for West Germans to adopt in the 
post-war years. Although German citizenship laws and definitions of being 
‘German’ continued to be based largely on blood ties, the Nazi period had made 
it impossible for Germans to be very proud of ethnicity as a source of national 
identity. This opened a space for new forms of identity building, namely a 
strong feeling of economic pride.   
  It is significant in this context that the images of Deutschmark 
banknotes and euro notes visibly highlight the desire of Germany to integrate 
with the West. Post- World War II German banknotes stressed German 
discontinuities by depicting portraits of pre-Bismarckian scientists and cultural 
figures. The difficult circumstances under which the currency was born supplied 
another incentive for the development of Deutschmark patriotism. Moreover, 
the fact that each individual German started out with the same amount of the 
new Deutschmarks on the day of the currency reform added to its potential of 
identity creation.159 As Klaus Müller notes, this helped to symbolise a common 
starting point for a new life and laid the ground for the social mythology of a 
society beyond classes and social strata.160 Altering the currency therefore, 
would arguably have had an effect on perceptions between the Bonn and Berlin 
Republic. Economically speaking, adopting the Euro represented a stark 
contrast between the two republics, with the loss of a national currency symbol 
highlighting change in a tangible way. Taking this into account, why did the 
Federal Republic replace its fruitful currency and place faith in a different one? 
Importantly, this was not a simple endeavour.   																																																								
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  On a purely pragmatic level the single currency was viewed as the 
logical follow-up to the European single market allowing for the free movement 
of goods, capital, labour and services. The Euro would also stop excessive 
currency fluctuations and protectionist pressures that could jeopardize the single 
market. Moreover, only an elaborate institutional framework, such as European 
Monetary Union, could have provided the exchange-rate stability necessary to 
provide economic stability in a globalising economy. The single currency would 
have also eliminated transaction costs and potentially lead to increased 
investment. In sum, the Euro was supposed to be the answer to the increased 
economic interdependence among the EU member-states and to challenge the 
consequences of globalisation.161  
  Indeed, while the points mentioned above were important for the 
German federal government, the continuation of integration with Europe was 
also significant. The federal government pressed for a deeper European 
integration and was willing to use monetary integration as a method to achieve 
this. German industry was also keen to create stable export markets in Europe 
and thus supported any efforts to economically integrate with Europe.162 Yet 
there were notable examples of opposition to the introduction of the common 
currency. For example, the country’s powerful central bank, the Bundesbank, 
was afraid that its influence may be lost if the currency that it produced and 
regulated were to dissolve into a common European currency. This, however, 
should be of no surprise. The Bundesbank had been the sole monetary policy 
agent in the Federal Republic since its inception. Any loss of economic 
sovereignty would have been met with criticisms regardless.    
   Opinions, both public and political, on the matter were a source of 
contention. One commentator noted that ‘Europe offered a substitute identity for 
those who were no longer proud of being German,’ suggesting that in the 
aftermath of West Germany’s post-war situation, European and Western 
integration helped to provide a sense of distinctiveness for West Germans. Yet 
after the success of West Germany’s economy, along with the dissolution of 
East Germany, national pride could now be sourced elsewhere. German’s need 
no longer look at European integration to help define them as the West German 
political system facilitated such pride.163 A sticking point for West Germans 
therefore was the Deutschmark as a national symbol. Greater European 
integration meant the loss of West German heritage, yet for East Germans such 
sentiments were also expressed. For example, an East German baker saw the 
introduction of the Euro in a pragmatic sense, highlighting the difficulty in yet 																																																								
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another conversion change, with preparation for new conversion tables, 
programming new cash registers, and making new price tags for each individual 
store.164 
  From a political perspective, prior to the eventual adoption of the Euro 
the Kohl government supported the introduction of the single currency for 
reasons of both economic and foreign policy. It was intent on sending a clear 
message that Germany was committed to European integration after 
reunification. This, too, was shared by the major parties of the Bundestag later 
on. The SPD-Green coalition, for example, favoured European integration as a 
means of providing security for both the continent and the Federal Republic.165 
Integration with Europe therefore marked an important aspect as to why 
Germany replaced its currency; rational economic issues defined such a move 
and were supported on the basis that interdependence was the new foreign 
policy norm. German perceptions of the Euro have, however, shifted since its 
adoption. Of course, an obvious explanation would be the fact that it replaced a 
popular currency that demonstrated the success of the West German economic 
system. On closer inspection one can highlight a tangible link between the 
economic changes the Federal Republic experienced after reunification and the 
development of Westalgie. The Deutschmark was a success story for West 
Germany that could be appropriated by its people to help forge a sense of 
identity at a time where there was little to celebrate. The timing of the Euro’s 
adoption is also important when discussing the development of nostalgia for 
West Germany. Like the political changes the Federal Republic experienced 
after reunification, economic changes – namely the switch to a single currency – 
occurred later in the life of ‘new’ Federal Republic. Reunification did not decide 
the fate of the Deutschmark, but rather the desire to integrate with Europe on a 
large scale. This was also a process that had been a priority for the West 
German federal government and the Allies since the end of the Second World 
War.   
   A lot of developments that can be connected to Westalgie’s onset refer 
more to a symbolic shift from Bonn to Berlin. Although the West German 
system was arguably more successful than its Eastern counterpart, the eventual 
changes Germany faced in the new millennium were key examples of difference 
between the past and present. Party political preferences changed, foreign policy 
was more assertive, the German economy struggled, and now the Deutschmark 
was gone. Indeed, specific criticisms of each individual case do suggest that 
there are practical reasons as to why one may feel aggrieved by any political or 
economic changes. Yet the political and economic changes Germany 
experienced, particularly after the year 2000, all contribute to the notion that 																																																								
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West Germany has changed. These changes do not necessarily have to be 
perceived as positive or negative, but rather acknowledged in general.  
  The Euro therefore marked an appropriate point for West Germans to 
notice a sense of difference between the past and the present. Its economic 
performance, however, would ultimately shape public perception of it compared 
to the Deutschmark. In the years between 1999 and 2005, Germany’s economy 
was plagued by high unemployment and its economic growth was consistently 
below that of other Eurozone countries. In fact, in the year after Germany 
adopted the Euro, economic growth stood at -0.2% compared to the 1.2% of 
combined Eurozone countries.166 Because of this it is surprising to find that 
support for the Euro in the Federal Republic has largely been positive during the 
2000s. Interestingly enough, opinion polls concerning the Euro have shown 
fluctuating levels of support amongst Germans.  
 
 
7). Early support for the Euro in European Countries. 
 
 
 France Germany Italy Spain U.K. 
1996 59 40 78 62 34 
1997 56 32 74 58 26 
1998 68 51 83 72 34 
1999 68 57 84 70 28 
2000 67 50 81 75 22 
2001 67 53 83 68 25 
2002 67 67 87 80 31 
2003 75 70 82 75 24 
2004 68 58 69 74 26 
 
 
Eurobarometer, Various Years. 
 
 
              Quantitative evidence suggests that early support for the Euro in the 
Federal Republic increased over time while there were variations elsewhere in 
the European Union. What then does growing support for the Euro mean for any 
connection between the Deutschmark and Westalgie? For one, nostalgia by its 
definition does not refer to changing the present to imitate the past but rather to 
fondly remember a part of time that is no longer attainable for an individual. 
Indeed, while support for the Deutschmark remained at a fairly constant state, 
this does not mean the majority of people were actively seeking to change their 
currencies. This once again stresses a pragmatic approach most Germans have 																																																								
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taken to the changes the Federal Republic experienced after 2000. While they 
may look back at the Deutschmark fondly, the early performance of the Euro 
took greater precedent than nostalgia as a whole.   
Generational differences, too, help to explain such surprising findings. 
Generations of Germans born after the change in currency will never have an 
intimate relationship with the Deutschmark and would only theoretically know 
about it through historical significance. Evidence provided by Eurobarometer, 
too, suggests that support for the Euro varied from different age groups with 
over sixty-eight percent of people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four 
showing support for the Euro, compared to fifty-five percent of people over 
fifty. However, it should be noted that these particular findings included people 
from every member country of the European union as opposed to just the 
Federal Republic.167 
It was, however, the Euro crisis later in the new millennium that could 
have feasibly shaken the perception of the currency in the Federal Republic. 
Partly as a consequence of the financial markets crisis of 2007/08 and the 
ensuing recession, the Eurozone was plunged into grave problems in the years 
after 2010. Moreover, as Greece’s national debt became substantial, a crisis in 
confidence grew over the currency union’s future viability. As the biggest EU 
economy, Germany was a crucial player in discussions about the handling and 
resolution of the crisis. As the German economy improved once the early 
problems of the Euro were overcome, the Federal Republic eventually 
guaranteed more than €200 billion as loans to Greece, Ireland and Portugal.168 It 
was therefore clear that the country would have to play a major role in the 
resolution of the Euro crisis. This, too, emphasised how German foreign policy 
had changed in the first decade of the new millennium. In its commitment to 
European integration, as well as being the economically strongest European 
country, the Federal Republic faced greater pressure to take on a more active 
responsible role when it came to the economy. Indeed, perceptions of the crisis, 
as well as Germany’s greater role in helping threatened economies, may have 
altered how the Euro was viewed in not just the Federal Republic, but in Europe 
as well. However, polls conducted by the European Commission suggest that 
support for the Euro still remains relatively strong.  
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8). Having the Euro is a Good or Bad Thing for your Country 
 
 
 
 
 
Flash Barometer 429, p. 8. 
 
 
As seen from the table above, in 2015 the Federal Republic was only 
behind Luxembourg and the Republic of Ireland when it came to general 
support for the Euro. In relation to other major European countries such as 
Spain and France, Germany stands out as one of the leading countries to support 
the currency. This, too, is surprising given the early issues the Federal 
Republic’s economy faced after the adoption of the common currency.  
  However, a major consequence of the Euro’s issues early in the 2010s 
was an increase in support for Eurosceptic parties. For example, the right-wing 
party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), highlighted in their manifesto the 
need to hold a national referendum on the whether Germany should remain in 
the Euro monetary union. Referring to the adoption of the Euro as an 
‘experiment,’ the AfD argued that the Euro jeopardises the peaceful co-
existence of European nations ‘forced into sharing a common destiny by the 
Eurocracy.’169 Indeed, as a staunch Euro-sceptic party, their recent electoral 
successes calls into question the Federal Republic’s relationship with the 																																																								
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European Union and as such the Euro itself.170 Yet their successes can also be 
attributed to wider issues concerning the integration of immigrants into German 
society and multiculturalism in general. For example, Der Speigel in one article 
noted that the consequential issues of the AfD’s election in the Bundestag 
would have an impact on refugees and immigrants in the Federal Republic.171 
Commentators outside of Germany also pointed to a fragmented electoral 
system between East and West Germans, highlighting differing perceptions 
between the two sets of voters.172  As such, recent electoral successes achieved 
by the AfD did not entirely mean a rejection of the Euro, but rather a set of 
issues regarding Eastern voters as well as multiculturalism in general.    
  Nevertheless, the introduction of the Euro in the Federal Republic was 
an extremely important moment for Germany. In favour of European 
integration, the federal government had replaced its prevalent currency, one that 
had a rich history for West Germany and was a source of national pride for 
West Germans. Moreover, the Euro represented change on an economic level. 
True, the fact that the Federal Republic continued to be a leading European 
power after the adoption of the common currency highlights that perceptions of 
such issues – either positive or negative – do little to help develop the onset of 
nostalgia; fundamental differences between the past and present do more to 
achieve that. Yet the change in currencies had consequences beyond superficial 
differences. For one, a part of West Germany’s identity was gone. The symbol 
of the Deutschmark was replaced by a desire to help progress European 
integration. This, however, helped develop criticisms of said integration and 
brought forward broader issues of Germany’s integration methods with other 
cultures. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
 
When viewing the relationship between economics and Westalgie, one can see a 
clear resemblance with the political element of the phenomenon. Examples of 
nostalgia for West Germany developed more so in reaction to changes made in 
the Federal Republic after the year 2000. The economic consequences of 
reunification, while challenging the notion of a strong West German economy, 
did more to affect East Germans at the time. They had to adapt to a new 
economic system, and accept a Western led economic unification. Of course, 
West German unemployment increased and the economy largely struggled prior 
to the end of the century. Yet these economic issues mostly exacerbated 
tensions between East and West Germans, rather than a sense of nostalgia for 
West Germany.  
  It is the Deutschmark and its eventual replacement that highlights how 
case-specific Westalgie is. In trying to integrate more with Europe, the Federal 
Republic lost an important symbol of West Germany that, therefore, shows a 
clear difference between the past and the present. Indeed, the general support 
for the Euro indicates that while the Deutschmark is still held in high regard by 
both East and West Germans, the desire for the currency to return is not 
necessarily there. Support for the Euro is also not necessarily based on a sense 
of nostalgia for the Deutschmark, but by its overall performance in modern 
times. More importantly, the adoption of the Euro was not a consequence of 
reunification, but rather a continuing effort by the Federal government to 
integrate with Europe that had started long before 1990.  
Westalgie’s development is therefore linked more with events that 
succeed the reunification of Germany. It is, however, challenging to link 
Westalgie with economic developments in the Berlin Republic. True, an 
individual may feel a sense of nostalgia for a time when the economy was not 
affected by the effects of reunification, such as the integration of the East 
German economy, or the personal impact of solidarity taxes. Yet to say that 
these feelings are representative of the entire West German population is 
problematic. Examples of Westalgie in an economic context are also not as 
obvious, especially in direct comparison to Ostalgie. For East Germans it is a lot 
easier to conceive why one might feel nostalgic as their lives were notably 
changed by the economic consequences of reunification. This again emphasises 
the fact West German nostalgia is a much more complex phenomenon on closer 
inspection, especially when analysing the concept in such broad terms.  
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5. German Multiculturalism Debates and Nostalgia 
 
 
Since the early 2000s across Europe, the rise and ubiquity of arguments 
challenging multiculturalism have become very apparent.173 Indeed, modern day 
Germany is by no means an exception to discourses concerning the impact of 
ethnic diversity. Throughout the Federal Republic’s history, debates concerning 
the integration of guest workers, xenophobic violence against foreigners, as well 
as the perception of Islam has persisted. These facts alone provide a justifiable 
reason to analyse how German multiculturalism and Westalgie are related. After 
all, criticisms of the Federal Republic’s multicultural policies, both past and 
present, suggest a sense of change that can be perceived negatively, insinuating 
some form of nostalgia for a past that may or may not have existed. Previous 
chapters have noted that change, and the perceptions of its consequences, are 
the driving force for the development of nostalgia as a whole. It is therefore 
prudent to engage with the varying cultural and social shifts that occurred in the 
Federal Republic after the reunification of Germany. 
  Indeed, West Germany did experience a growing critical discourse 
concerning multiculturalism, albeit at a slow pace. It is therefore challenging to 
use reunification as a starting point for the changing social circumstances of 
West Germans and any potential nostalgia that followed. Certainly, changes to 
German citizenship laws for migrants at the turn of the millennium do highlight 
the difference between the Bonn and Berlin Republic in some sense. Yet 
discussions concerning migrants in the Federal Republic had long been 
established even before the reunification of Germany. This, at the very least, 
calls into question whether multiculturalism has had a profound effect on 
Westalgie’s development.  
   Though there had been a very slow public discourse concerning 
immigration and its overall impact on society, politics, economics, and culture, 
contemporary Germany does face challenges to multiculturalism. This, too, is 
more apparent than ever considering the rise of far-right groups such as 
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and Pegida. Yet these criticisms are not 
simply a consequence of far-right radical thinking. For example, in October 
2010, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, made the bold statement that 
attempts to make a multicultural society in Germany had ‘utterly failed’. 
Furthermore, she added that the ‘multikulti’ concept – where people would ‘live 
side-by-side’ happily – did not work, and immigrants needed to do more to 
integrate in society.174  Similarly, the German Finance Minister, Wolfgang 																																																								
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Schäuble, stated in 2011 ‘we made a mistake in the early sixties when we 
decided to look for workers, not qualified workers but cheap workers from 
abroad,’ leading to a large group of migrants that had not integrated into the 
Federal Republic as desired.175 
  These criticisms from certain sections of the political spectrum 
highlight how critical the dialogue of multiculturalism in Germany has become. 
In this sense, it is not necessarily an issue of nostalgia, but rather an issue of 
integration and cohabitation with migrants that have spurned on critical 
discourses. Much like linking political and economic developments with 
Westalgie, one can find pragmatic and practical reasoning behind 
condemnations of German multiculturalism. It is therefore too simplistic to view 
multicultural discourses in modern times as a product of nostalgia. While 
nostalgia suggests the changes modernity brings are negative in comparison to 
past developments, it is important to understand the context of certain criticisms 
German multiculturalism has faced. For example, the topic of ethnic diversity in 
the Berlin Republic is by no means new, carrying over from earlier issues 
regarding the integration of foreign labourers that were expected to remain in 
West Germany as guests for a short period of time. This also highlights once 
again how complex Westalgie is as a phenomenon as discussions on German 
multiculturalism highlight concerns that are not entirely related to the concept of 
nostalgia.        
  It is, too, important to note that the historiography concerning German 
multiculturalism is both varied and extensive. For all the large numbers of 
immigrants entering Germany after the 1960s and working on a ‘temporary’ 
basis, scholars agree that critiques of guest workers and immigration as a whole 
came later in the Federal Republic’s history.176 Herbert and Hunn argue that the 
lack of critical dialogue surrounding the ‘guest worker question’ arose from the 
earlier Nazi utilisation of forced labourers. With the employment of foreign 
workforces just sixteen years after the Nationalist Socialist system of enforced 
labour had ended, there was no public mention whatsoever in the Federal 
Republic of this dark historical backdrop in the public discourse. This facilitated 
the fiction that there was no relevant precedent for the new wave of foreign 
workers because after the war there was no recognition in West Germany that 
the deployment of foreign slave labourers under the Third Reich was among 																																																								
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specific crimes perpetuated by the National Socialists.177 This, according to 
Herbert and Hunn, explains why people did not come to grips with questions on 
integrating contemporary foreign labourers. Yet this explanation is debatable 
considering that there have always been long standing traditions of foreign 
workers entering the country either voluntarily or involuntarily.  
Rita Chin, on the other hand, suggests a more pragmatic but simple 
reason for why such a slow public discourse concerning immigrant workers and 
their overall impact emerged. The title of ‘Gastarbeiter’ reinforced the 
impression amongst West Germans that the residency of foreign workers was 
temporary. As formulated by Erhard, the main principle behind the Gastarbeiter 
policies was the short-term employment of the foreign workforces entering the 
nation. Taking this rigid definition of the ‘guest worker’ into account, the 
Federal Republic insisted that the newcomers were just that: ‘guests’ and 
‘workers’ who were expected to return when the job was done and once the 
contract had finished. 178  Furthermore, labelling foreign workers as ‘guest 
workers’ reduced their presence in West German society to an economic 
function, implying that their impact was only limited to the labour market as 
opposed to any societal influence. This meant that the public dialogue about 
guest workers in this early period could not engage in the broader effects of 
labour migration.179 Instead, the public only viewed Gastarbeiter as a brief 
solution for West Germany’s improving economy. As long as the term ‘guest 
worker’ was used in the public, the belief that the type of work given to 
foreigners was temporary held firm in the public’s imagination of migrant 
labourers. 
A stumbling block has been the federal government’s apparent lack of 
urgency in introducing multicultural policies into the Federal Republic. Old-
fashioned institutionalised notions of what it means to be a ‘German’ have also 
not helped the government and public’s perceptions of multiculturalism. 
Schönwälder even suggests that Germany’s late acceptance of itself as a ‘land 
of immigration’ has not been beneficial to multicultural developments. 
Multiculturalism, according to her, served as a symbolic counterweight to 
nationalism and ethnic based conceptions of native Germans. When the federal 
government and general public slowly realised the overall impact of 
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immigration, they developed a defensive attitude against foreigners and their 
integration into society.180  
At the same time, whilst there is a general acknowledgment that a 
backlash against multiculturalism exists in Europe, the word ‘exaggeration’ 
tends to be used by academics in conjunction with any hostilities facing ethnic 
diversity. That is not to say that any public or governmental discussions 
critiquing multiculturalism and its consequences are not serious. In the case of 
Germany, sporadic right-wing violence against immigrants has been apparent, 
particularly in the years following reunification. 181  Instead, scholars are 
currently attempting to rationalise current discourses of multiculturalism by 
analysing beyond sweeping statements referring to its failure, and focussing on 
the relationship between the public’s disposition towards immigration and 
actual governmental policies. 
However, whilst discussions have focussed on the slow acknowledgment 
of multiculturalism in the Federal Republic, scholars have yet to engage with 
the impact nostalgia may have in relation to any issues created via the 
integration of migrants. Indeed, such a viewpoint would only be relevant after 
the reunification of Germany; especially considering the ‘old’ Federal Republic 
was a multicultural society. Yet as previous chapters have already discussed, 
nostalgia for West Germany developed far later in the history of the Bonn 
Republic. Nostalgia for East Germany was established very quickly after the 
reunification, owing to the pace of change in the everyday life of East Germans. 
West Germans, however, only began to acknowledge a sense of nostalgia that 
occurred in the new millennium. For West Germans, a perceived cultural shift, 
particularly in relation to the impact of Islam on German society, is worth 
analysing to understand whether Westalgie has driven more recent debates on 
multiculturalism. As such, the first subchapter will contextualise contemporary 
multicultural discourses by discussing the early implementation of guest worker 
initiatives. The second subchapter will analyse the violence migrants faced after 
the reunification of Germany, highlighting what caused a radical shift in critical 
discourses concerning multiculturalism. Lastly, the final subchapter will focus 
on more recent cultural debates in the ‘new’ Federal Republic, analysing 
whether any form of nostalgia has influenced such discussions.           
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Guest Worker Initiatives: The Introduction of Foreign Labour 
 
 
To understand how a critical discourse concerning multiculturalism developed, 
it is necessary to analyse the early onset of immigration in the Federal Republic 
after the Second World War and before the reunification of Germany. Of 
course, the Second World War had a drastic effect on the Federal Republic’s 
workforce. Nazi Germany’s wartime industrial production had been reliant on 
foreign civilian labourers and prisoners of war. When these workers returned to 
their respective native countries after the war ended, they were only partially 
replaced by the returning German soldiers. However, due to the number of able-
bodied German males having been drastically reduced by the war, the German 
economy needed to compensate for such a decline in domestic workers.182 The 
death rate of German soldiers was twice as high in the Second World War than 
the First. In fact, every third German male born between 1910 and 1925 did not 
survive the war.183 To compensate women served as an additional pool for 
labour, with over two million taking up employment outside the household. 
Even so, Konrad Adenauer’s government undertook campaigns to re-
domesticate women by encouraging them to focus on the reproduction of future 
German workforces.184 
Taking into account the relatively low workforces at their disposal, it 
was only natural to assume that if the economic boom continued, the Federal 
Republic would have to look externally for labourers. Accordingly, the first 
wave of foreign workers entered West Germany after the German-Italian 
agreement in 1955. The agreement itself outlined the terms and conditions that 
the labourers were expected to abide by whilst maintaining residency in the 
Federal Republic. Further significance, however, is found in the nature of 
habitation given to the Italian immigrants looking for work. In short, the 
employment offered to those entering West Germany under the German-Italian 
agreement was always temporary. In short, the employment offered to those 
entering West Germany under the German-Italian agreement was always 
temporary. Permanent residence for foreigners was not an established principle 
between the agreement, leading many entering the country for labour to be 
known as ‘Gastarbeiter’, or ‘guest workers’. Policies were shaped on the view 
that migrant workers were temporary labour units, which could be recruited, 
utilised, and sent away again as employers required.185 In principle, the guest 
worker policies introduced in the Federal Republic were designed to benefit 																																																								
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both the West German economy, and the foreigners who would return to their 
respective nations as skilled labourers. 
By the early 1960s, however, the need for new supplies of labour 
became a more crucial issue for the Federal Republic. The construction of the 
Berlin Wall in 1961 by the German Democratic Republic, which cut off East 
Berlin from the West, dramatically lowered the number of workers coming in 
from the East. At the same time, the period of relatively free movement along 
the border areas of East and West Germany ended abruptly. Prior to such 
changes in border relations, it had been possible to work in the West but reside 
in the East. Yet these revisions quickly changed the Federal Republic’s 
disposition to the inevitability of hiring workforces abroad. Between 1960 and 
1968, then, the West German government embarked on a drastic course of 
action designed to increase the supply of labour in the economy.186    
By 1967, the amount of immigrants entering Germany had more than 
tripled its 1955 levels. Up until this point in the Federal Republic’s attempts to 
bring in foreign labour, Italians had accounted for the majority of foreigners in 
the nation with over 413,000 presumably settled as guest workers. Yet by the 
start of the 1970s, immigrants from Turkey quickly overtook any other nation in 
terms of the country of origins of foreigners. By the end of the 1970s, the 
amount of Turks settled in West Germany had tripled the number of Italians.187 
It is important to note, however, that the practise of employing foreign labour in 
Germany was by no means a new policy produced by the Federal Republic. As 
previously stated, the Third Reich exploited the work of many foreigners to 
keep industrial production going during the Second World War. Likewise, 
during the First World War, the German Reich acquired a total of some 2.5 
million prisoners of war; a majority of whom were subjected to forced labour in 
areas such as agriculture and industry.188 Prior to the First World War, however, 
Germany took in voluntary workers from Russia and the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire to work in the eastern agricultural regions and coalmines of the Rhur 
valley.189 Therefore, guest workers were not necessarily a new concept for the 
Federal Republic to introduce. 
Despite the intention of successive governments in the Federal Republic, 
guest workers eventually turned into settlers. As the world economy moved into 
crisis in the mid-seventies, West Germany halted the recruitment of non-
European Community workers. Furthermore, Castles notes that resentment to 
foreigners publicly escalated in conjunction with the economic downturn that 																																																								
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West Germany experienced during the seventies. Seemingly, unemployment 
amongst native Germans motivated a sudden shift in rhetoric against 
Gastarbeiter. Tensions were further aggravated by the sudden increase of 
asylum seekers between 1979 and 1981. Since its inception, the Federal 
Republic employed comparatively generous asylum laws in Western Europe. As 
such, many who felt politically persecuted within their native countries could 
have easily sought refuge in the Federal Republic. From 1953 to 1978, only a 
total of 178,000 people sought political refuge in West Germany. However, 
these numbers greatly increased when over 200,000 applied for asylum in the 
following three years.190 Contemporary political emergencies elsewhere had 
some help in amplifying the number of applicants entering the Federal Republic 
for asylum. For example, Turkey had experienced a military coup in 1980, 
Poland had introduced martial law, and many Vietnamese people fled their 
country by boats.191 Consequently, even with the eventual cut off of guest 
worker programmes in the 1970s, foreigners still managed to find residency 
within West Germany, thereby perpetuating the social critique of migrants.192   
Hostility to foreigners eventually manifested publicly through written 
expression. In November 1981, the right-wing newspaper Deutsche 
Wochenzeitung published a version of the so-called Heidelberg Manifesto, 
criticising West Germany’s prior immigration policies and its consequences on 
society. Importantly, the manifesto raised concerns over ‘the infiltration of the 
German Volk through an influx of millions of foreigners and their families, the 
infiltration of our language, our culture, and our national traditions by foreign 
influences.’ Furthermore, the document called for the government to ‘preserve 
the German Volk and its spiritual identity on the basis of our occidental 
Christian heritage.’193 It is also significant to note that the authors of the 
manifesto were established academics, highlighting how the foreigner debate in 
West Germany was by no means relegated to the fringes of the extreme far 
right. For example, Professor Schmidt-Kahler, a member of the so-called 
Heidelberg Circle, was an astronomer from Bochum University and Professor 																																																								
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Schröcke was a mineralogist from Munich University. Indeed, while the 
Heidelberg Manifesto was rejected for its perceived xenophobic rhetoric, it 
marked one of the first public denunciations of West Germany’s guest worker 
policies, allowing later critical dialogues concerning German multiculturalism 
to come to the fore.    
In contrast to the earlier public and governmental discourse concerning 
immigration, critiques of the Federal Republic’s earlier policies developed at a 
much faster pace in the eighties. When Helmut Kohl came into power in 1982, 
he announced in his inaugural address that the government wanted to implement 
humane policies regarding foreigners.194 From a governmental perspective, the 
emphasis was now placed on stopping immigration whilst encouraging 
repatriation. In doing so, the law to encourage foreigners to return home (Gesetz 
zur Förderung der Rückkehrbereitschaft von Ausländern) was passed by the 
Bundestag in November 1983. Its main stipulation was that migrant workers 
from non-European community countries, who became unemployed between 
1983 and 1984, were offered premiums of DM 10,500 plus DM 1,500 per 
dependent child if they left the country instantly and finally. Even so, the scope 
of the main provisions was narrow for those eligible for such premiums. Only 
16,833 workers, 14,459 of whom were Turks, applied and received premiums to 
facilitate their departure from Germany.195 Yet this was hardly the policy of 
repatriation the Federal government led the public to expect. The foreign 
population fell ever so slightly between the years 1982 and 1984 from 4.6 
million to 4.3 million respectively. The real impact of this specific law was not 
through any tangible differences in the number of immigrant inhabitants. 
Instead, the influence of this law was ideological; it led people to think that the 
government was actively doing something about the ‘foreigner problem’, whilst 
reinforcing the belief that there was indeed a problem in the first place.  
Nevertheless, the intellectual, governmental, and public dialogue 
concerning immigration did little to reduce the physical number of foreigners in 
West Germany. On the contrary, the total foreign population in the Federal 
Republic was one million more at the start of the 1980s than in 1972. Moreover, 
the percentage of foreigners in the total population was 6.7; yet that same year, 
17.3 percent of all births in the Federal Republic were children of foreign 
parents. 196  Cutting off the guest worker programmes whilst encouraging 																																																								
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foreigner emigration through legislation failed to have the desired effect. 
Indeed, some political parties were slightly more ambivalent towards West 
Germany’s prior immigration policies. The Green Party, for example, 
encouraged the continuation of upholding the laws of asylum, largely as a way 
for Germany to atone for its past crimes. Nevertheless, the growing consensus 
was that the foreigner crisis had spiralled out of control by the start of the 
eighties. Whilst the 1970s developed a critical discourse concerning the Federal 
Republic’s immigration policies, the 1980s saw a greater consolidation of such 
criticisms in the public sphere. 39 percent of the native population had believed 
that guest workers should return home in 1979. Yet just three years later, over 
60 percent had now felt a desire for guest workers and asylum seekers to leave. 
Moreover, the number of people endorsing active integration with immigrants 
fell dramatically from 42 percent in 1979, to 11 percent in 1982.197 
 
 
Multiculturalism after Reunification 1990-2000 
 
 
Indeed, critical discourses concerning immigration developed at a slow 
pace owing to the definitions of guest workers and Germany’s Nazi past. Yet 
they developed, not necessarily as a reaction to change, but more as a result of 
integrating foreign labour into German society. In regards to German 
multiculturalism, the nineties exhibited key issues that add to the overall debates 
of immigration and integration. Consequently, it is important to examine and 
understand a complex part of the Federal Republic’s history, featuring violence, 
economic hardships, and significant changes in long established traditions of 
German citizenship. The changes that followed reunification have been used in 
previous chapters to highlight how East Germans could feasibly feel nostalgic 
for a time that had passed after the late eighties.  Yet in the context of German 
multiculturalism and Westalgie one can see that this is not the case. True, there 
were changes to the Federal Republic’s citizenship laws that enabled migrants 
to become naturalised German citizens. Yet issues concerning multiculturalism 
and immigration were largely a continuation of what was already discussed 
before 1990.   
After reunification the apparent ‘foreigner crisis’ did not simply die 
down. Following the collapse of the Iron Curtain, the immediate problem for the 
German government was the influx of more asylum-seekers from the chaotic 
political conditions of Eastern Europe. In the aftermath of the upheavals 
associated with the fall of communism and the break-up of Yugoslavia, 
hundreds of thousands entered the newly reunified Germany through the newly 
opened borders in the East. In fact, between 1989 and 1992, a total of around 
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one million arrived in Germany seeking asylum.198 Taking in even more asylum 
seekers than it did in the 1980s, the German government faced pressure from 
the public to adjust their laws regarding asylum. Importantly, whilst the physical 
number of foreigners in Germany had increased after reunification, little had 
changed in regards to their nationalities. The leading nationality amongst the 
foreigner population was still Turkish with over two million residing in 
Germany by 1999. Others included migrants still from countries like 
Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece, as well as Poland.199     
Significantly, concessions were made to Germany’s strict citizenship 
laws after 1990. One step toward easier access to naturalisation was made with 
changes in the foreigners law (Ausländergesetz) in 1993. Such alterations meant 
that foreigners between sixteen and twenty-three years of age with eight or more 
years of residency in Germany and foreigners above the age of twenty-three 
with a minimum of fifteen years of residency had a legal claim to naturalisation. 
On the surface at least these changes signified a conscious attempt to partially 
incorporate the principles of Jus Soli to determine citizenship. This, in turn, 
provided a significant change that was different to in how the ‘new’ Federal 
Republic defined its migrant population. Yet this only had a marginal effect. For 
example, nearly 75,000 foreigners were naturalised under the new changes 
brought in by the German government. However, these numbers only accounted 
for one percent of the total foreigner population in Germany. In fact, even by 
the end of the 1990s, the number of naturalised foreigners in Germany did not 
account for much in terms of the overall foreigner population. By the year 2000, 
a total of 186,700 immigrants had been naturalised; yet this amounted to just 2.5 
percent of the total foreign population in Germany.200  
These issues stress the fact that the critical discourse concerning 
immigration did not stop once Germany was reunified. Instead, it extended itself 
into actual governmental laws and, in some cases, manifested into violent 
expression against foreigners. The years 1991 and 1992 marked the first major 
wave of neo-Nazi activity when a spate of violent attacks occurred in the newly 
reunified country.201 Examples of specific localised violence include attacks on 
buildings that housed asylum seekers in Hoyerswerda and Rostock. Rocks, 
bottles, and Molotov cocktails were repeatedly used as the primary weapons in 
such attacks against foreigners. Similarly, a Turkish house in Solingen was 
firebombed resulting in the death of three children and two women. A news 
article from Die Zeit, for example, detailed an interview with a member of the 																																																								
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public who drew comparisons with the racist violence of the nineties and that 
experienced under the Third Reich.202 One German scholar had even suggested 
that the early examples of violence were ‘a re-instatement of mono-culturalism,’ 
with an overall reversal of social progress.203  
Indeed, the timing of such attacks, especially so soon after the 
reunification of Germany, stresses that the Federal Republic may have been 
changing at an uncontrollable pace. Yet linking the growth of right-wing 
violence with a sense of nostalgia is awkward when one considers more 
pragmatic reasons as to why violence occurred in the first place. Of course, a 
central issue behind the attacks was the lack of social integration between native 
Germans and foreigners throughout the Federal Republic’s history. The more 
immediate cause of racial violence, however, can be credited to the economic 
difficulties Germany experienced immediately after reunification. Certainly, 
much like the critical dialogue concerning immigration that grew out of the 
economic problems of the seventies and eighties, the racial violence of the 
nineties can be attributed to domestic economic hardships too. Developing this 
point further, Klaus Boehnke draws on the sociological effects of rapid social 
change that, in theory, weaken controls that otherwise would have kept deviant 
societal issues in check.204 In this particular instance, Germany’s sudden change 
in economic fortunes altered the perceptions of immigrants in the wider German 
public.  
Moreover, it should also be noted that xenophobic responses to 
immigration that turned into public violence were not necessarily associated 
with geography, even if the racial attacks were unfairly portrayed as an East 
German problem. In fact, according to the New York Times, a poll taken in the 
midst of the racial attacks found that 38 percent of West Germans felt sympathy 
for ‘radical right tendencies’ as opposed to 21 percent of East Germans.205 
Indeed, both the Western and Eastern states of Germany experienced fluctuating 
forms of racial attacks against foreigners after reunification. For example, the 
number of racial attacks in 1991, which included homicide, arson, and assault, 
amounted to over 990 in West Germany as opposed to the 493 in the East. 
Carrying on into 1992, racial attacks reached 1719 in the Western states in 
contrast to over 865 from East Germany. What is obvious is the initial increase 
in racial violence between the years 1991 and 1992. What is also important is 
the noticeable difference in the levels of violence between the Eastern states of 																																																								
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Germany and the West. Nevertheless, these statistics themselves do not take 
into account the differentiation of population sizes between the two states.206 
 Yet even with the prominent economic difficulties that immediately 
followed reunification, the question of citizenship and what defined a German 
citizen clearly helped to create a differing opinion on the question of what it 
meant to be ‘German’. As such, the racial violence that occurred can be viewed 
as a by-product of the multifaceted issues regarding German citizenship. In 
comparison to other European countries such as Britain and France, the legacy 
of empire allowed immigrants an easy route for basic political rights. Many 
immigrants entering either country were automatically qualified for citizenship 
or were otherwise allowed easier access to naturalisation. Even so, both 
countries still developed a critical disposition towards immigration in their own 
specific way.207 In the case of Germany, however, the persistent maintenance of 
their own citizenship laws contributed greatly to discussions on immigration, 
integration, and incorporation. Between 1990 and 2000 the Society for the 
German Language, which holds an annual competition for the ‘non-word’ of the 
year, chose three terms that in some way related to xenophobia. In 1991, the 
phrase ‘free of foreigners’ (ausländerfrei), which had been associated with the 
demands of the neo-Nazi youths, was chosen. In 1993, ‘domination by foreign 
influences’ (Überfremdung) was selected in conjunction with the growing 
criticisms of Germany’s liberal asylum laws. Lastly, in 2000, ‘nationally 
liberated zones’ (national befreite Zonen) was a term used by right-wing 
extremists to indicate areas where terror led to the removal of foreigners.208 
Certainly, if one were to take away the xenophobic attacks during the nineties, 
such terms used within the German public’s lexicon still show how potent the 
discourse of immigration was after reunification. 
Even with the apparent violence against foreigners, the political 
landscape of reunified Germany lacked representation in the Bundestag from 
the nationalist right-wing parties of the time. In regards to political success, the 
extreme German right-wing parties found little to celebrate on a federal level 
during the nineties. Results in the German federal elections of 1990, 1994, and 
1998 indicate that there was indeed no strong political representation for the far 
right. Parties such as the NDP, Die Republikaner (The Republicans), and the 
Volksunion failed to gain a single seat in the Bundestag, garnering only small 
percentages of the overall vote. With an average voter turnout of 79.7 percent 
during the 1990s, radical right-wing parties clearly failed to completely capture 
the public’s imagination.209 Moreover, the mainstream political parties still 																																																								
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maintained their strong positions within the German Parliament, with the CDU 
and the SPD the main competitors for the population’s votes.  
The Nazi era, too, worked as a strong deterrent against right-wing 
extremism in post-war Germany. In the words of Dietrich Thränhradt, the 
memory of Nazism was a vaccination against racism reaching the majority of 
German citizens. 210  Strong counter-reactions from the German public had 
therefore stunted the political mobilisation of the extreme right. Taking into 
account this viewpoint, the mainstream political parties had consistently 
rejected any coalition politics with the extreme right and played a key role in the 
ostracism of certain parties.211 
Given the longstanding settlement of Gastarbeiter and their descendants, 
it is no surprise that criticisms grew from foreigners about the ambiguity of 
what constituted the parameters of the term ‘Volk’. Soon after the reunification 
of Germany, demonstrations around Berlin’s Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtniskirche 
to protest the violence against foreigners featured similar catchphrases from 
immigrants stating ‘Wir sind auch das Volk’ (we are also the people). The twist 
on the slogan not only challenged the old notion of an ethnically homogenous 
German community, but also brought to light the question on how to legally 
integrate foreigners into society. For the many settled immigrants, the term ‘das 
Volk’ no longer comprised of just the native German population, but rather the 
foreign-born guest workers and their descendants too.212 
Importantly, the critical dialogue of immigration that started in West 
Germany remained in the ‘new’ Federal Republic and, in some instances, was 
made worse by the growing number of xenophobic attacks in specific parts of 
the country. However, a sense of Westalgie does not explain the growing 
difficulties associated with immigration in the first decade of the Federal 
Republic. The issues migrants faced after reunification were not born out of a 
sense of West German nostalgia, but rather out of a continuing debate that 
developed late in the twentieth century. Marginal changes to German citizenship 
laws may have created a sense of difference between the Bonn and Berlin 
Republic. However, the issue remains that integrating immigrants was the prime 
force behind critical discourses concerning German multiculturalism. In 
essence, the problems were once again caused by a slow recognition in how 
multicultural reunified Germany really was.   
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Islam in Modern Germany: Multicultural Debates in the New Millennium 
 
 
Since the turn of the millennium, Islam has contributed heavily to multicultural 
debates within the ‘new’ Federal Republic. The 9/11 terrorists attacks 
intensified a growing discourse viewing Islam not only as culturally 
incompatible but also as an existential security threat to Germany and Western 
Europe. It is within these debates where multicultural discussions have become 
much more narrow and focussed, allowing political parties and prominent 
individuals to flex a strong counter argument against Islam, and by extension 
multiculturalism itself. These criticisms, however, focus heavily on the societal 
impact Islam has had on modern day Germany. While the past is certainly 
referenced within these debates, there are a number of pragmatic issues to 
consider when analysing critical discussions against Islam and multiculturalism. 
For example, how is a specific religion affecting German culture? More 
importantly, however, what types of German culture are critics referring to? The 
answers to these questions, of course, vary significantly depending on one’s 
political disposition and tolerance towards immigration.  
  The AfD’s party manifesto specifically states the commitment to 
German as the predominant culture which, according to the AfD, is derived 
from three sources: the religious traditions of Christianity, the scientific and 
humanistic heritage, whose roots were renewed during the age of 
enlightenment; and lastly, Roman law, upon which the very basis of a 
constitutional state is founded.213 Indeed, such references to a ‘German culture’ 
hark back to a time long before the establishment of the Federal Republic. The 
AfD therefore do not consider West Germany the reference point for an ideal 
Leitkultur, as discourses concerning multiculturalism had already developed 
within its history. Other far-right political groups and movements also advocate 
this specific sense of German culture. Patriotic Europeans Against the 
Islamisation of the West, otherwise known as Pegida, similarly highlight strong 
Christian values as a fundamental basis for German culture, calling for the 
respectful treatment of ‘our culture and language,’ especially in relation to 
Islam.214 
  It is this viewpoint of a leading German culture that muddles the 
argumentation of nostalgia as a key catalyst in multicultural debates in the 
Federal Republic. West Germany, as highlighted in the previous subchapters, 
developed a critical dialogue against multiculturalism, but at a slow pace due to 
the terminology of guest workers, and the discomfort with referring to 
Germany’s Nazi past. With the implementation of guest worker initiatives, 
coupled with a growing debate concerning what it means to be ‘German,’ West 
Germany was very much a multicultural society; even if there was a latent 																																																								
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acknowledgment of the fact. Far-right political groups seemingly reject a sense 
of Westalgie, lacking much reference to the ‘old’ Federal Republic, most likely 
because the growth of multiculturalism stemmed from initiatives created in its 
history. That is not to say that there are no nostalgic elements linked with such 
debates, but rather West Germany is not the main reference point for a lot of 
critical debates concerning Islam and multiculturalism.  
  The recent success of the AfD, on a federal level, suggests as much 
considering their party program refers to the past in a critical light, but not a 
nostalgic one. As seen in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, nostalgia 
contributed to the success of candidate Donald Trump’s campaign. Sweeping 
statements such as ‘Make America Great Again’, suggested a sense of 
difference between the past and the present that voters could engage with 
mentally. However, the language of the AfD party programme lacks the 
nostalgic framework that helped the Republicans succeed in 2016. Instead it 
showcases a critical approach to multiculturalism and Islam, viewing the 
religion as a danger to German society and values.215 
  Indeed, Germany’s contemporary election campaigns have typically 
avoided explicit nostalgic outpourings in favour of a more grounded and 
pragmatic methodology. In the 2017 elections, the campaign slogan employed 
by the Chancellor’s CDU party roughly translated as ‘For a Germany in which 
we live gladly and live well’. Much like the AfD party programme, the CDU 
avoided sentimentality, only looking to the future to set policy targets such as 
modest tax cuts and full employment by 2025.216 Their main challengers, the 
Social Democratic Party (SPD), based their campaign around solidarity and 
social fairness, with the slogan ‘Time for more Justice’. Focussing on the future 
of German society, the SPD largely placed emphasis on future-orientated 
solutions to technological, economic, and social changes. 217  This 
understandably questions the impact of nostalgia on current debates concerning 
German multiculturalism as many political parties chose not to indulge in 
sentimentality to create a unique party platform in 2017.   
However, as one of the biggest critics of Islam, and multiculturalism in 
general, the AfD’s rise to prominence needs addressing. After all, the AfD was 
the third most successful party in the 2017 Bundestag election, winning 94 
seats.218 If a sense of nostalgia amongst West Germans did little to trigger the 
advent of the AfD then what helped their growth? In early 2015, a number of 
factors, including heightened global conflicts, drought and civil wars, led to a 																																																								
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dramatic surge in the number of refugee and migrant arrivals to Europe by boat 
from Muslim-majority countries, increasing critical discourses even further. 
Such hostile attitudes towards Islam, directly account for support of right-wing 
parties or movements. One 2016 study found that 85.9 percent of people 
supporting groups such as the AfD and Pegida said they felt like a stranger in 
their own country due to the high Muslim presence, with 80.3 percent of people 
wanting to restrict immigration from Muslim countries.219 Moreover, support in 
the East of Germany arguably helped their rise, with the former Eastern states 
voting heavily for the AfD. In Saxony, for instance, support for the AfD 
narrowly overtook the CDU and in the four remaining Eastern states, the right-
wing party was the second most popular political party.220 Eastern support for 
the AfD can be viewed partially as a rejection of the implementation of a 
Western model that has failed to fully account for East German citizens since 
the reunification of Germany. For those in the East who had previously 
experienced certainty, a clear, fixed status and a less hierarchical economic 
model, the prospect of a Western capitalist market economy felt like a 
mirage.221  
Indeed, such gains led by right-wing parties in recent German elections 
suggest a lack of effort by the Federal Republic to help integrate migrants into 
German society. Yet in a few instances, there had been marginal attempts to do 
so. For example, in 2000 the SPD led federal government founded the League 
for Democracy and Tolerance against Right-Wing Extremism and Violence. 
One year later, the federal government founded ‘xenos’ (foreigner), ‘civitas’ 
(city), and ‘entimon’ (dignity and respect) programmes, committing over $30 
million to the maintenance of said programmes. Through various courses, 
workshops, conferences, and theatre projects, the main purpose of these 
initiatives is to specifically combat right-wing extremism in contemporary 
Germany.222 Newspaper reports, however, highlighted a few issues with these 
initiatives. For one, the federal programs were principally directed at young 
people, with critics pointing out that right-wing ideas have long pervaded all 
ages and strata of society. Moreover, many groups associated with these federal 
programs found themselves overwhelmed and, even with federal funding, 
lacking adequate financial resources.223 																																																								
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However, even with these attempts to integrate foreigners into German 
society, the social and economic distance between immigrants and native 
Germans is still telling. Unemployment statistics amongst foreigners, for 
example, reveal a great disparity economically when linked to the same 
statistics of native Germans. In 2010, the Federal Employment Agency reported 
that the unemployment rate for foreigners was 15 percent compared to the 7 
percent rate of natives.224 Whilst not necessarily surprising, on average native 
Germans tend to earn more than foreigners in terms of hourly wages. Second-
generation immigrants fare worse in comparison to the first generation, but 
female foreigners statistically earn far less than even their male counterparts. 
Whilst not necessarily surprising, on average native Germans tend to earn more 
than foreigners in terms of hourly wages. Second-generation immigrants fare 
worse in comparison to the first generation, but female foreigners statistically 
earn far less than even their male counterparts.225 Education is at least partially 
responsible for the lack of economic and social integration of immigrants. Both 
first and second-generation immigrants tend to leave full-time education earlier 
than Germans, with the average age amongst immigrant men and women being 
around twenty. However, the average age specifically for Turks living in the 
Federal Republic that leave full-time education is much smaller at the age of 
eighteen.226 
Certain critics of the Federal Republic’s immigration policies both past 
and present contend that immigrants have refused to integrate to an acceptable 
level. In conjunction Merkel’s statement that multiculturalism had failed, a 
notably staunch critic of German immigration, Thilo Sarrazin, contributed 
greatly to the overall public debate concerning multiculturalism in reunified 
Germany. His book, entitled Deutschland schafft sich ab, openly disapproved of 
the Federal Republic’s immigration policies of the past, whilst also creating a 
public forum to discuss issues concerning multiculturalism and the integration 
of Islam into German society. As stated by Sarrazin: 
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Anyone with a legal residence status is welcome. But we expect you to 
learn the language, earn your livelihood with work, have educational 
ambitions for your children, adapt to the customs and customs of 
Germany, and become German over time – if not you, then at least your 
children. If you are of Muslim faith, you have the same rights and duties 
as Pagan, Protestant or Catholic Germans. But we do not want national 
minorities. Anyone who wants to remain a Turk or Arab and wants to do 
so for his children is better off in his country of origin. And those who 
are particularly interested in the blessings of the German welfare state are 
certainly not welcome here.227 
 
          The integration of Muslims into German society is also set out by 
Sarrazin via the introduction of mandatory charitable work to be conducted by 
Muslims, strict focus on learning only German in nursery classes, tightening the 
linguistic requirements for German citizenship, and advocating extremely 
restrictive conditions for further immigration from Muslim countries. 228 
Sarrazin’s preoccupation with Islam relies heavily on its association with 
German heritage. Indeed, the views shared in his book are comparable to the 
rhetoric of far-right groups in recent times. Both share a pre-conceived notion of 
what it means to be ‘German’, suggesting a strong Christian foundation at the 
core of it all. Yet unlike the manifestos of leading German political parties, one 
can highlight notions of nostalgia that is present in Sarrazin’s work. 
Interestingly enough, Sarrazin mentions the concept of nostalgia within his 2010 
book, arguing:  
 
As soon as anyone tries to reverse trends that seem unfavourable, he is in 
danger of thinking un-historically, falling into nostalgia, and misjudging 
the influence that should be afforded key moments. Like a river, the 
stream of history is constant and never returns to its old course. Still, 
nostalgia is tempting for all those who want to preserve the good and do 
not condone change for its own sake.229 
   
               Moreover, Sarrazin noted that he did not want the land of his 
grandchildren and his great-grandchildren to be largely Muslim, stressing that a 
period of time has existed, where Islam did not influence a leading culture 
within Germany. This, in turn, suggests at the very least that nostalgia may have 
influenced one of the Federal Republic’s biggest critics of German 
multiculturalism. The very title implies the development of nostalgia with the 
idea that Germany is literally ‘abolishing itself’ in the present. There are, 
however, a few points to consider. Sarrazin’s views suggest a strong fixation 
with the genetics of migrants, and their socio-economic impact on German 
society. For instance, using the help of congenital research, Sarrazin argued that 																																																								
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Turkish and Kurdish immigrants were more prone to disabilities and thus would 
affect a foreigners economic potential in the Federal Republic.230 Sarrazin’s 
critics highlight his awkward approach in discussing integrating migrants but he 
is not accused of being a nostalgic, especially in regards to nostalgia for West 
Germany. The ‘old’ Federal Republic was, for the most part, accommodating of 
migrants during forty years of separation. As noted previously, the issues 
multiculturalism came from a lack of clarity in defining a migrant’s status in the 
‘old’ Federal Republic. The perseveration of German culture lies at the forefront 
of both Sarrazin’s ideology and the policies of far-right parties and not 
necessarily looking back at West Germany in a nostalgic fashion.   
According to one survey, 46 percent of Germans agree with Sarrazin’s 
views concerning the fear of foreign economic, social, and political domination 
in contemporary Germany.231 Of course, such findings are by no means relevant 
to nostalgia for West Germany, but can stress a level of doubt regarding how 
effective the Federal Republic’s immigration policies are in helping to develop a 
German society. A previous mayor of Hamburg, Christoph Ahlhaus, spoke 
negatively of the Federal Republic’s past immigration laws, especially in 
regards to how ‘open’ these prior policies were for foreigners. However, the 
predominant theme of Ahlhlaus’ statements is not suggestive of any sense of 
nostalgia, but of a desire to critique the failure to address the ‘immigrant 
question’ and to control immigration to a greater extent for the ‘legitimate 
national interests of this country.’232 Even after decades of settlement, evidence 
suggests foreigners have been unable to integrate into society to an appropriate 
extent. This, in turn, has had a say in the social, political and economic 
representation of ethnic minorities. As such, Westalgie’s contribution to these 
debates is somewhat complex. Indeed, Sarrazin’s views do suggest some sense 
of nostalgia for a past that is viewed in a rose-tinted manner. But these are not 
representative of a nostalgia for West Germany, as it has been clearly 
established that West Germany was a land of immigration long before many 
began to view it as such. But recent criticisms of German multiculturalism, 
much like with the political and economic developments of the Berlin Republic, 
suggest pragmatic concerns that are not wholly related to nostalgia for West 
Germany.   
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Concluding Remarks 
 
 
The integration of foreigners into German society is still an on-going process 
that requires both time and patience from immigrants, native Germans, and the 
federal government. Of course, it is difficult to predict how the German 
government and its native citizens will view facets of multiculturalism in the 
years to come. Future discourses concerning immigrants and their integration 
into society could be shaped very differently in the next decade. Nevertheless, 
the fundamental issue raised from this chapter is that linking Westalgie with 
criticisms of German multiculturalism is a far more complex and nuanced 
subject. Above all, nostalgia is a critique against change. As such, while 
Roderick Peters’ example of homesickness as a rationale for nostalgia’s 
onset,233 or Davis’ use of the transition of ageing as a suitable explanation for 
one to reminisce,234 are indeed correct; the issue with German multiculturalism 
is not as simple. There are certainly plenty examples of change that are 
associated with the integration of migrants within German society. Yet there 
lacks a clear reference point for one to feel nostalgic about. As previously 
stated, governments before the Federal Republic used foreign labourers to help 
increase productivity and allowing foreigners to work within Germany was not 
a new concept.       
Indeed, as Gary Freeman notes, ‘no state possesses a truly coherent 
incorporation regime.’235 Each country has had differing experiences regarding 
the social, political, and economic integration of its foreign inhabitants. This, 
too, makes it difficult to analyse how multiculturalism has had on effect on 
nostalgia in other countries. There is no doubt a strong public response to 
immigration in the Federal Republic, whether it is positive or negative. A major 
issue within the public discourse is, of course, the integration of foreigners into 
German society. In a separate survey conducted in 2000, Germans ‘tended to 
agree’ with the statement that ‘it is a good thing for any society to be made up 
of people from different races, religions, and cultures.’236 True, agreeing with 
the statement is by no means a validation of multicultural practices. Even if 
public opinion was fairly supportive towards the pluralisation of German 
society, the question of how to integrate different races and cultures is 
noticeably absent.  
  Yet nostalgia, more specifically Westalgie, seemingly contributes little 
to the growing emergence of critical debates regarding multiculturalism. As 																																																								
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stated previously, more pragmatic concerns about the future and heritage of 
German culture have shaped fierce criticisms of multicultural practises. Islam is 
criticised not because of nostalgia, but because there are real concerns about its 
impact on not just German society, but Western society as well. Indeed, the past 
is clearly referenced within such criticisms of the religion. Yet this predates the 
history of the ‘old’ Federal Republic, focussing on older notions of what it 
means to be a German and shaped by Christian virtues. Importantly, this 
stresses how case-specific Westalgie is as a phenomenon. Sarrazin’s views may 
have been influenced by a notion of a German past that has, as he puts it, been 
abolished by the policies of modern day Germany. However, they are not 
entirely characteristic of the wider debate concerning German multiculturalism. 
Recent debates lack a strong connection to Westalgie, instead focussing on 
perceived notions of German culture shaped by hundreds of years of history.  
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6. Westalgie or Localised Nostalgia for West Berlin? 
 
 
During the Cold War, many different terms were used to describe West Berlin’s 
unique geographical location and political situation. It was called an ‘outpost of 
freedom’, a ‘thorn in the flesh of communism’, and even an ‘island in a red sea.’ 
Berlin’s history, its symbolism as a site of the Cold War as well as of 
unification, and the unprecedented building boom of the 1990s turned the city 
into a workshop for a changing German identity.237 The city itself, one can 
argue, represented divided Germany in microcosm during the Cold War. 
Literally divided into East and West Berlin, generations of Berliners grew 
accustomed to a certain way of life in the backdrop of an ideological conflict.  
  Preceding chapters in this thesis have attempted to analyse why 
nostalgia for the ‘old’ Federal Republic developed after Germany reunified in 
1990. In doing so one can view Westalgie as a very multifaceted phenomenon. 
While there are examples of Westalgie when discussing German politics, 
economics, and multiculturalism, the phenomenon itself is rather case-specific. 
Additionally, it is more of an expression of misgivings to the developments in 
the Berlin Republic, and not a rejection of change like Ostalgie implies. This is 
important to note, as Westalgie is not entirely comparable to its East German 
counterpart. More importantly, there exists an extra element to Westalgie that 
will be discussed in this chapter: the legacy of West Berlin. It can be argued that 
in recent times a sense of localised nostalgia has developed for the city, with 
museum exhibitions, films, and even social media demonstrating how the 
process of change has affected the city and its inhabitants. However, can this 
localised nostalgia for West Berlin be considered an element of Westalgie? Or is 
it a separate phenomenon in its own right? After all, West Berlin was unique not 
simply because of its location within East Germany. At the very least nostalgia 
for West Berlin highlights how complex Westalgie really is, as it suggests a 
sense of nostalgia for two separate areas. This, too, is further exemplified by the 
fact that there is little mention of an East Berlin nostalgia in the public sphere. 
Films such as Sonnenalle or Goodbye Lenin!, while set in East Berlin, are 
considered examples of Ostalgie rather than localised nostalgia.   
Analysing nostalgia in a post-communist world, Svetlana Boym argues 
that ‘Nostalgia inevitably reappears as a defence mechanism in a time of 
accelerated rhythms of life and historical upheavals.’ This nostalgic longing, 
according to Boym, has pervaded post-communist countries going through a 
turbulent transition and presents the past in an almost utopian fantasy.238 Amy 
Sadaro comments further that if societies must come to terms with the negative 
past ‘in order to adhere to the international normative demands of today’, they 																																																								
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can soften the shame of regret with a sense of nostalgic remembrance.239 Yet in 
comparison to West Berlin, whose history is deemed less controversial, it is 
problematic to view nostalgia as a way of coping with a difficult past. Indeed, 
narratives concerning West Berlin portray the city in a positive light, with titles 
such as the ‘Island of Freedom’ highlighting a sense of positivity when referring 
to West Berlin. It is therefore prudent to view nostalgia for West Berlin, as 
simply a process of changing circumstances to the lives and identities of its 
inhabitants.  
Commenting on urban nostalgia, novelist, Colson Whitehead, suggests a 
sense of identity forms when ‘what was before is more real and solid than what 
is here now.’240 While one’s sense of urban belonging may register in many 
ways, through the familiarity of daily routines, through communities of work, 
and through the physical spaces in which people gather, one can acquire a truly 
urban identity at the moment people react to change by remembering a vanished 
city. Consequently, Whitehead’s views on nostalgia and its relationship with 
urban landscapes leave a somewhat negative impression on the reader. Yet 
perceptions on the concept of nostalgia do little to form the fundamental 
message in Whitehead’s assertions. Rather, as Tamar Katz notes, it is the 
passage of time, and the physical and metaphorical change that accompanies it, 
that shape a person’s relationship with their surroundings. Whitehead, too, 
focuses on the physical change of a city, without discussing the mentalities of 
its inhabitants.  Indeed, transforming a city landscape is often not an obvious 
transition, which is why a person’s reaction to physical change is paradoxically 
both slow and unexpected. However, as Katz argues, ‘When we live in a city, 
we celebrate its novelty.’241 Attitudes and presumptions amongst the population 
of a city shapes identity and are therefore not solely reliant on physical 
surroundings to shape a distinctive sense of character. As Gerald D. Suttles 
notes, ‘Cities get to know what they are and what is distinctive about them from 
the unified observation of others’, with the population, be it politicians, 
musicians, artists, helping to shape a unique setting.242 
Undoubtedly, the city of Berlin has numerous physical landmarks that 
distinguish it against other European capitals. Yet in the context of Cold War 
the city of West Berlin, occupied by western allies but geographically situated 
in East Germany, arguably created a culture unique in Western Europe. Darryl 
Pinckney notes that ‘West Berlin was a fine place in which to be a voluntarily 
displaced person. It was a small town with a big culture. All the music, film, and 																																																								
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theatre you could sit through.’243 Imagery of an ‘island’ within a communist 
setting evoke a sense of isolation that was made worse with the construction of 
the Berlin Wall. Yet West Berlin was already unique prior to its cut off from 
East Germany. It had retained a special political status until reunification and 
was considered a de facto part of West Germany. Moreover, under allied law, 
West Berliners were exempt from any military service, making the city an ideal 
haven to those wanting to avoid conscription. West Berlin, too, known for its 
energetic nightlife, developed a sense of alternative living for its inhabitants 
who listened to psychedelic music, engaged with punk movements, and faced 
no closing times in clubs.244   
The city of West Berlin was therefore influenced not just by its physical 
surroundings, but also by its population’s desire to seek experiences outside 
normative trends. Nostalgia for West Berlin, as opposed to Westalgie, does not 
simply refer to a time before East Germany became a part of the Federal 
Republic. Instead it refers to an urban centre that no longer exists in the 
consciousness of its population.   This chapter will therefore analyse important 
issues regarding localised nostalgia for West Berlin. It first analyses how the 
Berlin-Bonn debate altered the ‘new’ Federal Republic, providing a sense of 
change that helped drive nostalgia for West Germany. The next section will 
analyse how nostalgia for West Berlin has been connected with landmarks 
important to the history of West Berlin such as Tempelhof Airport. Lastly, this 
chapter will examine West Berlin nostalgia in the context of popular culture, 
demonstrating how varying mediums refer to the city and its population. 
 
 
The Berlin-Bonn Debate 
 
 
Capital cities can serve symbolic as well as practical purposes. Using this logic, 
it is both useful and important to analyse the Berlin-Bonn debate, especially in 
the context of nostalgia for West Germany and West Berlin. In terms of political 
differences between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Federal Republic, the Berlin-Bonn 
debate arguably highlights the most significant change the country has faced 
since reunification. For Berlin, the question of Germany’s capital after 
reunification stirred another debate about national identity and urban form. It, 
too, posed questions of integration with East Germany and West German 
heritage. Politics in the Bonn Republic were marked not only by negative 
memories of the Third Reich but of the failure of the Weimar Republic as well. 																																																								
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The constitutional Basic Law was designed to make sure that Bonn would not 
be Weimar, but rather a unique governmental system in its own right.245  
  Bonn, the provisional capital of West Germany had created a strong 
reputation for West Germans. It represented a successful democracy, especially 
compared to the government of the GDR based in East Berlin. Bonn, too, 
highlighted Germany’s integration into the West, through its membership in 
NATO and the European community. Bonn, as the capital of West Germany, 
symbolised such normalisation and in many ways helped foster a West German 
identity. Moving the Federal Republic’s government eastwards undoubtedly 
constituted a major difference between the Bonn and Berlin Republic, stressing 
not only a significant change between the two governments but a clear 
justification for why Westalgie can develop.  
The Hauptstadt controversy at the turn of the 1990s was long and 
acrimonious, culminating in a protracted debate in the Bundestag, after which it 
was voted by a slim margin to return the capital status to Berlin. Indeed, the 
closeness of the vote, 338 to 320, highlighted how important the city of Bonn 
had become as a symbol of West German heritage yet there were also other 
issues to consider. For example, there were practical worries concerning the cost 
of moving a government from Bonn to Berlin. There, too, were also personal 
concerns with politicians who resided in Bonn and would likely see the value of 
their properties fall with a decision to move to Berlin.246 On a wider issue, the 
decision to base the German government in a city associated with the political 
systems of Weimar and Nazism was in stark contrast to Bonn’s federal nature 
and modest authority claimed by a liberal state.247 Technically, the question of 
Germany’s capital had long been settled. When the new West German 
government decided in 1949 to govern from Bonn, it underlined the provisional 
nature of the city and its seat of government by declaring Berlin would resume 
its position as the German capital if and when German reunified.  
After forty years, however, many people and politicians no longer 
considered Bonn a provisional capital and saw little reason to move the 
government eastwards. Supporters of retaining Bonn as the capital of the 
Federal Republic presented their city as representative of a successful 
democracy, in contrast to Berlin, which had served as a capital of a monarchy, a 
failed democracy, and two dictatorships.248 Yet the argument for integrating 
East Germans in the Federal Republic also countered such ideas of Berlin’s 
history with previous governments. The move from Bonn to Berlin was 
therefore not only a practical measure, but a symbolic one as well. It represented 																																																								
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a desire to include East Germans within the political culture of the Federal 
Republic, thereby creating a sense of unity between East and West Germans. 
Moreover, the London Times suggested Berlin was ‘the one gift East Germans 
had been able to bring to their rich cousins in the West.’249 The city was a 
symbol of German reunification and therefore, deserved to be reinstated as the 
capital of Germany.  
  Indeed, the debate concerning where to place the Federal Republic’s 
government caused both ire and controversy. The then deputy mayor of Bonn 
argued, ‘Bonn's small size symbolizes West Germany's federalism,’ also noting 
‘one city does not control the whole country. Frankfurt is the capital city for 
business, Karlsruhe is the center for legal affairs, Munich is where many of 
West Germany's high-tech companies are based, and Berlin is the center of film, 
arts, and culture.’250 During the tense debate, CDU politician, Norbert Blüm, a 
staunch defender of Bonn argued, ‘It was a good thing for the post-war West 
Germany that parliamentary and governmental seats were at work in the Bonn 
workshop. Bonn's modest self-assurance has done well on the working day of 
Parliament and on government work. Why not our reunited Germany?’251 
Others, however, stressed the positive symbolic importance of Berlin as a 
German capital, as well as the symbolic inclusion of East Germans in the 
political system of the Federal Republic.  
  For example, Helmut Kohl, the then Chancellor of Germany focussed 
on Berlin as a symbol of German unity stating, ‘Berlin has always been the 
opportunity to overcome the division. Berlin was the focal point of German 
division and longing for the unity of Germany.’252 Eberhard Diepgen, another 
CDU politician and former mayor of Berlin, contributed to the discussion by 
adding, ‘the city of Berlin is certainly full of opposites, full of tensions and 
contradictions. But precisely for this reason it is not the hoard of centralism, 
precisely because of its diversity it is not that.’253 Indeed, the issues to base the 
government in either Bonn or Berlin were numerous. Not only were there 
personal preferences, but also symbolic questions concerning Berlin, Bonn’s 
geographical isolation in Germany, and also the lingering issue of inner German 
unity. For West Germans, however, the eventual decision to base the German 
government in Berlin instead of Bonn may have had negative repercussions in 
the long run.   
Naturally, Berlin’s local press greeted the decision with great fervour. 
Der Tagesspiegel, for example, declared Berlin to be ‘a capital for all Germans’, 
highlighting Bonn’s role as the capital had become obsolete after the 
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reunification of Germany.254 Moreover, the Berliner Morgenpost referred to the 
date as ‘a historic day for our city’.255 Reports’ concerning the decision to move 
the German government from Bonn to Berlin was front-page news for several 
days, especially with newspapers located in Berlin. Yet outside of Berlin, 
newspaper publications issued articles with gentle scepticism concerning the 
Berlin-Bonn Debate. One article in the conservative newspaper, Die Welt, 
located in Hamburg, suggested that Berlin still had a lot of work to do in terms 
of creating a sustainable post-wall German identity, noting ‘a global spirit must 
be felt, an atmosphere of high intellectual and cultural aspirations must prevail’, 
and ‘the capital of the Germans must be a clean, beautiful city characterized by 
a tolerant spirit.’256 Outside of Germany, The London Times noted that the joy 
and exuberance in Berlin felt after the decision to move capitals was only 
matched by the opening of the Berlin Wall.257   
  Indeed, the choice to move capitals was decided by very slim margins, 
suggesting that Bonn had, in the mind of certain West Germans, lost its 
provisional status as capital of the Federal Republic. Nostalgia was first 
recognised as a psychological condition associated with travellers and soldiers 
experiencing varying degrees of homesickness. Drawing on this very basic 
definition of nostalgia, one can see how such a stark political change may have 
created a sense of nostalgia for a West Germany. It is perhaps the symbolism of 
Bonn as a city of West German democracy and overall success that caused 
controversy once discussions took place concerning Berlin’s status as the capital 
of Germany. Nostalgia is largely an expression of displacement in contemporary 
times, indicating strong affection for past memories. Westalgie is very much 
explained by changing circumstances, regardless of whether these changes are 
considered positive or negative.  
  Regarding West Berlin’s special status during the Cold War, the move 
from Bonn to Berlin altered a city that was unique for its time. West Berlin was 
attractive for a number of reasons, be it tastes in music, a lack of conscription, 
as well as its geographical location. It was not a capital city but rather an 
enclave for its population to develop its own identity. By bringing the title of 
capital city to Berlin, along with the integration of East Berlin, West Berlin lost 
its unique setting, leaving behind an identity that has had to adapt to changing 
social and political events. For West Berliners, the change in capitals arguably 
altered not only the landscape of the city, but also the mentality of its 
inhabitants. The city was a symbol of an alternative and creative lifestyle 
cultivated by students, youths, and immigrants. This, too, was emphasised in the 
late sixties and early seventies, with the development of student movements 
against the rigid structures of post-war society. Critical attitudes against the 																																																								
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Vietnam War and the United States stood in contrast to earlier perceptions of 
the U.S. as friends and protectors of the FRG. This observation of West Berlin 
as an unconventional culture contributed to its legacy. The city was unique to its 
inhabitants and outside observers and while it was legally recognised as a part 
of West Germany, it also retained its own distinctive heritage once the 
reunification of Germany occurred.  
  The complexities of Westalgie are therefore highlighted once more 
when discussing localised nostalgia. West Berlin had its own special status 
during the Cold War and was not a complete representation of the West German 
system. Consequently, nostalgia for West Berlin can be considered somewhat 
separate to Westalgie as it refers to an urban centre that was unlike any other 
West German city. A museum exhibition held between 2014 and 2015 entitled 
West Berlin: An Island in Search of its Mainland retrospectively examined the 
history of West Berlin, suggesting a growing sense of recognition for a city that 
no longer exists. The exhibition pamphlet implies a sense of great change by 
highlighting the twenty-fifth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
loss of West Berlin’s special status and prestige.258 Yet the curators of the 
exhibition argued that the exhibition was not a retrospective romanticism of 
West Berlin, but rather an attempt to help people find the ‘spirit’ of the city.259 It 
is, however, the very appearance of the exhibition that suggests a sense of 
difference between the past and present, a key implication of the development 
of nostalgia.  
Even so, Bonn benefitted in some way from the change in 
circumstances. Fortified by federal aid worth almost $2 billion, and by decisions 
to locate the headquarters of Germany’s privatised postal and 
telecommunications industries in Bonn, along with several United Nations 
agencies, Bonn has prospered. In 2011, The New York Times noted the 
population had risen from 310,000 in 1991 to 318,000; the number of jobs in the 
city and the surrounding region had also increased by 14.4 percent to 
285,000.260 This can partly be explained by the fact that not all government 
agencies moved to Berlin. Even when the Parliament and Chancellery moved to 
Berlin in 1999, six ministries, including Defense, retained substantial operations 
in Bonn, along with many other organizations. According to Paul Betts, the 
concept of nostalgia arrived fairly late in Germany compared to other European 
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nation states.261 As a result of Germany’s Nazi past, both East and West 
Germans lacked a viable remembrance culture. After reunification, however, 
changes that were political, economic, and cultural helped to cultivate strong 
senses of nostalgia amongst West Berliners.  
 
 
West Berlin Landmarks 
 
 
As highlighted by Hanno Hochmuth, the city of Berlin has changed noticeably 
since the reunification of Germany. So much so that photobooks detailing 
Berlin’s dynamic urban transformation are readily available to consumers.262 
Distinctive landmarks, in the words of Aimee Mollaghan, ‘carry a certain 
cultural significance, offering itself as a utopia or balms to the ills of 
modernity.’263 Therefore, nostalgia seemingly affects various aspects of life 
including the landmarks one may find themselves visiting. Referring to 
Whitehead’s previous link between nostalgia and the physical features of a city, 
urban change can make a person confront the present in a very physical way as 
it guarantees that they see a city that is no longer there. Berlin, as a divided city, 
created landmarks for both East and West Berliners. For example, in East Berlin 
one can find a monument a Soviet War memorial within Treptower Park; and 
parts of the Berlin Wall are now adorned with art produced by various artists in 
the East Side Gallery. The West, too, built landmarks that created a history for 
West Berliners. Yet with the changing landscape of Berlin after the 
reunification, it is important to analyse whether nostalgia for West Berlin 
landmarks exists within Berlin.  
One of the few Nazi landmarks in Berlin to survive after the Second 
World War, Tempelhof Airport, was at first representational of the success of 
Nazism, with its unique design shaped to be the wings of an eagle. However, the 
symbolism of Tempelholf Airport after the Second World War cannot be 
understated. Between 26th June and 6th October, airplanes flew over 270,000 
missions carrying more than 2.1 million tonnes of freight to West Berlin. Food, 
coal, machinery, and everyday goods flew in to tackle land and sea trade 
restrictions placed by the Soviet Union. Even so soon after the Second World 
War, the majority of West Berliners were on the side of U.S. and British forces, 
changing the relationship with the occupying forces to an almost protective 
association. At the same time the boldness, and even adventurism, of the U.S. 																																																								
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military authority in Germany proved warranted in the short-term faceoff with 
the USSR in central Europe. The airlift was able to get supplies into the city 
until the Soviets called off the blockade, and West Berlin came into existence, a 
bone in the throat of the Soviet Union and a beacon of freedom behind the Iron 
Curtain.264  
The local population and the West Berlin media were very much aware 
of the benefits of a strong public commitment to the Western powers. On the 
first day of the blockade, the newspaper Der Abend reminded readers ‘the 
struggle for freedom and human rights had led the world to hold the city in high 
regard.’265 This newly acquired reputation and international attention were 
considered to be of great importance; something West Berlin would be able to 
capitalise on politically. Moreover, the city of Berlin and the Airlift itself gave 
the United States the opportunity to celebrate its first victory in the struggle 
between two superpowers. Tempelhof’s reverence outside of Germany was 
even noted by foreign politicians decades later. Barack Obama, then a senator 
campaigning to be President of the United States, noted that relations between 
West Germany and the U.S. improved due to the efforts of the Berlin Airlift, 
arguing ‘Germans and Americans learned to work together and trust each other 
less than three years after facing each other on the field of battle’.266  
  Yet the decision to close Tempelhof in 2008 was met with some 
resistance. After years of declining use, both for military affairs and public 
transportation, the airport ceased operation. Moreover, with Tegel Airport and 
Schönefeld Airport coming into the fold, Tempelhof soon became redundant to 
airliners and passengers. Speaking in 2004 about the state of Templehof, the 
then city Mayor, Klaus Wowereit, argued there was ‘no case for keeping the 
rundown airport alive at a time when libraries and swimming pools were being 
shut to stave off bankruptcy,’ before stating ‘Tempelhof has outlived itself.’267 
Indeed, the symbolic nature of the airport did not equate to adequate financial 
outlays for the city by the time it had closed. Use of the airport had even started 
to decline by the mid 1980s, with one commentator noting, ‘Today Tempelhof 
is silent. The only air traffic is the occasional American military plane from 
bases in West Germany and a flight a month from North Carolina to give 
American-based pilots experience of flying through the air corridors.’268 
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  Protesters did little to stop the decision and were even described as 
‘mourning nostalgics’ in an article by Der Spiegel.269 Furthermore, as a symbol 
of West Berlin, and to some extent the ‘old’ Federal Republic, the decision to 
close an airport of historical significance stresses the difference between the 
past and the present from a Berlin landscape perspective. In spite of its 
inactivity Tempelhof represented a decisive part of West Berlin’s history and 
the decision to close the airport marked a definite change experienced by West 
Berliners. Yet such a decision did not change the structural integrity of 
Tempelhof. Now, one can freely enter the grounds of Tempelhof, including its 
runway for recreational purposes. A local referendum maintained its status as a 
public park, despite plans to open the grounds for construction. Visitors to the 
park can now freely gain access to a symbol of West Berlin, with signs 
providing information about Tempelhof’s history, and an airplane once used for 
training by fire services sits near the airport’s buildings.270 Indeed, though 
Tempelhof no longer functions as an official airport, the fact that it has yet to be 
replaced by other forms of construction suggests a lingering connection with the 
landmark and the city’s inhabitants. Its role in the Berlin Airlift is symbolic as a 
Cold War symbol and a West Berlin one, too. Moreover, the fact that it now 
remains a public space for Berlin’s inhabitants suggests a growing 
preoccupation with the ‘old’ West Germany, with the chance to learn about its 
history in one of its most symbolic landmarks.  
   West Berlin’s link with western integration is further emphasised by 
landmarks visited by prominent American politicians. Standing in front of 
Rathaus Schönberg, the West Berlin city hall, US President John F. Kennedy 
declared in a speech that the now walled-in audience would be living on a 
‘defended island of freedom’ and that Americans would ‘take the greatest pride’ 
in this shared struggle to uphold this symbol of democracy. ‘There are many 
people in the world who really don’t understand, or say they don’t, what is the 
great issue between the free world and the Communist world. Let them come to 
Berlin’, said Kennedy.271 A few years later, speaking at the Siemens factory in 
West Berlin, President Nixon addressed workers, referring to West Berlin as ‘an 
island of freedom and prosperity, of courage and determination, in the centre of 
post-war Europe.’272 Indeed, by framing West Berlin as a symbol to the rest of 
the world, American presidents were not just equating the city with the United 																																																								
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States, but incorporating it into their own ‘imagined community.’ 273  The 
Amerika-Gedenkbibliothek, too, highlights a strong connection with the west, 
with donations coming from the U.S. to build a public library for the West 
Berlin population. Even the Brandenburg gate, a monument built in the 
eighteenth century, shares a strong personal history with East and West Berlin. 
As Neil MacGregor notes, ‘There is no building or site that speaks so 
powerfully to Germans everywhere of the division and the reunification of their 
country.’274 Again the links with the West were put on display when Ronald 
Reagan boldly stated to ‘Tear down this wall’. With the Berlin Wall situated 
right next to the Brandenburg gate, a symbol of division and unity grew in the 
consciousness of Berliners.  
  Aside from these Western links, photos of West Berlin landmarks 
continue to circulate both digital and print medias. Because of the 
implementation of digital photography it has become far easier to view life in 
West Berlin, highlighting how nostalgia can be a transferable phenomenon, 
easily shared amongst groups of people. It, too, is interesting not only as a way 
to document the past, but also as a contemporary expression of longing for West 
Berlin. Color photographs remind one of the ‘old’ West Berlin before the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, and even help in reproducing urban myths to drive tourism.275 
They document a part of Berlin’s postwar history, which has clearly become a 
thing of the past. The representation of a passive, secluded, utopian space the 
citizens in West Berlin created for themselves allows for an interpretation as 
nostalgia for escapism. Landmarks and areas highlight a city’s history for its 
inhabitants and tourists, suggesting that nostalgia for attractions can feasibly 
exist. West Berlin, a city filled with history from the Cold War, undoubtedly 
changed after the reunification of Germany.  
 
 
West Berlin Nostalgia in Popular Culture  
 
 
Of course, as a unique city in time and history, portrayals of West Berlin and the 
lives of its inhabitants in popular culture avenues such as film, literature, and 
even social media, are undoubtedly ubiquitous. In general nostalgia and popular 
culture are linked very closely, from Hollywood reboots of beloved franchises 
to modern pop music drawing influence from earlier examples. It is therefore 
necessary to analyse West Berlin nostalgia in popular culture, helping to 
understand how it has developed whilst also demonstrating its existence in the 
public sphere.  																																																								
273 Stefanie Eisenhuth and Scott H. Krause, ‘Inventing the “Outpost of Freedom”: Transatlantic 
Narratives and Historical Actors Crafting West Berlin’s Postwar Political Culture’, Studies in 
Contemporary History, Vol, 2, (2014), p. 199.  
274 Neil MacGregor, Germany: Memories of a Nation, (London, 2014), p. 15.  
275 Hanno Hochmuth, ‘Sehnsuchtsbilder’, p. 326.  
	 100 
In modern times, the dissemination of nostalgic tendencies in popular 
culture has become readily available to consumers, be it through ownership of 
physical media, or the growth of social media in the past few years. By the turn 
of the millennium, the culture of home entertainment still centred on the 
ownership of physical media, video store rentals, and repetitions in television 
programming. Allowing consumers a connection with older films, these 
examples of access brought images of past places into private households for 
personal consumption.276 Nevertheless, as the Internet and social-networking 
sites and apps have revolutionised a person’s access to information there is now 
a new form of consuming nostalgia. Internet forums, for example, act as 
multifunctional memory archives that give people who are interested in a past 
that is not simply their own a sense of amusement and sociality. They also 
provide a strong understanding of how nostalgia has developed in recent times 
and has made it much easier to find a community of people to discuss the past 
nostalgically.  
Most notably, films have played a prominent role in cultivating a sense 
of nostalgia in the Federal Republic. Referring to East Germany, Goodbye 
Lenin! and Sonnenalle were both viewed as nostalgic representations of the 
GDR, with both films presenting everyday life in the East. However, it is 
important to note that films even prior to the division of West Berlin highlight a 
Berlin that has come and gone with time. For example, Walter Ruttmann’s 
Berlin. Die Sinfonie der Großstadt (Berlin: Symphony of a Great City), released 
in 1927 and a cinematic document of Weimar’s golden years, presents Berlin as 
a modern, populous, and lively city. Brigitta B. Wagner notes that in the 
immediate post-wall era, Ruttmann’s film offered a usable past for a new Berlin 
to be influenced by, especially in light of the cities’ recent historical division 
and links to the Third Reich.277  Indeed, whilst Ruttmann’s film does not link 
nostalgia and West Berlin together, it does underline how media in the past 
influences people in the present, especially in terms of fragmented identities that 
were prevalent in West Berlin after reunification.  
Taking this into account, Leander Haußmann’s film, Herr Lehmann, 
offers the viewer a major example of nostalgia for West Berlin, as well as 
touching upon issues of identity in a changing city. Based on the novel by Sven 
Regener, the film tells the story of a young man seemingly out of touch with 
political events occurring around him, focusing more on the trials and 
tribulations of love and friendship. This film, however, is set before the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, and takes place in the former West Berlin district of Kreuzberg, 
geographically isolated from other parts of West Berlin as it was surrounded by 
Eastern sections of the city.278 The film depicts the stagnant everyday life of a 																																																								
276 Brigitta B. Wagner, Berlin Replayed: Cinema and Urban Nostalgia in the Postwall Era, 
(Minnesota, 2012), p. 12.  
277 Ibid, p. 26.  
278  Anthony Enns, ‘Post-Reunification Cinema: Horror, Nostalgia, Redemption’, in Terri 
Ginsberg and Andrea Mensch, A Companion to German Cinema, (Oxford, 2012), p. 118.  
	 101 
group of young West Germans, most of whom have moved to West Berlin from 
the FRG to evade being drafted for military service or to embrace the alternative 
lifestyle that was associated with the city. What is notable, however, is the lack 
of appreciation given to a key event in the Federal Republic’s history, the fall of 
the Berlin Wall.  
The film instead focuses on the personal life of its main character, Herr 
Lehmann, lessening the seriousness of the film’s historical context. 
Nevertheless, during pivotal moments in Lehmann’s personal life, he seems 
oblivious to the changing social and political changes unfolding in the GDR. 
When the Wall does fall, Lehmann, in a bar drinking, appears numb by the 
news, eventually waking his friend up to tell him of the events. When suggested 
by his friend to see the occasion in person, Lehmann responds, ‘drink up first,’ 
underplaying the significance of a pivotal moment in German history and 
making it seem like an insignificant moment in Lehmann’s difficult personal 
life.      
  For Lehmann, the fall of the Berlin Wall symbolises the end of his 
carefree and alternative lifestyle, recognising that the past is truly gone. In this 
sense, the depiction of such an event as an anticlimactic and uncertain moment 
matches the post-reunification response of failing to meet people’s lofty 
expectations, suggesting a deeper angst in the present. Yet the presentation of a 
comfortable bohemian lifestyle in blissful ignorance can be seen specifically as 
nostalgia for the old West Berlin with its special status and the chance of hiding 
from reality.279 Herr Lehmann, as an example of nostalgic cinema, highlights 
how change can affect a person’s sense of identity especially in the context of 
turbulent times such as the reunification of Germany. In comparison to Walter 
Ruttmann’s Berlin, seen as a positive influence on urban landscapes, Herr 
Lehmann stresses the importance of interpersonal relationships, along with the 
anxieties faced by changing circumstances.  
  Another example of nostalgia for West Berlin within popular culture 
can be found in David Bowie’s song, Where Are We Now?, released in 2013. 
Though the lyrics are simple and repetitive, they allude to an older person 
reminiscing about time spent in West Berlin, with references to key spots such 
as KaDeWe. Bowie, a former resident in West Berlin, demonstrates a sense of 
nostalgia driven to a lost time and place. The music video that accompanies the 
song, too, highlights areas of West Berlin and alludes to a sense of longing for a 
place that has changed dramatically. Its presence on YouTube, too, makes 
access to the song relatively easy. The website’s increasing collection of video 
and data is a prime example of how one consumes information in the digital 
age, as well as how nostalgia can surface. When cultural data is dematerialised, 
our capacity to store, sort, and access it is vastly increased and enhanced. The 
compression of text, images, and audio means issues of physical space no 
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longer deter us from keeping anything. Such advances in technology make it 
irresistibly quick and convenient to share information on a wide scale.       
It is, therefore, unsurprising that social networks have helped the 
dissemination of nostalgia. Social media websites like Twitter, Facebook, and 
Instagram arguably changed the structures, spaces and conditions of social 
communication, not just for a contemporary generation but also for preceding 
ones too. Internet forums with strong participative and interactive elements 
enable like-minded people to swap their stories and are, too, collecting points 
for nostalgia. True, as a lot of what is commented on social media is personal 
and therefore subjective, the validity of what is placed on such websites can be 
difficult to examine, especially in the search for authenticity of such nostalgia.  
  As mentioned previously, a common objection to nostalgia as a 
concept is the risk of creating false memories of the past, as well as its capacity 
to overlook and underplay important historical evidence, with Lessing’s 
definition of nostalgia as ‘poisoned itch’ as a useful example. Yet authenticity 
and nostalgia is not always as important in understanding how and why 
nostalgia developed in the first place. Nostalgia can be viewed as a tension 
between the past and present. In the context of certain issues, Westalgie is a 
clear indication of this. The present is marked as an unsatisfactory place while 
the past is a place to be celebrated. It is precisely these positive values and 
sentiments that are associated with the past that are presumed to be lacking in 
the present.280 Indeed, one of the first critiques of Ostalgie was its rose-tinted 
vision of the former GDR, seemingly forgetting the troubles most East Germans 
had to live with under the East German government.  
   Therefore, authenticity is not as important as previously believed by 
scholars studying nostalgia. This, in a sense, helps to analyse West Berlin 
nostalgia in a social media context. Today, one can easily access internet forums 
to discuss the ‘old’ Federal Republic, mostly in a positive manner. Mike 
Featherstone points out in a post-modern consumer culture, one’s connection to 
the past may be lost, which then leads to nostalgia for the past.281 Yet with the 
gradual increase in social media users the past decade, the potential for one to 
experience nostalgia has arguably increased. Indeed, it is much easier in today’s 
society to indulge in nostalgia, be it through sharing one’s past with likeminded 
people or accessing ‘vintage’ consumer goods online. The potential of nostalgia 
on social media is consequently important in analysing how and why Westalgie 
developed over time, not to mention it demonstrates its existence on a digital 
format.  
  One of the most prominent groups to discuss nostalgia for the ‘old’ 
Federal Republic is the Facebook group, the ‘West Berliner Mauerkinder’, 
where people can share stories, photos, and videos of a past that no longer 																																																								
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exists.282 The group’s creator, Jeanette Chong, argued ‘Westalgie reminds us of 
a world in which most was good and a little was bad.’283 Regular updates in the 
group highlight how different the former West Berlin is compared to 
contemporary times. Much of what is written can be considered nostalgia, 
especially with posted links to websites that compare Berlin’s landscape 
between the past and present. Yet the group, too, consists of former East 
German citizens to allow them to see how West Berliners lived, according to 
Chong.284 This, importantly, can help the two German identities coexist by 
being able to understand how East and West Germans lived whilst Germany 
was divided. Indeed, early in the new millennium much of the increased interest 
in Eastern consumer culture actually came from the West. One of the major 
distributors of East German products found that around 85 percent of its cliental 
was based in the West.285 Moreover, symbols of the GDR – most notably the 
Ampelmännchen – have been taken upon by Western entrepreneurs to appeal to 
a wide variety of audiences. Today, one can find shops selling Ampelmännchen 
memorabilia in the form of key chains, confectionary, and even pasta. 
Moreover, West Germans can indulge in Ostalgie by drinking Vita Cola or 
eating traditional East German meals. Using this logic, East Germans 
themselves can experience some form of Westalgie without actually being 
considered an authentic West German.  
Nostalgia for the West Berlin occurred because the ‘new’ Berlin 
contrasted heavily with its past roots. In this respect West Berlin nostalgia, 
shares a common trait with Ostalgie. At its most fundamental level, nostalgia 
for East Germany can help to remember facets of the GDR in a positive light. It 
can also be viewed as a way for East Germans conceptualise an ‘Eastern 
identity’ in reaction to their heritage being overlooked. This Eastern nostalgia 
therefore developed an identity that was unique compared to the West but also 
highlighted the positive aspects from East Germany’s heritage. Concerning 
West Berlin nostalgia, the process of identity formation is somewhat parallel to 
Ostalgie. Both rely upon shared experiences to shape a distinctive sense of self 
and both required the rupture of reunification to rationalise the desire to do so. 
More contemporary examples of West Berlin nostalgia such as the 																																																								
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aforementioned museum exhibition can be a rationalised as a reactive 
psychological process to foster and showcase a West German identity. Social 
networking websites, too, suggest the convergence of West Germans drawing 
upon their own experiences to share within a distinctive Western culture. 
  Drawing upon Davis’ view on nostalgia, the concept is readily 
employed by individuals to construct and form their identities. It can also 
provide a sense of social connectedness upon a collective group of people who 
experience nostalgia, thereby providing more positive associations with the 
past.286 Without a sense of identity, a person’s history and past experiences can 
be left redundant. Nostalgia for West Berlin, too, requires the individual to 
come to terms with a different environment. The city of West Berlin, only able 
to exist in the context of the Cold War, gave way once the Berlin Wall came 
down, and the capital of Germany was decided to be Berlin again. In a similar 
fashion to Ostalgie, identity formation amongst West Berliners stands as a 
principal explanation for why such a phenomenon can take place. In this sense, 
people from West Berlin can subconsciously apply their sense of discomfort 
caused by reunification to compare and contrast life between the two republics 
of Germany. Even though West Germans did not need to adjust to a new 
political and economic system to the same extent as East Germans, and although 
they did not share a common past under an oppressive regime, they still faced 
concerns regarding their own heritage and identities.287 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 
Nostalgia for West Berlin is unique in the sense that it is a form of localised 
nostalgia for a specific part of the ‘old’ Federal Republic. It is, too, distinctive in 
that it exists alongside Westalgie, although the two are not the same 
phenomenon. As previously stated, West Berlin throughout its lifetime retained 
a special status within Germany. Isolated, but also considered a legal extension 
of the FRG. Its inhabitants, credited with creating an alternative lifestyle that 
was attractive to certain outside observers, also contributed to the distinctive 
sense of identity amongst West Berliners. This is important to note, as nostalgia 
for West Berlin is seemingly different to Westalgie from a conceptual 
standpoint. For one, there are certainly clearer examples of nostalgia for West 
Berlin found in popular culture than with Westalgie. As such, it is far easier to 
demonstrate the existence of nostalgia for West Berlin as opposed to West 
Germany. Furthermore, these two sets of nostalgia are essentially different 
phenomenon. Westalgie indicates a negative reaction to developments in the 																																																								
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Federal Republic. This could relate to changes in foreign policies or 
multicultural discourses to highlight a few examples. West Berlin nostalgia, 
however, is more comparable to Ostalgie in the sense that it refers to a 
distinctive environment that has changed significantly, and whose inhabitants 
have faced an identity crisis following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Such a 
relationship between the two phenomenon contributes to the complexities 
concerning Westalgie. Though the two refer to sense of nostalgia for the ‘old’ 
Federal Republic, due to the exceptional situation West Berlin was in during the 
forty years of separation, they largely diverge from each other.  
As a city closely connected to the history of the Cold War, and by 
extension divided Germany, West Berlin developed an identity that evolved and 
changed after the reunification of Germany in 1990. In regards to any West 
German and West Berliner that may feel some form of nostalgic sentimentality 
for the ‘old’ Federal Republic, the reunification of Germany facilitated enough 
change in their lives to help nostalgia develop. The changing landscape of 
Berlin has, too, facilitated a sense of differentiation between the past and 
present. Because of such changes to their lives, generations of West Germans 
can detail their past stories to a broad number of people, either to share their 
histories with likeminded people or to show how one lived in the past. The 
digital era has arguably had an effect on the cultivation of nostalgia in the public 
sphere. Before, one found it difficult to note their nostalgic tendencies to people. 
Yet with the help of social media, it is now easy to share thoughts and feelings 
related to the past. West Berlin is clearly no exception to a nostalgia trend. 
Museum exhibitions highlight its history; landmarks celebrate the heritage of 
West Berlin; films detail the stories of the city’s inhabitants; and social media 
has allowed generations of West Germans to discuss the past to a number of 
people. Not only does this demonstrate the existence of a West German 
nostalgia, but a localised nostalgia for a city that no longer exists.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
 
The ‘old’ Federal Republic was a success story, even if one ignores the direct 
comparisons between the FRG and the GDR. It recovered from the Second 
World War to become a responsible and leading world power, thus creating its 
own rich histories and legacies. Now that contemporary Germany is different to 
life under both East and West Germany such legacies are much more noticeable 
from both sets of Germans. Nostalgia among West Germans developed at a 
slower pace but also highlighted varying degrees of difference between the 
Bonn and Berlin Republic. This specific case of nostalgia seems fragmented in 
terms of what it refers to, but at least helps one to understand how change has 
affected West Germans years after the reunification of Germany. Likewise, it is 
clear that the Berlin Republic is not a continuation of the West German model, 
but rather a variation of it. The effects of globalisation, the fear of terrorism, and 
European integration are but a few examples of the different challenges the 
Berlin Republic faces in the present day.  
This thesis has attempted to examine a few issues in relation to the 
phenomenon of Westalgie. Firstly, it has highlighted that such a concept can 
exist within modern day Germany and therefore should be given attention to via 
scholarly research. Secondly, it has demonstrated that Westalgie is a broad idea, 
being able to be found within the political, economic, and social aspects of 
everyday life in the Federal Republic. Thirdly, while nostalgia for West 
Germany can be considered to exist in said aspects, it is not necessarily the 
driving force behind the criticisms of modern day developments. Indeed, in the 
case of German multiculturalism, there are clear examples of nostalgia being 
exhibited from the likes of Thilo Sarrazin and the AfD. Nevertheless, they both 
refer to a period that either did not exist (as nostalgia can sometimes suggest), or 
even a time that predated the ‘old’ Federal Republic. It is therefore challenging 
to assess the impact of Westalgie in broad terms. Criticisms of certain 
developments within modern day Germany are by no means solely related to 
nostalgia for a time that no longer exists. As previously stated throughout this 
thesis, pragmatic concerns can often be considered more relevant to explain 
why one could be against any social, political, or economic change in modern 
times.  
  Take, for example, the issue concerning the Federal Republic’s 
perception of the Euro since its introduction after the new millennium. Indeed, it 
can be said that the loss of a national symbol in the form of the Deutschmark 
may have unearthed some form of nostalgia for something that contributed to 
the legacy of the ‘old’ Federal Republic. Yet does this mean that West 
German’s would forgo the Euro, and by extension European integration, in 
favour of their previous currency? Ultimately, the performance of the Euro will 
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have more of an impact on public perception for the currency rather than a 
nostalgic appreciation for the Deutschmark.  
  Throughout this thesis the complexities of Westalgie have been widely 
noted, highlighting the fact that it is a rather case-specific phenomenon that is 
very much unlike its East German counterpart. Ostalgie is a much easier 
concept to grasp in spite of its far more detailed historiography. It was more so a 
reaction to the unprecedented pace of reunification that changed the lives of 
East Germans. The concept is, too, more readily apparent because of the fact 
that everyday life in the GDR was so fundamentally different to life in West 
Germany. Consumer goods that East Germans used were quickly replaced, the 
East German economy suffered, unemployment was a reality, and the allure of a 
Western capitalist model was found to be rather different than what was 
expected. East Germans could rightly feel nostalgic for a period of their life that 
was different before the reunification of Germany. Ostalgie also helped to allay 
the processes of reunification by cultivating a sense of identity amongst East 
Germans. They could highlight the unique aspects of life in the GDR through 
the commercialisation of the phenomenon and by the stories told in film and 
literature. True, there has been some debate concerning whether such factors 
glorify a part of German history that in certain respects was controversial. Yet 
for East Germans, the concept of Ostalgie is not a desire to bring back the East 
German government, but to appreciate and acknowledge specific elements of 
the former GDR.  
West Germans, on the other hand, did not face the same level of rupture 
that East Germans experienced. Indeed, they did experience the negative effects 
of reunification such as rising unemployment levels and increasing taxes. 
However, the changes that West Germans experienced were not related to 
reunification, but rather developments that occurred more so in the new 
millennium. Modern day Germany became more active on the world stage, 
changed its currency, changed its capital city, and therefore faced issues that 
could not have happened in the past. This stresses the point that Westalgie does 
not refer to the changes brought on by reunification, but more so by the 
developments of the Berlin Republic, an obvious difference to Ostalgie. 
Furthermore, the concept is not as noticeable as one would assume, explaining 
why academic discussions on Westalgie are both limited and underdeveloped.  
When discussing what the concept of what Westalgie is, it seems 
pertinent to address the varying definitions of nostalgia that were mentioned in 
the introduction. Of course, as mentioned previously, Peter’s argument that 
nostalgia is more so related to homesickness is redundant in the case of West 
Germans as it was the West German system that shifted eastwards, not the other 
way around. Yet Atia and Davies’ view that nostalgia is the bittersweet side 
effect of modernity as well as a potential cause of hostility to the changes that 
modernity brings seems quite relevant in this case. Westalgie is undoubtedly a 
reaction to changes that were experienced in the new millennium for West 
Germans. However, as outlined in the preceding chapters, such hostilities to 
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developments can also be down to more rational concerns like how the Federal 
Republic presents itself on the world stage. It is therefore not so crucial to view 
every criticism of the Federal Republic as an example of nostalgia for the ‘old’ 
Federal Republic. It is, too, important to stress that Westalgie is not so much a 
‘poisoned itch’ as Lessing would suggest with her definition of nostalgia. As 
with the case for Ostalgie, both sets of nostalgia seemingly do not make matters 
worse for the recipient, but allow one to critically engage with present day 
developments. Moreover, Westalgie lacks the same level of commercialisation 
compared to Ostalgie, because Western brands were not afforded the same level 
of treatment compared to Eastern brands. West Germans did not lose their 
consumer goods, thereby making it difficult to develop an identity like East 
Germans could with their relationship with their consumer goods. This also 
negates Lowenthal’s view that the commercialisation of nostalgia can lead to an 
inauthentic outlook on the past.   
  More importantly, this suggests that Westalgie is not so much about the 
creation of a Western identity but, as previously stated, the development of 
critical discourses in contemporary times. West Berlin nostalgia, however, is 
different in that respect and should be considered separate from nostalgia for 
West Germany. Identity formation seems much more pronounced when 
examining West Berlin and the concept of nostalgia as it is clear that, much like 
East Germans, West Berliners faced change on a somewhat similar level. The 
unique aspect of the city was rendered obsolete once Germany was able to 
reunify. It was no longer an ‘island in the red sea’ once the GDR fell, and thus 
its distinctive feeling could easily give way in reunified Germany. Indeed, as a 
central part of West Germany’s history, it remains important to discuss the 
impact of nostalgia for West Berlin, simply because there exists a wide array of 
examples of such nostalgia that even seems to outnumber nostalgia for West 
Germany. Yet closer inspection reveals that it may have more in common with 
Ostalgie than it does Westalgie, adding to the complex discourse of Westalgie 
overall.  
Where then should research concerning Westalgie progress? Of course, 
as one of the first studies on the concept in written English, this thesis has 
attempted to broadly examine various factors that have feasibly been affected by 
nostalgia for West Germany. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that more 
research can be given to each individual aspect outlined in this project, allowing 
for a more focussed and sophisticated analysis of the phenomenon. 
Furthermore, as the concept of nostalgia is becoming increasingly prevalent in 
modern Western societies, it seems appropriate to analyse how nostalgia is 
apparently affecting countries other than the Federal Republic politically. As 
previously mentioned, the process of Brexit can be considered to be influenced 
by nostalgic tendencies, as a narrative of the vote leave campaign was the 
notion of Britain returning to its former glory. Even the U.S. Presidential 
elections in 2016 highlighted a sense of nostalgia, with Donald Trump’s slogan 
to ‘Make America Great Again’, suggesting that America could return to the 
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apex of world influence. Understanding how nostalgia has impacted political 
developments elsewhere will allow for a transnational approach that could shed 
greater light on Westalgie. This, too, would allow for comparative studies 
between differing countries that would help develop discourses concerning 
nostalgia and its potential political influence.   
Nostalgia for West Berlin and its relationship with Westalgie can also be 
given more attention considering how vastly different the two sets of nostalgia 
appear to be. The fact that nostalgia for West Berlin can be considered separate 
from Westalgie, means one could analyse such nostalgia in a very narrow sense. 
Localised case studies on West Berlin and nostalgia are still underdeveloped 
and therefore the opportunity to analyse it in greater detail is apparent. 
Moreover, one could also investigate other prominent West German cities to see 
whether localised nostalgia exists in places other than West Berlin. Bonn, for 
example, would be a useful case study considering that it used to be the capital 
of West Germany and developed a legacy of its own throughout the forty years 
of separation. Above all, this would help to emphasise how widespread 
Westalgie is or, as West Berlin nostalgia has highlighted, how separate localised 
nostalgia has developed over time in major West German cities.  
Another issue not discussed due to the scope of this thesis is the legacy 
of the German student movement of 1968. The protests, developed in part by a 
reaction against the perceived authoritarianism of Western governments, were 
noticeable legacies of the Bonn Republic, as well as the city of West Berlin. 
Moreover, the protests arguably had an effect the ‘old’ West Germany as a 
certain strata of citizens challenged the U.S. war in Vietnam, the hypocrisy of 
the German government, as well as the apparent repressive educational system. 
Students, who were not alive during the Third Reich, disputed their 
accountability in the crimes committed by a generation before them. This 
critical spirit of the movement, above all, rebelled against the bourgeois morals 
of the political establishment. Now, fifty years later, one can see a similar sense 
of revolt against the modern-day establishments not just in the Federal 
Republic, but also in other Western countries. Trump’s electoral success, was 
arguably down to the perception that he was ‘anti-establishment’, especially in 
direct comparison to his opponent, Hilary Clinton, who had ties with former 
presidents. Regarding, Britain’s decision to leave the European Union, Michael 
Gove’s statement that British people had ‘had enough of experts’ suggests a 
sense of anti-intellectualism and distrust in established institutions. Even the 
AfD in the 2017 Federal Elections highlighted their anti-establishment rhetoric 
and their electoral success suggests that some Germans may share similar 
thoughts. Obviously, these specific examples refer to right-wing political 
developments compared to the left-wing inspired protests in the sixties. Yet the 
underlying theme from these instances is a sense of displeasure in modern 
establishments. As such, one could ask whether these ideals of rebellion against 
the so-called establishment have resurfaced in recent times. Have they been 
influenced in part by the legacy of the 1968? If so, does this relate to a sense of 
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nostalgia for West Germany? Comparatively analysing the methodologies, 
motivations, and strategies of the student movement and today’s anti-
establishment groups may shed a greater light on how contemporary 
developments have occurred.  
To conclude, Westalgie is a far more complex phenomenon on closer 
inspection. To view it in the same manner as Ostalgie would ultimately suggest 
that the two are identical in their development and how they interact with those 
that feel nostalgically for the FRG or the GDR. This, of course, is incorrect as it 
is clear that nostalgia for East Germany predates the development of Westalgie. 
Added to this is the fact that examples of Ostalgie are far more widespread and 
obvious, from its commercial aspects to its ability to engage with East German 
identity. This contributes to the complexities of Westalgie and stresses how 
unique of a phenomenon it is. This specific form of nostalgia warrants greater 
investigation to help contextualise perceptions, both past and present, of the 
political, economic, and social developments in the Federal Republic. 
Generations of East and West Germans will continue to occupy the vast number 
of identities within contemporary Germany for the foreseeable future. 
Understanding how nostalgia affects these sets of strata in German society is 
therefore necessary to recognise differing opinions that contribute to critical 
discourses in the present day.   
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